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1 Introduction: Comparative 
perspectives on gender in Japan 
and Norway 
Masako Ishii-Kuntz,  
Guro Korsnes Kristensen,  
and Priscilla Ringrose   
Gender equality in Japan and Norway 
Both Japan and Norway are advanced economies with highly developed 
technological infrastructures. They ranked highly in the United Nation’s 
2020 ‘Human Development Index,’ which lists Norway at the top and 
Japan at 19th out of 189 countries and territories (United Nations, 2020). 
Japan’s ranking is the second highest (after Hong Kong) among East Asian 
countries. Most importantly for the focus of this volume, we note that both 
the Japanese and Norwegian governments have been making concerted and 
sustained efforts to promote gender equality at all societal levels. 
These two nations, however, differ significantly in terms of historical, 
cultural, geopolitical and socio-economic backgrounds. We cannot ignore 
the fact that Japan scores much lower than Norway when it comes to 
achieving gender parity in economic and political participation as evidenced 
in the WEF’s ‘Gender Gap Report’ (2021). In line with this, Norway is 
often portrayed as a pioneer nation in gender equality. Indeed, gender 
equality is also claimed to be at the core of the Norwegian cultural identity 
(Danielsen et al., 2013; Gullikstad et al., 2016). Japan, on the other hand, is 
better known for its lack of gender equality and emphasis on separate 
gendered spheres, as exemplified by the extensive application of gender 
segregation. This is somewhat surprising, given that it is a wealthy, secular 
country with a highly educated population. Additionally, the COVID-19 
crisis, and the subsequent closure of children’s schools, has widened the 
gender gap in Japan, accelerating the domestic demands and decreased 
employment opportunities for women. The pandemic has also had a ne-
gative impact on gender equality in the Norwegian context. As Norwegian 
Prime Minister Erna Solberg declared in her speech about COVID-19 to the 
Reykjavik Global Forum – Women Leaders 2020, ‘The pandemic’s impact 
on women has been evident in our own country as well. We see that unpaid 
care work at home is not evenly distributed between men and women. 
Women spend more time than their partners on household chores and 
taking care of their children, no matter how much they work outside the 
home’ (Thorbecke, 2020). 
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While Japan and Norway are ranked very differently in WEF’s ‘Gender 
Gap Report,’ aspects of the Norwegian labour market complicate this po-
larised picture of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ or ‘pioneer’ and ‘backward’ states in 
regard to gender equality. For example, the Norwegian labour market is 
highly gender-segregated along occupational lines (Reisel et al., 2019), and 
Norway is among the countries with the largest STEM gender gaps in 
education (Stoet and Geary, 2018). And, while Norway is considered to be 
a bastion of gender equality, it has a long history of ignoring its problems 
with domestic racism, including widespread social mistrust of non-Western 
immigrants, a bias it shares with Japan. 
A few words on the definitions of gender and gender equality are in 
order. Certainly, feminist and queer theory, LGBTQ activism and legal 
innovations have complicated conventional notions of gender. However, 
many of the sources explored in this volume, from laws and public policies 
to the popular culture of TV comedies and advertisements, uphold a nor-
mative view of a cisgendered binary. Families tend to be defined as com-
prised of a male-identified father married to a female-identified mother, 
who typically raise two children. Nonetheless, our volume strives to include 
analysis of the experiences, legal challenges and resistances of those who do 
not conform to this binary. 
This volume also shows how definitions of ‘gender equality’ have 
changed over time in Japan and Norway, both reinforcing and challenging 
historical beliefs, concerns for national identity and welfare, and individual 
human rights. The aim of this anthology is to understand how gender is 
intertwined in the dimensions of family and home, education, media, 
sexuality and reproduction by comparing these issues across the two 
countries. In doing so, we take an open approach to the notion of gender 
equality, noting the changes in its definition in the two contexts and ex-
ploring the ways in which gender equality has been inflected globally. This 
exploration aims to capture cross-cultural similarities and differences, with 
cultural meaning-making in focus. In this introductory chapter, we start by 
outlining this comparative approach before contextualising the overall 
study by looking at broad historical and sociodemographic dimensions 
around gender in both Japan and Norway. We conclude by introducing the 
individual chapters. 
Exploring gender equality in Japan and Norway: The 
challenges and opportunities of cross-cultural research 
This volume investigates the forms and contents of gender equality from a 
localised and historicised perspective, taking into account the concept’s 
complexity and fluidity. Such an approach interrogates universalist as-
sumptions and understandings of gender equality and assumes that gender 
intersects with other socially differentiating categories such as sexuality and 
socio-economic class (Cho et al., 2013; Davis, 2008; Manalansan, 2006;  
2 Masako Ishii-Kuntz et al. 
Purkayastha, 2012). Writing about the challenge that qualitative re-
searchers face when attempting to reconcile complexity, detail and context, 
especially when undertaking cross-cultural research, Mangen refers to the 
crucial importance of ‘reflexivity,’ by which is meant ‘the ability of re-
searchers to take stock of their actions and their role in the research process’ 
(Mangen, 1999, p. 110). Mangen deferring to Silverman’s recommenda-
tions (1993) comments that when undertaking cross-cultural research, 
where attempts at ‘wide contextualization’ are often insufficient to provide 
adequate understanding of the phenomena being investigated, researchers 
should avoid being tempted by ‘polar explanatory opposites’ and be open 
to multifaceted analysis (1999, 110). In examining gender equality across 
Japan and Norway, we too strove to be open to comparative perspectives 
which did not pit both countries as polar opposites in terms of gender 
equality. Rather, we sought to remain open to the many paradoxes of 
equality and the challenges common to both countries, whether it comes to 
areas like work–home balance, restrictions on assisted reproductive tech-
nologies (ARTs) or the lived experience of trans people. 
Salway et al. (2011) point to other potential challenges which cross- 
national comparative research brings into play including developing 
meaningful conceptual frameworks adapted to both contexts and avoiding 
generalised or essentialised categorisations within national contexts in the 
interest of synchronisation. They also caution against the tendency to 
produce analyses at the superficial level that reinforce independent country 
descriptions rather than generating integrated insights. Additionally, we 
need to remind ourselves that in some chapters due to the fact that the 
researchers and most of their interview participants, especially in Japan, 
were able to speak English, our interviewees had experiences of gender that 
may be distinct from the majority of those in Japan. 
At the same time, Salway et al. (2011) assert that there are many ways in 
which cross-national comparative research can potentially strengthen the 
rigor and utility of research by researchers engaging in both ideological and 
methodological reflexivity. They also point to the potential of such research 
to raise awareness of the social and historical contingency of conceptual and 
methodological frameworks, as well as direct more attention to the need for 
research that has to take on board wider geopolitical contexts (Salway et al., 
2011). Cross-national research also allows researchers to look at familiar 
data from new perspectives, questioning fixed groups and categories and 
engaging in analyses which take into account local, national and global 
impacts on specific phenomena (Salway et al., 2011). When employing such 
multi-layered analytical perspectives, cross-national research teams benefit 
from productive exchanges of ideas and experiences, which often result in 
conceptual and methodological innovation (Salway et al., 2011). 
The starting point of this book occurred through such an exchange of ideas 
and experiences between two research teams. It is part of an ongoing col-
laborative project entitled Norway–Japan: Bridging Research and Education 
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in Gender Equality and Diversity, which is funded by the Research Council 
of Norway (2020). Most of the researchers contributing to this volume are 
affiliated either with the Center for Gender Studies of the Norwegian 
University of Science and Technology (NTNU, Trondheim) or the Institute 
for Gender Studies (IGS) at Ochanomizu University (Tokyo). These authors 
have a range of disciplinary backgrounds, including gender studies, sociology, 
anthropology and film studies. The collaboration has proved productive for 
several reasons. Namely, the project has increased awareness of the socially and 
historically embedded nature of gender equality, enhanced our appreciation of 
the need to take into account both localised perspectives within Japan and 
Norway as well as wider sociopolitical and geopolitical considerations, 
and, finally, drawn our attention to critical reflectivity in terms of our metho-
dological choices. 
As a result of the exchange of ideas across research teams, most of the 
chapters are co-authored by both Japanese and Norwegian researchers, 
while others have been authored by a researcher from one national context 
with feedback from researchers in the other context. The researchers en-
gaged with a variety of data, including questionnaires, interviews, govern-
mental documents, advertisements and films. We have used different 
comparative methods, including generating parallel data in both countries, 
comparing similar types of data (such as policy documents relating to si-
milar thematic areas) and comparing cultural products which shared 
themes. For example, for Chapter 7 on women in academia, Norwegian 
researchers interviewed academics in both Japan and Norway on their 
career trajectories, using the same interview guide. While the research was 
mostly undertaken by researchers from Norway, Japanese colleagues 
helped with the recruitment of informants and interpretation of results. In 
Chapter 10 on trans experiences in Japan and Norway, another interview- 
based chapter, the Norwegian interviews were conducted alone by the 
Norway-based author, while in Japan the two authors conducted the ma-
jority together. 
In the chapters based on documentary or media analysis, language con-
straints necessitated that Japanese and Norwegian researchers worked on 
each data set separately. As Mangen (1999) notes, the linguistic dimension 
of cross-cultural research cannot be disengaged from the cultural context, 
nor from the specific way the discipline(s) involved have evolved within the 
national context. Chapter 12 on ARTs for example brought together two 
specialists in reproduction in both national contexts, who analysed policy 
and media documents in Japan and Norway, before identifying points of 
common concern and interest. 
Finally, a couple of the chapters discuss cultural phenomena. In Chapter 
8, two Norwegian researchers compared two historical comedies that 
parody modern men’s working and domestic lives in Japan and Norway. A 
Japanese colleague assisted the authors in their study of the Japanese film by 
providing an English transcription of the script, details on the historical 
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background, feedback on their interpretations of the films and wider 
knowledge on the generic antecedents of the Japanese filmic genres in-
volved. Such collegial dialogues across all the chapters were crucial to en-
gendering the new perspectives which cross-cultural research affords. 
Gender equality in Japan and Norway: A brief historical 
review 
The year 1970 marks the beginning of Norway’s second wave feminist move-
ment, as it was the year the Norwegian Association for Women’s Rights or-
ganised its first large meeting in Oslo (Danielsen et al., 2013). In the following 
months, many women’s groups formed across Norway, increasingly attracting 
media attention. These groups discussed various issues, including women’s 
housing problems and labour force participation. Although the issues were di-
verse, the second wave feminism increased women’s solidarity across different 
layers of the population by encouraging women to join forces to realise gender 
equality. Representing a different sensibility of women, these widespread 
movements marked a significant departure from the first wave feminism, which 
had had a limited impact on Norwegian society (Blom et al., 2005). 
In 1970, a new women’s liberation movement called ‘Woman Lib’ emerged in 
Japan from the New Left and radical student movements of the late 1960s. This 
movement was in sync with radical feminist movements in the United States and 
elsewhere. The activists forwarded a comprehensive critique of the male- 
dominated nature of modern Japan, arguing for a fundamental change in the 
political–economic system and culture of the society. What distinguished them 
from previous feminist movements was their emphasis on the liberation of 
women’s sexuality. They did not aim for equality with men, but rather focused 
on the fact that men should also be liberated from the oppressive aspects of a 
patriarchal and capitalist system. The Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1979 was ratified by the Japanese government in 1985. 
The brief overview of the history of feminism and the related movements 
reveals striking similarities between Norway and Japan. In both nations, though 
gender equality and women’s rights were considered important agendas since 
the mid-19th century, women’s suffrage was not introduced until the first half of 
the 20th century. Additionally, in both countries, it was the second wave fem-
inism which fervently pushed for women’s rights and gender equality. These 
similarities are especially noteworthy given the differences in the degree of 
gender equality in contemporary Norwegian and Japanese societies. 
Structure of the volume 
This book is organised according to contributions that address various 
dimensions of gender-related issues in Japan and Norway. It is divided into 
five parts, plus an introduction and a concluding chapter. Altogether, there 
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are 14 chapters that focus on issues related to gender in Japan and Norway. 
These chapters all share the common theme of looking at gender issues 
from comparative perspectives. 
Given that the home is perhaps where many of us initially encounter 
gender roles, PART I analyses how strongly notions of gender are em-
bedded in Japanese and Norwegian domestic spheres. This is thematised in 
a review of the historical literature as well as in the chapters on con-
temporary domestic issues such as fathers’ participation in childcare and 
housework. PART II analyses how gender is intertwined in education in 
both contexts by presenting a historical overview of the relationship be-
tween gender and education, home economics education, feminist educa-
tors’ attitudes towards pedagogy and academic career trajectories of 
women. PART III covers gender as it is portrayed in films and advertise-
ments. Specifically, the chapters engage with the framing of masculinities in 
Viking and Samurai comedy films, and in television advertisements’ pre-
sentations of the balance between a newly emerging kind of work and home 
life during the COVID-19 in Norway and Japan. PART IV presents issues 
related to sexuality, fertility and assisted reproduction. In particular, it 
analyses the modes of political positioning of trans people, the meanings of 
fertility and family planning and the development of regulations concerning 
assisted reproduction technologies in Japan and Norway. In PART V, we 
present a dialogue between two senior feminist scholars in Japan and 
Norway, reflecting on their involvement with feminism from their coming 
of age to their arrival into academic posts, and to holding positions of 
academic leadership within gender studies. 
This volume itself may be only a small step toward our goal of studying 
various dimensions of gender-related issues in Japan and Norway. 
Nonetheless, it is a significant departure from previous studies that ex-
amined gendered practices in everyday life in only one societal context or 
regional framework. 
Family and home 
In the chapter ’Gender and Home in Japan and Norway: Considering the 
Past and Contemplating the Future’ (Ch. 2), Guro Korsnes Kristensen, 
Priscilla Ringrose and Masako Ishii-Kuntz address the gendered meanings 
typically ascribed to the home in the two national contexts. To explore this 
question, they conducted a review of a wide range of contemporary re-
search publications and media in Japan and Norway. They also describe the 
history, changes/transitions and present situations concerning the home to 
show that gender and home are closely intertwined in both countries. In 
particular, they draw attention to the differing amounts of time fathers and 
mothers devote to housework and childcare, suggesting ways in which 
social campaigns and cultural mores have promoted equal participation as 
an ideal. 
6 Masako Ishii-Kuntz et al. 
Masako Ishii-Kuntz’s ’Caring Masculinity: Fathers’ Childcare in Japan and 
Norway’ (Ch. 3) focuses on gender equality in the home as demonstrated by 
fathers’ involvement in childcare and housework. Analysing various publicly 
available nationwide data on men and women’s participation in domestic 
chores in both countries as well as web survey data collected in 2020, the 
author finds that Norwegian men are more likely to be involved in childcare 
compared to their Japanese counterparts. In both countries, however, it is 
also shown that mothers are likely to be the main provider of childcare. 
Reasons for these persistent gendered practices at home are discussed by 
taking into account similarities and differences with respect to cultural and 
sociodemographic characteristics in the two countries. 
Education 
Ryoko Kodama, in ’Education and Gender in Japan and Norway from 
Historical Perspective’ (Ch. 4), describes historical research trends in gender 
and education in Japan and Norway. In Japan, although gender as analy-
tical concept shaped research generally in the 1980s, its introduction to 
educational research specifically was delayed because of a myth that gender 
equality had already been realised in post-war Japanese education. The 
author analyses statistical data collected by the governments on education 
in the two countries to show the gender gap in university enrolment and 
major fields, teacher ratios in preschools to universities and their salaries. In 
’Creating More Equal Partnerships: Home Economics Education and 
Gender Equality in Japan and Norway’ (Ch. 5), Jennifer Branlat and Junko 
Sano present the history of Home Economics education in Japan and 
Norway. Based on its history as a segregated subject for girls and young 
women, they ask how the subject area in its current form contributes to 
reducing inequalities within the home and the role it has to play in. pro-
moting a gender-equal society in the two countries. This chapter is based on 
qualitative interviews with teacher practitioners and university-level faculty 
in teacher training, as well as on analyses of teaching plans and curricular 
texts in both Japan and Norway. 
Jennifer Branlat’s contribution, ‘Teaching with Feminist Values: A 
Dialogical Narrative Analysis of Gender Studies Educator Narratives’ (Ch. 6), 
examines gender studies education in Japan and Norway, a topic on which 
little research exists in either country. To compare feminist educators’ 
attitudes towards pedagogy, Branlat conducted in-depth interviews with 
professors in gender studies. She covered issues such as teachers’ and 
students’ motivation for working or learning in the gender studies field, 
uniqueness of and the challenges faced by the field, the relations of gender 
studies to broader society and the kinds of pedagogy needed for today’s 
society against the gender backlash. Branlat also questions whether a 
theoretical framework grounded in feminist pedagogy can be used trans-
nationally to tackle these questions. In ’Making it in Academia: A Study of 
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Career Narratives of Men and Women Professors in Norway and Japan’ 
(Ch. 7), Vivian Anette Lagesen, Guro Korsnes Kristensen, Siri Øyslebø 
Sørensen and Derek Matsuda examine the career narratives that emerged 
in their in-depth interviews with men and women professors in Norway 
and Japan to shed the light on the gendered dimensions of academia in the 
two countries. 
Media 
In ‘Masculinity in Contemporary Viking and Samurai Comedies: “It’s Not 
Really Me, That Fear-Based Leadership Style Stuff”’ (Ch. 8), Jennifer 
Branlat and Priscilla Ringrose analyse two recent popular productions, the 
sitcom series Vikings/Vikingane (created by Jon Iver Helgaker and Jonas 
Torgersen, 2016) and the film Samurai Shifters/Hikkoshi Daimyo (directed 
by Isshin Inudô, written by Akihiro Dobashi, 2019) to illuminate crises of 
masculinity in Norwegian and Japanese popular culture. Both comedies 
serve to defamiliarise contemporary societal pressures on men by staging 
them in a past dominated by militaristic, hegemonic hierarchies. But 
whereas both comedies are concerned with the unattainable imperatives of 
modern ‘caring,’ ‘sensitive’ manhood, the Norwegian series focuses on its 
‘excesses’ while the Japanese comedy more light-heartedly affirms its ega-
litarian values. 
With Chihiro Wada and Roger A. Søraa’s contribution, ’Work–Life 
Balance and Equality Observed through Advertising during the COVID-19 
Pandemic in Japan and Norway’ (Ch. 9), we move into one of the most 
recent and urgent situations surrounding gender equality, namely the gen-
dered (re)distribution of domestic labour amidst the rise of home office. 
They investigate how advertisements geared to national audiences represent 
Japanese and Norwegian households’ ways of dealing with the balance 
between a new kind of work and home life. Specifically, they examine how 
advertisements envision balancing working at home during the pandemic 
while accomplishing necessary housework and caregiving. The authors 
focus on the presentation of certain domestic tasks as gendered, analysing 
how gender intersects narratives about the balance between work and home 
in everyday life. 
Sexuality and reproduction 
Exploring gender equality from a different perspective, france rose hartline 
and Kei Ishimaru’s chapter, ’The Struggle to Belong: Trans and Gender- 
Diverse Experiences in Japan and Norway’ (Ch. 10) compares the collected 
interview narratives of trans-identifying people from Norway and Japan. 
They analyse the individuals’ modes of political positioning and experi-
ential sense-making amidst the changing political climate of their respective 
countries. By comparing the two contexts for how trans people view 
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institutional conditions for security and reshape their experiences in resti-
tutive ways, the authors show how the globalising trans movement’s 
ideologies are translating into practice in Norway and Japan. 
In ’A Matter of Gender (In)Equality? Public Discourses on Declining 
Fertility Rates in Japan and Norway’ (Ch. 11), Guro Korsnes Kristensen 
and Yukari Semba explore the meanings that are ascribed to fertility and 
family planning when these issues are discussed publicly in Japan and 
Norway, asking whether and how gender and nation are made relevant to 
these debates. This chapter is theoretically situated within the field of bio-
politics and population control, and the data material consists of news-
papers and other news media items in both Japan and Norway published 
between 2018 and 2021. The authors identify three issues inciting public 
fears concerning fertility and family planning in Norway – the low fertility 
rate among ethnic Norwegians, high fertility among the immigrants and the 
environmental problems associated with global population growth. They 
also discuss how the declining birth rate in Japan is attributed to delayed 
marriage by women and the concomitant rise in the maternal age at 
childbirth. 
Merete Lie and Yukari Semba, in ’Assisted Reproduction with Donated 
Eggs and Sperm: A Comparison of Regulations on Assisted Reproduction in 
Norway and Japan’ (Ch. 12), examine the development of Norwegian and 
Japanese regulations concerning assisted reproduction with donated gamete 
(eggs and sperm) within a feminist theoretical framework. Debates about 
reproduction imply explicit and implicit discussions of gender difference, 
sexuality, heteronormativity and the question of what constitutes a family – a 
field with marked differences but also similarities in the two countries. In 
both Japan and Norway, a clear divide has existed between the legality of 
sperm donation and the prohibition on egg donation. A radical change took 
place when both countries legalised egg donation from 2020/2021. Analysing 
data consisting of official government documents, announcements and re-
ports from academic and professional groups, and information from news-
papers and other news media on political debates, the authors explore the 
ways in which cultural notions of gender, gender difference and gender 
equality in the two countries have influenced the debates and resulted in the 
recent amendments of legal regulations and professional guidelines. 
Dialogue 
’Becoming a Feminist Academic in Japan and Norway: A Dialogue with 
Professors Masako Ishii-Kuntz and Agnes Bolsø’ (Ch. 13), facilitated by 
feminist scholar Jennifer Branlat, breaks with the academic format of the 
previous chapters and offers a discussion between two senior academics 
regarding their personal views on feminism, academia and gender equality 
in Japan and Norway. In this dialogue, Agnes Bolsø and Masako Ishii- 
Kuntz reflect on their long academic careers, engaging in a thought- 
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provoking conversation on what feminism has meant to them and how it 
has impacted their different life stages. Coming of age in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s in different national contexts, each was influenced by the 
second wave feminism. Taking up issues such as sexuality, class, nation and 
power relations, they describe how feminism has represented a trans-
forming energy along their journeys. 
Conclusion 
In ‘Comparative Perspectives on Gender Equality in Japan and Norway: 
Reflections and Lesson Learnt’ (Ch. 14), the editors reflect on findings, 
convergences and divergences between the two national cultures which the 
book has brought to light, discuss theoretical and empirical lessons learned 
and make practical policy recommendations. Furthermore, they consider 
lessons learned about cross-national and interdisciplinary research in this 
highly politicised field. 
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Family and home  

2 Gender and home in Japan and 
Norway: Considering the past 
and contemplating the future 
Kristensen Guro Korsnes,  
Ringrose Priscilla, and Ishii-Kuntz Masako   
What is a home and what does gender have to do with it? 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss and compare the ways in which gender 
and home are intertwined in Japan and Norway, exploring both their his-
toric and contemporary contexts. Our overarching focus is the gendered 
meanings that have been and are presently ascribed to the home in Japan 
and Norway. We use our discussions of this meaning-making to reflect on 
what we can learn from national particularities and similarities across the 
two contexts in the light of today’s globalised world, and to contemplate 
potential trends relating to the gendering of the private sphere. 
In sociological and cultural research, the notion of home is often ascribed 
a straightforward empirical meaning. It is defined as a place of shelter, a 
space where people live, sleep, eat and provide or receive care. Importantly, 
the home enables people to withdraw from the outside world into a private 
sphere. In line with this, Carsten (2004) describes the home as a central 
place for the creation of family ties, given that relations of kinship often 
emerge ‘through the intimate sharing of space, food, and nurturance’ 
(p. 35). In most societies, the home is conflated with family, whether 
structured as a nuclear family or as an extended family combining several 
generations and/or many relatives (Carsten, 2004, p. 35). Moreover, the 
notion of the home often evokes a sense of attachment and belonging, in the 
sense that the expressions ‘being at home’ and ‘feeling at home’ connote 
being at peace and feeling comfortable (Moore, 1984). The home has also 
been described as a haven from the pressures of the outside world, as well as 
a site for leisure and recreation (Carsten, 2004). 
At the same time, these rather idealised understandings of the home have 
been contested by other strands of research. These often examine the home 
as a potentially unsafe space for children, women, the elderly and others 
who are at particular risk of domestic violence. Similarly, scholars find that 
home may not signify stability or safety for migrants. In line with this, 
migration research points to the many millions of migrants who for various 
reasons have left their homes behind in exchange for more or less tem-
porary residences in a new region, country or continent (Chatterjee, 
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forthcoming 2022). Finally, another significant way of understanding the 
modern notion of home is to see it as a gendered realm, a private ‘feminised’ 
space strongly associated with the world of women. This stands in contrast 
to the ‘masculinised’ public sphere, more closely aligned to the domain of 
men (Erel, 2011; Lister, 2003; Pateman, 1989; Solheim, 1998). 
Taking our inspiration from these general accounts of ‘the home,’ we 
‘home in’ on the Norwegian and the Japanese contexts to ask: What gen-
dered meanings are ascribed to the home in the two national contexts, both 
historically and today? What similarities and differences can we see? What 
are the most significant issues which emerge when gender is at stake? 
Research methods 
To explore these questions, we surveyed a wide range of social science and 
cultural studies research publications from Norway and Japan which 
engage with the concepts of home and gender in either Norway or Japan. 
These texts include both quantitative and qualitative studies and cover 
both historical and contemporary perspectives. Whereas the quantitative 
studies provide information about the statistical patterns relating to the 
Norwegian and Japanese home and domestic life, the qualitative studies 
provide insights into the cultural meanings that are attached to the 
Norwegian and Japanese home and to everyday life within the home 
historically and today. 
We conducted online searches by using the search words ‘home and 
gender’ and ‘gendered notions of the home’ combined with ‘Norway’ or 
‘Japan’ in standard academic search engines and databases. As homeowners 
living in and feeling a sense of belonging to Norwegian or Japanese homes 
ourselves, we also draw on our personal experiences and observations as 
insiders, whereas our position as outsiders to the other national context has 
helped us identify tacit knowledge which would otherwise not have found 
its way into the text. 
As Irene Cieraad notes in At Home: An Anthropology of Domestic Space 
(1999), even though it is generally taken for granted that cultural concep-
tions of the home have some kind of national particularities, there are re-
latively few comparative studies in this field. In this chapter, we use 
comparison as an analytical tool to draw our attention towards similarities 
and variance. The overarching aim of the comparative perspective as we 
approach it is to reveal unique aspects of each national context that would 
be hard to detect otherwise (Mills et al., 2006). 
The Norwegian home 
Scholarship on the ‘Western home’ views it as a distinct entity, a social con-
struct which has undergone dramatic changes as a result of the processes of 
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modernity and the rise of capitalism. These forces have transformed the home 
from a site centred around the family as a self-sufficient production unit to a 
place where women are fulfilling their supposed ‘natural mission’ to clean, care 
and cook, and where men working outside the home can retreat (Lasch, 1977). 
This change created a new, highly gendered division between the private 
(home) as associated with women and the public (work) with men. Following 
this, a discourse emerged glorifying women’s role in homemaking, and cele-
brating the home as her ‘haven’ (Solheim, 2007; Somerville, 1997). 
Home ownerships and trends 
The home is not only the cornerstone of the Norwegian way of life; it is 
a personal and highly adorned castle, where time and money are 
invested, and where life unfolds. (Brusdal, 2006, p. 35)  
This statement about the Norwegian home echoes the perspectives of other 
researchers in both the Humanities and the Social Sciences, who present the 
home as a very important part of Norwegian life – on both practical and 
ideological levels (Gullestad, 1992; Solheim, 1998). Compared to many 
other national contexts, including European ones, home ownership is very 
common in Norway. Currently eight out of ten Norwegians are home-
owners, and 98% can expect to own a home at some time in their lives.1 
This trend has its roots in post-war national policies which explicitly aimed 
at creating a nation of homeowners. 
The post-war home envisioned in Norwegian housing policies was po-
pularly known as ‘two rooms and a kitchen’ – meaning a simple apartment 
with one living room, a bedroom, a bathroom and a kitchen for a couple 
and their two children to share. This meant that the whole family would 
often share one bedroom. In contemproary Norway houses and appa-
rtments are expensive (particularly in urban areas), and, as such, they 
usually represent a family’s greatest investment and most important eco-
nomic asset. Moreover, due to the steady rise in house prices over the last 
decades, housing has become an important market for investors. To buy a 
home in Norway, you must obtain mortgage approval from a bank before 
you can even start viewing houses or apartments. Property prices are de-
termined as a result of a bidding process. This means that only those with 
inherited wealth, a very high income, or previous beneficial investments in 
the housing market can afford a detached home in an inner-city district. 
High property values in urban Norway mean that many city dwellers to 
live in small homes, whereas rural residents typically enjoy much more 
spacious dwellings. In both urban and rural areas today, a large number of 
single occupant households exist. In 2020, 39% of Norwegian households 
were single occupant households, and the average size of Norwegian 
households was 2,15 persons (Andersen, 2020). Whereas most Norwegians 
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at some time in their adult life live with another person or their own chil-
dren, multigenerational households are rare in Norway. In the case of 
student accommodation, however, the custom of cohabitating with peers is 
widespread. Even though Norwegians have relatively spacious homes, 
many also own a modest cottage (‘hytte’) in the mountains or holiday house 
by the coast. These cottages and holiday houses are used for weekend 
holiday breaks and function as second homes (Brusdal, 2006). 
Another important aspect of the Norwegian home is the strong concurrence 
between the house and the family, and, more specifically in the 20th and 21st 
centuries, between the house and the nuclear family. According to the social 
anthropologist Marianne Gullestad, the most important function of the 
Norwegian home is to provide a setting for modern intimacy (Gullestad, 
1993). As Gullestad formulates it, ‘Norwegians do not only have houses, they 
have homes. The word hjem (home) brings together in one notion both the 
idea of a place and the idea of social togetherness associated with this place’ 
(Gullestad, 1993, pp. 88–9). The home functions as the family’s ‘territory,’ 
and the house is where its intimacy is played out (Gullestad, 1992). This 
conflation between family and home is also very much the case with the 
second homes (the cottage or the holiday house), as they are often handed 
over from one generation to the next, after years of overlapping use involving 
various cross-generational activities (Døving, 2020). Whereas children move 
out of the ordinary family home when they grow up, no one moves out of the 
cottage or holiday house. In this sense, the house, that is the first home, is 
more oriented towards the nuclear family, whereas the second home is more 
oriented towards the extended family (Døving, 2020). 
At the same time, the Norwegian home is also a significant site for in-
teraction with friends and sometimes even colleagues, both informally and 
for more organised parties and celebrations. Whereas pubs, parks, etc., are 
important meeting places in many other countries, in Norway the home is 
often the default setting for social activities beyond family ties. This means 
that the Norwegian home, especially the kitchen and living room, and ev-
eryday life in the home in these spaces is somewhat more public and also 
more on display than in many other countries. Following from this, the 
home is for many Norwegians a life project where identity is both con-
structed and communicated. According to Gullestad (1993), Norwegians 
‘use the home to create and express their specific ideas of identity and in-
timacy’ (p. 89). Renovation and home decoration are important parts of 
this life project. Occupants’ selection of colours, furniture and special 
consumer goods tell other people what kind of persons are living here 
(Brusdal, 2006). When it comes to interior aesthetics, a ‘good’ Norwegian 
home has traditionally been imagined as cosy, informal and warm (Brusdal, 
2006; Gullestad, 1993, 2002; Lorentzen, 2008). In the past decades, this 
warm cosiness has in part been replaced by a more ‘clean and functional’ 
‘Scandinavian design,’ as it is presented and sold in, for example, the 
Swedish furniture chain IKEA. 
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The cosiness of the old times, as well as the more functional ‘modern’ 
style, have been and to a great extent still are the responsibility of women, 
who would typically be the ones hanging up the paintings on the wall and 
lighting the candles in the living room in the evenings, and it is women’s 
identities which are most symbolically projected onto the interiors and style 
of the Norwegian home (Gullestad, 1984/2001). It is not surprising then 
that women consume far more home decoration magazines than men, in 
which they also figure much more predominantly as the lead consumer/ 
decorators. In line with this, women are more frequent consumers of fur-
niture and other home decoration items than men. In times where gender 
equality is an ideal, men have, however, been increasingly entering the 
domestic arena. Still men tend to be more associated with the exterior 
housework, where they do more of the work, whereas women are still 
envisioned as the ones ruling inside (Kristensen, 2016). According to social 
anthropologist Runar Døving (2001), this association between women and 
the home has often been misinterpreted as some kind of oppression of 
women, yet quite a few women are enjoying their role in the home and find 
it to be a means of expression and creativity, using this position to exercise 
power in terms of making decisions regarding the family’s social networks 
and daily routines. Examples of rather typical Norwegian homes are found 
in this photographs (Figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5). 
The home in the housewife era and in times of gender equality 
Whereas Norwegian men have traditionally been responsible for the fi-
nancial aspects of home ownership, as well as for maintenance work on the 
exteriors (and partly also interiors) of the home, as we have seen, women 
have traditionally been responsible for turning houses into homes. This was 
particularly true in the increasing affluence of the post-war era, when men, 
as the family’s breadwinners, provided financially for the family while their 
wives spent their days taking care of their children and fulfilling their role as 
professional, though unpaid, housewives and home makers – cooking, 
cleaning and caring from morning till night (Danielsen et al., 2014). While 
the housewife era can be dated back to the 19th century with the estab-
lishment of the housewife schools, it is the 1950s which are most often 
described as the golden age of the housewife (Lorentzen, 2013). 
Home décor, which in the 1950s and 1960s had become available and 
affordable for more families, was also an important part of this gendered 
work of turning houses into homes (Døving, 2001). The high standards 
women maintained in the home bore the vestigial influence of the 
Norwegian public housewife schools’ training, which spread across 
Norway from the late 1800s to the mid-20th century (Avdem & Melby, 
1985; Hagemann & Roll-Hansen, 2005). Their aim was to professionalise 
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‘women’s work’ in the same way as the agricultural schools professionalised 
men’s farm work (see Ch. 6 for more information). These schools created 
homemaking as a specialised arena which was reflected in the professio-
nalised standards of housekeeping in private homes (Avdem & Melby, 
1985; Hagemann & Roll-Hansen, 2005). 
This traditional model was challenged in the 1970s by the feminist 
movement as Norway gradually transitioned to today’s dual earner/dual 
carer model of gender equality, where both men and women work and care 
for their children (Danielsen et al., 2014; Ellingsæter & Leira, 2006). As a 
result of women being more invested in paid work outside the home, the 
number of hours they currently spend on housework is low relative to 
previous decades, while on the other hand, men now take a more active 
role in housework and care work (Danielsen et al., 2014; Kitterød & 
Lappegard, 2012). However, mothers of young children spend more time 
Figure 2.1 Norwegian living room; photograph by Guro Korsnes Kristensen.  
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on household work and less time on paid work than fathers of young 
children (Statistisk Sentralbyrå [SSB], 2018, p. 22). Having said this, gen-
dered disparities during this stage of life have significantly reduced over the 
years, since fathers with young children spend more time on household 
work and less on paid work than previously, while the opposite is true for 
mothers. In 1980, the time that fathers spent on housework was 21% of 
that of the mothers, whereas in 2010, the proportion was 55% (SSB, 2018, 
p. 23). For fathers, the time currently used on caring for the family amounts 
to 64% of the time spent by mothers, compared to 44% in 1980 (SSB,  
2018, p. 23). Whereas the post-war home was a site for women to ‘do 
gender’ in a traditional way, with clearly differentiated tasks and respon-
sibilities for women and men, the dual earner/dual carer model for gender 
equality somehow transformed the home into a site for ‘doing’ gender 
equality. 
The modern Norwegian home – Gender equality as stress 
This new way of organising domestic tasks means that the actual doing of 
what Bridged Anderson (2000) once labelled the three Cs (cleaning, 
cooking and caring) in the home since the 1970s has become a way for 
Figure 2.2 Norwegian kitchen; photograph by Guro Korsnes Kristensen.  
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individuals and couples to become gender equal and to be seen as being 
gender equal. This means that the home is now considered the main domain 
where gender norms and gender equality ideals should be embraced, ne-
gotiated, and challenged (Døving, 2001; Klepp, 2006; Kristensen, 2017). 
According to sociologist Helene Aarseth (2011), Norwegian middle-class 
dual earner/dual carer couples who embrace the political and cultural ideal 
of gender equality turn all domestic tasks, including maintenance and 
construction work, into a self-realisation project where each member of the 
couple actively collaborates with the other in a ‘gender-neutral’ way. In line 
with this, Norwegian fathers’ engagement in childcare is also seen as a 
typical expression of the Norwegian style of gender equality (Danielsen 
et al., 2014). 
The other side of the coin is that the dual earner/dual carer model for 
gender equality has also turned the home into a site for arguments about 
Figure 2.3 Traditional Norwegian house; photograph by Guro Korsnes Kristensen.  
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domestic labour, and thus of the undoing of gender equality (Kristensen, 
2016). Even though a lot of men have increased their efforts with cooking, 
cleaning and caring as more women have taken on paid work outside the 
home, this has not been enough to maintain the high standards of cleanli-
ness carried over from the previous era’s custom of female-dominated 
housework and home-making (Kristensen, 2016). Today, the combination 
of high cleaning standards and favourable economic circumstances mean 
that more and more Norwegians own an increasing number of ‘things’ and 
have an increasing amount of mess to be cleaned up in their increasingly 
spacious first homes, as well as in their second homes. And even though 
welfare state provisions for families have increased over this same period, 
this situation has been described as having led to a ‘time-bind in relation to 
the home-work balance, in particular for families with young children 
(Kristensen, 2016; 2017). 
For many Norwegian families, the time-bind – in part created by high 
standards for the cleanliness and style of their homes – is a pressing chal-
lenge which they attempt to solve in a variety of ways (Danielsen et al., 
2014). One widespread solution which women opt for is to reduce their 
working hours (to continue) to take on the role of the primary homemaker 
(Kitterød & Lappegård, 2012). Another solution to the time-bind is for 
couples to pay a third party to assist with domestic tasks. Compared to 
many other European countries, Norway does not have a history of hiring 
paid domestic labour. This was particularly true in the post-war era, when 
Figure 2.4 Norwegian house; photograph by Priscilla Ringrose.  
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social democratic ideologies introduced a strong focus on public welfare 
and equality and when notions of social hierarchies and servitude were 
explicitly rejected (Sollund, 2010). In the last decades, however, this seems 
to have changed, as the employment of various kinds of domestic labourers 
has steadily grown in parallel to the growing pool of migrant labourers 
(Kristensen, 2016). The most common forms of paid domestic labour in 
contemporary Norway are in the areas of home cleaning and au pairing. 
Whereas the au pair arrangement, which in legal terms is  regulated as 
cultural exchange and not work, is today most widely used by women from 
the Philippines (Utlendingsdirektoratet [UDI], 2020), the home cleaners 
are more often migrant women from Eastern Europe (Friberg & Tyldum, 
2007). Overall, au pairing is a much more marginal phenomenon in 
Norway than home cleaning, but it has nevertheless shown rapid growth 
in recent years (Kristensen, 2017). 
These developments mean that more Norwegian families are outsourcing 
tasks that were traditionally labelled female but which today, in line with 
the dual earner/dual carer model of gender equality, are ideally expected to 
be shared between the couple. This also means that more and more families 
are employing an extra person who is not part of the family to help keep or 
take charge of keeping the house tidy and clean. Whereas this part-time 
Figure 2.5 Norwegian house; photograph by Guro Korsnes Kristensen.  
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employee helps keep the home clean and cosy even when the ‘woman of the 
house’ is out working, she also ‘disturbs’ the Norwegian home as the site of 
the nuclear family, and paradoxically she also represents a partial return to 
a time when the three Cs were not part of men’s repertoire and when the 
home was a place for relaxation and not work. 
The Japanese home 
In the contemporary East Asian context, home usually means a place in 
which members coexist by providing essential physical and psychological 
care for each other. Historically, however, East Asian homes also func-
tioned as a hierarchical unit based on age and gender. That is, elderly male 
members of the family controlled the household budget, and the eldest son 
and heir eventually assumed leadership from his father. In Japan, this pa-
triarchal system, associated with the samurai class, is known as the ie 
system, which is also translated as ‘household,’ denoting both the physical 
home, the family members and the family lineage. Under this ie system, the 
father was given absolute authority over individual family members in 
making all the important decisions, including the selection of an adult 
child’s occupation and marriage partner. The Meiji Civil Code which went 
into effect in 1898) incorporated much of the ie system, retaining the power 
of the household head and making the family the basic unit of modern 
Japanese society; this Code remained in effect until the post-war reforms of 
the late 1940s. 
Although such strictly patriarchal homes have largely disappeared in 
many contemporary East Asian countries, where partners have been as-
cribed equal status in the home, there still remains a strong emphasis on 
women’s roles as mothers and homemakers and men’s roles as breadwin-
ners (Ishii-Kuntz, 1994; Smith & Schooler, 1978) that can be traced to 
these traditional beliefs about the home. While the term ‘good wife, wise 
mother’ sounds outmoded, one still finds motherhood defined as women’s 
primary mission in Japan. 
In Japan, the home ownership rate was approximately 61.2% in 2018, 
and has remained relatively unchanged since 2003 (Kettenhofen, 2021). 
Out of all the residential buildings in Japan, detached houses are the most 
popular, and the majority of ordinary Japanese households live in detached 
houses. The home ownership rate, however, varies considerably depending 
on the regions of residence. In larger metropolitan areas such as Tokyo, this 
rate is 45%, whereas in rural Akita, a north western prefecture, home 
ownership is the highest for all of Japan at 77.3%. Additionally, of the 
homeowners in the Tokyo area, 44.1% own condominiums rather than 
detached houses. The most popular floor plan of these urban con-
dominiums is called 2LDK (2 rooms with a living+dining kitchen and a 
bedroom) and is similar to the small Norwegian urban family space. The 
smaller condominiums may reflect the fact that there are many more 
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nuclear families living in larger cities and many more extended families 
living in smaller cities. Examples of typical Japanese homes in urban and 
rural areas are seen in the photographs (Figures 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9). 
Home ownership has often been considered a dream for many Japanese as it 
symbolises the entry into true adulthood as well as long-term economic security. 
Also, as in Norway, home ownership represents a family’s largest investment 
and most important financial asset. This trend seems particularly evident among 
Japanese men whose bread-winning responsibility is still considered their 
dominant role. Japanese homes, especially in less populated areas, are the places 
where family events such as birthdays and new year celebrations take place. This 
may not be the pattern in large cities because of the availability of many family 
restaurants and other gathering places as well as the relatively small sizes of 
homes. Other than these family events, large gatherings with relatives and 
friends are not common in Japanese homes. This can be explained by the clear 
division between public and private spheres in which home is considered the 
most private place to which even relatives and friends are not usually invited. As 
a result, Western type large gatherings which take place in private homes and 
gardens, such as barbeque parties, are very uncommon in Japan. Because of this 
public–private division, even co-workers and colleagues in Japanese workplaces 
may have no idea about each other’s homes. 
Figure 2.6 Japanese apartment buildings; photograph by Masako Ishii-Kuntz.  
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In Japan, as in Norway, many magazines are devoted to homemaking 
and home décor that frame women as the main consumers/designers, and 
Japanese, too, struggle with an excess of things in their homes, a phe-
nomenon that gave rise to the popularity of decluttering experts such as 
Marie Kondo. 
Another recent trend regarding Japanese homes is the shut-in (hiki- 
komori) phenomenon. This issue refers to the population of young men, 
who are frequently eldest sons, that have shut themselves off from the 
world by retreating in their bedrooms. Although a small percentage of 
young women have become shut-ins, too, the issue is mainly associated 
with men; many of these men continue to keep up this social withdrawal 
even as they reach middle-age and their (financially supporting) parents 
become elderly. 
The historical Japanese home as a gendered institution 
Of all the social institutions in Japanese society, home is perhaps where 
gender inequality is most constantly displayed. According to the report of 
the Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office (2016), approximately 44.7% 
and 37% of Japanese men and women, respectively, think that it is better 
for men to be breadwinners and women to be homemakers. Men’s parti-
cipation in childcare and housework is quite limited, with an average of 
Figure 2.7 Japanese house; photograph by Juliette Ringrose.  
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1.4 hours per day spent on these activities. This is considerably lower than 
the figure for women (7.6 hours). In addition, many Japanese believe in 
the so-called ‘three-year-old myth,’ which emphasises the critical role mo- 
thers play in their children’s first three years of ‘healthy’ psychological 
development (e.g., Tama, 1985). Several studies in Japan also point out 
how traditional gender roles are learned at home with lasting impact on 
women’s and men’s educational and career choices (e.g., Sasahara, 2008). 
In the following, we will briefly present the historical antecedents of the 
modern-day gendered home. 
The concept of ‘home’ first appeared in the 1880s during Japan’s Meiji 
period, which marked the rise of women’s homemaker roles (Muta, 1996). 
Within the aforementioned ie system, brides marrying into the family found 
themselves under the strict supervision of their mothers-in-law, felt pressure 
to produce male heirs and had few rights in divorce or to property. In 
common with other East Asian family models, the ie system upholds 
Confucian values of loyalty, which demand that family members show 
respect to the household head (Kitano, 1976). In the late 19th century, 
Japanese intellectuals coined the term ‘good wife, wise mother,’ blending 
Victorian notions of women’s place in the Christian home with Confucian 
values of loyalty, to argue for women’s education and their modern role in 
Figure 2.8 Japanese kitchen; photograph by Masako Ishii-Kuntz.  
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childrearing, domestic management and the creation of a patriotic, thrifty 
household. 
In the succeeding eras, the gendered division of household labour came to 
be firmly accepted in Japanese families. This sharp division of women and 
men’s roles at home continued during the post-war economic boom from 
the 1950s to the 1970s. During this period, Japanese salaried men were 
frequently called ‘corporate warriors’ who dedicated their lives to their 
companies. Many women, in contrast, became ‘professional housewives’ 
and kept themselves busy taking care of their husbands and children 
at home. 
Since the 1980s and especially after the collapse of the bubble economy in 
the early 1990s, several incidents and demographic shifts necessitated three 
major changes in women and men’s roles in Japanese homes. First, several 
shocking cases of child abuse and child killing by mothers were reported in 
Figure 2.9 Japanese living room; photograph by Masako Ishii-Kuntz.  
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the Japanese media in the 1980s, which consequently led to the collapse 
of the ‘maternal instinct myth.’ In addition, Makino (1982) found that 
mothers’ isolated home environments and lack of husbands’ childcare in-
volvement increased levels of maternal stress and anxiety. These findings 
also contributed to the re-evaluation of home and family roles for many 
Japanese couples. 
Second, Japan’s birth rate began to decline in the late 1970s. The decline 
in fertility continues today, raising the government’s concerns over the 
shortage of labour force in the near future. One ‘solution’ that the gov-
ernment has been promoting is to increase men’s involvement at home 
assuming that paternal involvement would encourage their wives to have 
more babies. Several governmental campaigns to increase fathers’ partici-
pation in childcare since 1999, for example, have contributed to raise 
awareness among Japanese people of the importance of paternal involve-
ment (Ishii-Kuntz, 2013). 
Third, there has been an increase in labour force participation among 
Japanese women, including those of childbearing age. According to the 
Labour Force Survey (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. 
Statistics Japan, 2016), 57.1% of women aged 25 to 44 were employed in 
1986, but this figure increased to 72.7% by 2016. With this increase, many 
married women and men have found it necessary to reassign their roles 
at home. 
The modern Japanese home as a gendered space 
Despite several attempts to bring about equality in women and men’s roles 
at home, we still see that these roles are sharply divided by gender. As a 
result, women are more likely than men to experience work-life conflict. 
Encouraged by the Government’s Act on Promotion of Women’s 
Participation and Advancement in the Workplace fully enforced in 2016, an 
increasing number of Japanese women have been entering the labour force 
in recent years. However, many women find it rather difficult to realise their 
work–family balance mainly due to the shortage of day care centres as well 
as to the lack of support of their bosses and co-workers. 
Despite the increasing conflicts that Japanese women are experiencing 
between work and family demands, outsourcing of childcare and house-
work is still uncommon in Japanese homes, unlike in Norway. Nagai 
(2016) reports an increase since the mid-1990s in terms of the costs of 
outsourcing cooking. However, the outsourcing of cooking includes pur-
chasing ready-made foods at the supermarket and eating out at restaurants, 
but does not include the real labour of cooking in the home. Additionally, 
the cost of outsourcing housework constitutes only 0.03% of total house-
hold expenditures, which implies that for many Japanese homes, this not a 
common phenomenon. This may also be explained by the hesitancy that 
many Japanese express towards allowing ‘outsiders’ to enter their homes. 
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In summary, with an increase of women’s labour force participation, the 
sharing of familial roles at home has become a necessity in Japan. In reality, 
however, as discussed in chapter 3, men still work longer hours than do 
women, thus many fathers find it difficult to be involved in childcare and 
housework. Women, on the other hand, are burdened by an overwhelming 
amount of family and work demands. Unless there are major structural and 
attitudinal changes, gender equality at home may not be realised in 
Japanese society in the foreseeable future. 
The social meaning of the home: Similarities and differences 
In this chapter we asked: What gendered meanings are ascribed to the home 
in Norway and Japan, both historically and today, and what kind of si-
milarities and differences can we see? What are the most significant issues 
which emerge when gender is at stake? 
From the analysis, we have learnt that both Japan and Norway show a 
trend toward single household occupancy, with almost one-third of the 
households being single occupied. Also, in both countries, separate spheres 
for productivity for women (home) and men (work outside) have been 
celebrated in popular discourse, codified in law, instrumental in devising 
education plans, and naturalised through decades of practice. In Norway 
there were housewife schools which taught women to become proper 
homemakers, whereas in Japan, the ‘good wife, wise mother’ ideology of 
the late 19th to early 20th centuries served to educate women and imbue 
them with a mission. Even as domesticity no longer describes many 
Japanese women’s lives, we can still see their influence in women’s strong 
feelings about motherhood and the home as a venue of creativity. 
In both cases, we note that the home is still a gendered sphere where 
women continue to be most responsible for housework and for childcare, 
although more recently there have been shifts towards men taking more 
responsibility, in both contexts. At the same time, the Norwegian dual 
earner/dual carer system and the parental leave system have gone a long 
way towards normalising fathers taking on childcare and spending more 
time on housework. This is helped by the relatively short working day for 
both men and women, which means that in principle both parents are at 
home from late afternoon. This stands in contrast with the long working 
hours expected in Japan, especially for men, which precludes many men 
from undertaking as much household and childcare duties, and which puts 
a relatively greater burden on working mothers. 
Despite the contrast between Norway and Japan in terms of working 
hours, in Norway, there is still a lot of discussion about the ‘time bind.’ 
When addressing this time bind, it is taken for granted that somehow a 
couple should at least in principle be gender-equal when dealing with time 
stresses. At the same time this ‘gender equality’ is sometime achieved by 
Gender and home in Japan and Norway 31 
outsourcing domestic work to non-Norwegian women cleaners, para-
doxically reinforcing the traditional feminised domestic sphere of the 
housework era of Norway. In Japan, recent debates have similarly re-
inforced that achieving a work–family balance is high on the public 
agenda, as campaigns for day-care facilities have shown. 
The main difference between Norway and Japan is that in Japan a very 
strict distinction is maintained between the public and private spheres. 
Whereas the Japanese home is very much a private space where it is rare for 
‘outsiders’ to the family to be invited, the Norwegian home is more likely to 
be a space where visitors are welcomed. Having said that, open hospitality 
is not as common in today’s Norway as in, for example, Southern European 
countries, and immigrants report that they find Norwegian people generally 
reserved, and that they are very rarely invited into Norwegian homes 
(Penner, forthcoming). However, while Norwegian families can mitigate 
this pressure by outsourcing hourswork to (most often migrant and female) 
domestic labourers, this is not a possibility in Japan, given the tightly 
guarded domestic sphere and the greater reluctance to allow outsiders into 
the home. 
Either way, gender relations are changing in both countries and the world 
is getting more international. Japanese homes are also decorated with fur-
niture from IKEA, and Norwegian home owners are talking about Japanese 
minimalism and zen when discussing their home décor. It remains to be 
seen how global trends interacting with local customs and needs will shape 
the home and its potentially gendered identity in the future. 
Note  
1 Eiendom Norge. Den norske boligmodellen. https://eiendomnorge.no/om-oss/ 
visjon-og-verdier/den-norske-boligmodellen 
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3 Caring masculinity: Fathers’ 
childcare in Japan and Norway 
Masako Ishii-Kuntz    
Fatherhood: A brief history 
This chapter examines fathers’ involvement in childcare in Japan and 
Norway since the 1990s, a pivotal decade marked by major policy changes 
in parental leave that have had far-reaching consequences. After reviewing 
the major policies enacted from the 1990s to the present, we will examine 
how they may have affected fathers’ involvement in childcare by reviewing 
publicly available statistics relating to parental leave. Second, looking closer 
at what factors may be related to the levels of fathers’ childcare partici-
pation, we consider a range of social and ideological factors predicting 
paternal involvement. We will do this by constructing and examining a 
model by a multi-sample structural equation analysis. In particular, this 
model looks at how intersectional dimensions, such as employment status, 
education and age, predict men's gender ideology, which, in turn, influences 
men's childcare involvement. What insights does the model provide into 
explaining the extent of fathers’ childcare within and across both national 
contexts? How are some factors differentially affecting fathers’ childcare 
involvement in both countries? These are some of the questions to be ad-
dressed by the statistical analyses of the data collected in Japan and Norway 
in 2020. 
The historical review of modern Norwegian fatherhood is typically di-
vided into three main periods in which notable changes in the position of 
fatherhood occurred (Lorentzen, 2013). The first period of 1850–1927 is 
represented by fathers in farming business. During this period of pre- 
modernisation, the sharing of work and household responsibilities between 
mothers and fathers was common (Lorentzen, 2013). A shift to in-
dustrialisation and urbanisation in 1927–1970, however, positioned fathers 
as the main economic providers. In the third period of 1970–2012, fathers 
again became very involved in childcare. This coincides with ‘women’s 
entry into the workplace, women’s demand for equality’ (Lorentzen, 2013, 
p. 110) which may have contributed to the collapse of the gendered division 
of household labour. In 1985, a national Commission on the Role of Men 
was formed to discuss the subject of men and gender equality. In 1991, the 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003185222-3 
Commission issued its final report entitled ‘Men and Care’ which empha-
sised, among other things, the importance of mothers and fathers having 
equal entitlement to parental leave. It recommended instituting a ‘father’s 
quota,’ whereby fathers would receive four-weeks paid parental leave, and 
if they did not take this leave, they would lose that much childcare leave 
time. The Commission gave three reasons for recommending the father’s 
quota: The need to ensure equality between fathers and mothers, fathers’ 
needs to care for their children and the children’s needs for more contact 
with their fathers. In 1993, the father’s quota was formally established in 
the new national parental leave policy. 
In Japan, too, industrialisation and urbanisation affected the role of fa-
thers. Although a few studies report that Japanese fathers were involved in 
educating and disciplining their sons in Edo period (1603–1868) (Ohta, 
1994), childrearing became naturalised as the primary task of mothers 
throughout the Industrialisation Era. As in Norway, urbanised post-war 
Japanese society positioned fathers as breadwinners outside the home and 
mothers as primary caregivers within the home. It was not until the 1990s 
that the Japanese began paying more attention to fathers’ roles and diverse 
types of fatherhood (Ishii-Kuntz, 2013). This increasing attention can be 
attributed to the so-called ‘1.57 (fertility) shock’ of 1989, which marked the 
beginning of governmental efforts to establish family-friendly laws and 
policies, including campaigns for increased paternal involvement, to boost 
the nation’s birth rate. The diversity of views about fatherhood was also 
debated in the 1990s. On the one hand, conservative critics advocated for 
the strong presence of fathers as authoritarian figures, as Hayashi (1996) 
wrote in his book Fusei no Fukken (Restoration of Paternity). On the other 
hand, several books about involved fathers were written by men who took 
childcare leave, and who went on daily one-hour ‘strikes’ to take their 
children to day-care centres (Otoko mo onna mo ikuji jikan o renrakukai, 
1995; Tajiri, 1990). A confluence of factors contributed to the increasing 
attention to fatherhood in the 1990s: The decline in fertility and the sub-
sequent government campaigns promoting paternal involvement, father-
hood research in developmental psychology, the introduction of men and 
masculinity studies to Japanese academia and general public, research on 
mothers’ childcare stress and anxiety in family sociology, and the emer-
gence of men’s and fatherhood movements. 
Parental leave policy 
Norway: The father’s quota 
Today, Norwegian family policy is widely known for its generosity and for 
its significant role in supporting both high female labour-force participation 
and men’s involvement in childcare. Although the state provision for 
childcare remained incomplete well into the 1980s, the introduction of the 
Caring masculinity 37 
father’s quota in the 1993 parental leave policy certainly enhanced 
Norway’s journey to gender equality in the area of domestic chores. 
Essentially, the father’s quota system gave Norwegian fathers four weeks 
of ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ parental leave. Before the introduction of this system, 
only about 3% of men took paternity leave. Initially, Norway’s rationale 
for establishing fathers’ childcare leave and the quota system was to pro-
mote gender equality, a response to the agenda taken up by the strong 
women’s movement in the beginning of the 1990s. Scholars such as  
Sainsbury (1996) would suggest that the paternity leave can be seen as 
breaking the male breadwinner model as well as granting father’s individual 
right, but the parental leave and the quota system in Norway are not 
exactly based on an ideology of individual rights. 
Despite the ideological battle over gender equality and individual rights 
discourse surrounding the father’s quota over the last two decades, the 
research analysing the effects of paternity leave in Norway has focused 
mainly on the father–child relationship. Stated another way, today, the 
discussion of the father’s quota is less about ensuring gender equality in the 
home, and more about the importance of father–child bonding. This re-
search underscores the benefits to children and society when men partici-
pate more equally in caregiving work. Brandth and Kvande (2003), for 
example, described this shift in views of paternal involvement as moving 
away from gender equality discourse to celebrations of the nurturing 
fathers’ positive effects on children. 
Although Norway was the first country to introduce the father’s quota in 
1993, Sweden followed suit with a ‘daddy month’ in 1994. However, in 
both Norway and Sweden, further expansions of the father’s quotas have 
been rather slow to occur. In fact, it has taken more than two decades to 
achieve quotas of about three months in both countries. Additionally, the 
Norwegian’s father’s quota policy has been contested by both the political 
left and right (Ellingsæter, 2020). These disagreements from both sides are 
perhaps due to the fact that the father’s quota limits parental choice and 
punishes parents who do not use it. 
While the 1993 quota rapidly increased fathers’ use of the leave, few 
fathers took more than the four weeks, allowing mothers to take most of 
the shareable part of the leave. With the pressure to increase the father’s 
quota, the government initiated the first extension, which led to the addi-
tion of one week to the total leave in 2005. Since 2005, the total parental 
leave has been extended from 42 to 49 weeks with 100% compensation 
from the workplace. In a move that recognised the importance of father’s 
involvement in parenting, three weeks were transferred from the sharable 
part of the leave to the father’s quota. Reverberations from the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2008, however, changed attitudes toward the father’s quota 
dramatically. In 2010, the Conservative Party joined the Progress Party in 
its goal to abandon the father’s quota altogether. Although these parties 
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worked to abolish the quota, the Christian Democratic Party and the 
Liberal Party later negotiated a compromise that allowed the quota to 
remain, but reduced it. As a result, in 2014 the quota dwindled from 14 to 
10 weeks. 
In 2017, a parliamentary majority was in favour of reversing the cut to 
the father’s quota in an effort to give children more time to spend with their 
fathers and to contribute to gender equality in the workplace (Ellingsæter, 
2020). This majority successfully requested the re-elected minority right- 
wing government to present a bill restoring the father quota to the previous 
14 weeks. Under Norway’s current policy, effective as of July 2018, mo-
thers get 15 weeks of non-transferable leave, plus three weeks before birth. 
It once again became popular for fathers to take parental leave. The im-
portance of the parental leave system, including a special quota for fathers, 
is regarded positively today. Research has shown how a statutory, ear-
marked and non-transferable leave has impacted on the high use of the 
leave by Norwegian fathers (Brandth & Kvande, 2020). This may mean 
that men’s use of parental leave may be due to the nature of the way the 
leave is structured rather than the benefits to fathers and children. 
Japan: Revisions in parental leave policy 
In 1999, the Basic Act for Gender-Equal Society was enacted by the 
Japanese government. This Act includes the basic principles to form a 
gender-equal society and lays out the respective duties of the state, local 
governments and citizens. Additionally, it clearly states that both women 
and men are equal participants in labour force and family care. In 2000, the 
second phase of Basic Plan for a Gender-Equal Society was released to 
further promote gender equality in Japan. Then the third phase emphasised 
the importance of changing men’s lives with an emphasis on reducing their 
long work hours and increasing their childcare involvement. In the fourth 
phase, however, plans directly related to men’s involvement in childcare 
and elder care seem to have been significantly reduced perhaps due to a 
more conservative turn with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in the 
Japanese Parliament. This pattern continued in the most recent fifth phase 
of the plan which was released in December 2020. 
Much of the impetus for promoting men’s caregiving comes from the 
ongoing crisis of Japan’s low fertility rate. The Japanese government, with 
the assumption that the husbands’ participation in childcare would en-
courage women to have more babies, revised the Childcare Leave Law in 
1992 allowing fathers, for the first time, to take parental leave from work. 
However, there was no state compensation stipulated for such leave as it 
has been in Norway. It was not until one year later, in 1993, that Norway 
introduced the fathers’ quota system, although the parental leave where 
fathers were allowed to share leave time with the mothers had been 
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introduced in Norway in 1977. Japanese fathers’ use of the parental leave 
was considered not only ‘progressive’ at the time but it was also seen dif-
ficult to actually use it due to the lack of financial compensation and health 
insurance coverage during the leave as well as harassment by and lack of 
understanding from their supervisors and co-workers (Ishii-Kuntz, 2013). 
In 2010, the following three major categories were added to the Child 
Care and Family Care Leave Law:  
1 Men whose wives are full-time homemakers can take the parental 
leave. (Prior to this, only men whose wives were employed could use 
the leave.)  
2 If fathers take the first parental leave during their wives’ maternity 
leave, they can take the leave again after the maternity leave ends. 
(Prior to this, men could take the leave only once during the 12-months 
after the birth of the baby but now they can take two leaves of equal or 
different duration.)  
3 If both fathers and mothers use parental leave, then they can extend the 
leave up to 14 months. This is called ‘Papa Mama Childcare Plus.’ 
(Prior to this, either the father or mother could only take up to 12 
months parental leave. If fathers take the leave, then the entire parental 
leave can be extended to 14 months.) 
Although Japan and Norway have both been promoting fathers’ childcare 
for the past several decades, there has been a gap in the proportion of 
Norwegian and Japanese men taking up such a leave. The report prepared 
by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training (2017) shows that 
close to 90% of Norwegian fathers today take childcare leave. Although it 
has been almost 30 years since the 1992 revision of the Child Care Leave 
Law in Japan, which allowed men to take the parental leave, the proportion 
of Japanese men taking advantage of such a leave remains quite low at 
about only 7% in 2021. 
Figure 3.1 shows the changes in women and men in Japan taking 
childcare leave from work between 2007 and 2019. The percentages of 
women taking childcare leave fluctuate between 81.5 and 87.8. In contrast, 
only a small proportion of Japanese men take such a leave, although the 
percentages increased from 1.38 in 2010 to 7.48 in 2019. Similar gender 
differences are also noted with respect to the length of childcare leave be-
tween mothers and fathers. As shown in Figure 3.2, 31.1% of women take 
10–12 months leave, whereas the majority of men (56.9%) are taking a 
leave of less than five days, despite the Papa Mama Childcare Plus initiative. 
Norway and Japan: Moving closer? 
Is Japan’s family policy moving closer to the Nordic model of childcare 
schemes? Japanese lawmakers often praise the Norwegian model of 
40 Masako Ishii-Kuntz 
parental leave policy. In fact, the topic of father’s quota in parental leave 
policy has been debated in the Japanese political arena. Atoh and Akachi 
(2005) suggested that there may be a possibility that Nordic family policy 
measures such as the father’s quota could have an equalising effect on 
gender relations and hence result in better work–family harmonisation in 
Japan. 
Japanese family policy has ostensibly moved closer to the Norwegian 
model over the 1990s and early 2000s. However, regardless of Japan’s 
admiration of the parental leave policy in Norway, the relevant services are 
hardly guaranteed to all Japanese as a matter of right since only full-time 
regular employees are eligible for parental leave, whereas in Norway, part- 
time workers are also eligible to take the leave. Also, Toivonen (2007) 
argued that the Japanese childcare and parental leave schemes are weak in 
terms of continuity when compared to Nordic equivalents. While the new 
parental leave scheme of 2010 such as Papa and Mama Childcare Plus 
resembles the fathers’ quota system on surface, the stringent eligibility 
conditions together with women’s weak labour market position reduce this 
similarity in practice. For the latter, it is the gendered wage gap that makes 
it difficult for men to take up the leave because it means a large income loss 
in the family. Furthermore, regarding the context for the development of 
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Figure 3.1 Percentage of mothers and fathers taking parental leave in Japan, 
2010–2020. 
Source: Adapted from  Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2020, figure compiled by the 
author.  
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more generous family policies, a lack of continuity in welfare discourse, the 
comparatively weak political influence of women and the heavy economic 
burdens associated with demographic ageing in Japan are factors that have 
constrained (and are likely to continue to constrain) the development of 
such policies in Japan. In addition, hegemonic masculinity is still firmly in 
place in Japan which gives little encouragement to any men who wishes to 
give priority to childcare. 
Today, the debate over fathers’ childcare leave continues in both coun-
tries. In Japan, for example, the head of the Ministry of the Environment 
declared in 2019 to take merely two weeks of parental leave but he was 
criticised by his fellow politicians, because they thought that the public 
servants should not take the leave from work for personal reasons. In 
Norway, the debate over abolishing the father’s quota system is still alive 
because some argue that it is not fair that mothers and fathers are not 














































































































































































Figure 3.2 Duration of parental leave for mothers and fathers in Japan. 
Source: Adapted from  Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 2020, figure compiled by the 
author.  
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Fathers’ childcare: Data comparisons 
Here, we will look at the publicly available data to compare the extent of 
fathers’ involvement in childcare in both countries. According to the 2016 
Japan’s Gender Equality Bureau’s comparison between Norway and Japan 
concerning men and women’s involvement in housework and childcare, 
Japanese husbands spend approximately 1.23 hours/day for household la-
bour, which includes 0.49 hours of childcare activities. The comparable 
figures for Norwegian fathers are 3.12 hours for household labour out of 
which 1.13 hours are spent for childcare activities. This comparison gen-
erates the finding that Norwegian fathers are 2.5 times more likely than 
their Japanese counterparts to be involved in household labour including 
childcare. For Japanese mothers, 7.34 hours/day are devoted to household 
labour with 3.45 hours used for childcare. Norwegian mothers spend 
5.26 hours in household labour, which includes 2.17 hours of childcare. 
Although Japanese mothers spend longer time in housework and childcare 
than do Norwegian mothers, the gendered pattern of the division of 
household labour in which mothers are more likely to be engaged can be 
seen from these figures. 
These statistics make it clear that Norwegian men are much more likely 
to be involved in childcare compared to their Japanese counterparts. We 
need to be aware that this does not assume that gender equality in childcare 
has completely been achieved in Norway, since mothers are still the default 
caretakers of their children (Ringrose, 2017; Sørensen, 2017). Additionally, 
mothers’ and fathers’ childcare participation may be different depending on 
the content of care. It is also important to note that fathers’ childcare in-
volvement may be different between Japan and Norway because of the 
differences of the daily life customs in both countries. These possibilities 
will be described in the following section with the data collected in both 
countries. Given that gender disparity in childcare involvement still exists in 
Japan and Norway, it is worth investigating how different factors are af-
fecting men’s childcare involvement in the two contexts. 
Factors predicting the levels of fathers’ childcare 
We begin this section by reviewing the previous literature on factors af-
fecting fathers’ involvement in childcare in order to generate the analytical 
model shown in Figure 3.3. In this model, the hypotheses tested in the prior 
literature, such as relative resources and childcare demand, will be included 
along with new factors, such as men’s attitudes toward gender roles at work 
and home. 
Using quantitative data collected in the spring of 2020 in Japan and 
Norway, we will test this analytical model to directly compare the pre-
dictors of fathers’ childcare in both countries. In other words, Japanese and 
Norwegian data are compared by a multi-sample structural equation model 
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that analyses the same model using two samples, one from Japan and the 
other from Norway. This analysis allows the direct comparison of the es-
timated parameters for both countries. 
Antecedents to fathers’ childcare 
Prior studies (Ishii-Kuntz, 2009, 2013) examined relative resources, time 
availability, gender ideology and childcare demands, among others, as 
predictors of fathers’ participation in childcare. According to Relative 
Resources Hypothesis, husbands with more resources, such as income and 
educational background, than those of their wives are less likely to be in-
volved in childcare. As for time availability, husbands who spend more time 
at home than those who spend less time are predicted to perform more 
childcare duties. Gender Ideology Hypothesis posits that husbands who 
hold liberal attitudes toward gender roles would be frequently involved in 
childcare. Childcare demands are higher when there are more children and 
younger children in the household, and if so, fathers are more likely to 
participate in childcare. Additionally, Ishii-Kuntz (2013) found that father- 
friendly practices at work and the existence of role models are positively 
related to men’s taking childcare leave. 
In our analysis, we will examine the effects of fathers’ employment status, 
income, age, education, as well as their spouse’s income and education (as in-
dicators of the spouse’s resources), and number and age of children (as in-
dicators of childcare demands) to examine how these variables are related to 

















Figure 3.3 Analytical model predicting fathers’ childcare involvement. 
Source: Figure created by the author.  
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Another dimension examined in our study is the relationship between 
masculinity measures and men’s childcare involvement. For many years, 
Japanese men have been characterised by hegemonic masculinity, which 
emphasises the importance of their breadwinning role. As previously 
mentioned, in recent years, however, we have been witnessing the rise of 
men who are active participants in care work, including housework and 
childcare. 
There has also been a growing theoretical and research interest in what is 
considered as a new form of masculinity, known as a caring masculinity, 
which is a masculine identity that rejects domination  and embraces values 
of care, such as interdependence and relationality (e.g., Elliott, 2015). 
Although caring masculinity became a focus of many European critical 
studies of men and masculinity, it has never been extensively studied within 
Asian contexts. 
Based on the explanation above, we will analyse the following model using 
the comparative data collected in Norway and Japan. We predict that fathers 
with full-time employment and higher educational attainment, who earn 
higher income, have fewer children, whose children are older and whose 
spouses’ income and educational levels are lower, are less likely to be in-
volved in childcare. In addition, these variables are predicted to influence 
such intervening variables as men’s competitiveness at work, views toward 
their female co-workers and bosses, and gender ideology, which, in turn, 
influence their childcare involvement. Stated another way, men who are 
competitive at work, hold conservative views and attitudes toward their fe-
male co-workers or bosses and have traditional ideology toward gender roles 
are less likely to be involved in childcare. For the sake of the direct cross- 
cultural comparison, we will analyse the same model for Norway and Japan. 
Methods and sample characteristics 
The data used in this research come from an ongoing cross-cultural project 
on men and masculinities sponsored by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation in 
Tokyo. The data were collected by a web survey in the spring of 2020 from 
married men aged 20–69 who have at least one child and were residing in 
Norway (n = 114) and Tokyo (n = 332). Initially, we aimed to collect data 
from the capital cities in both countries. However, given the scarcity of the 
Norwegian population, we needed to go beyond Oslo to collect enough 
data for our analysis. Thus, the Norwegian data were collected nationwide, 
whereas the Japanese data were collected from those living in Tokyo. 
Our sample has some demographic differences among the Japanese and 
Norwegian men, although they are not nationally representative samples. The 
average age of Japanese fathers is 41.2, about ten years younger than the 
Norwegian fathers (51.1). Approximately 62.9% and 50.2% of Japanese and 
Norwegian men, respectively, are college educated. The majority (84.4%) of 
Japanese men are employed and the comparable figure for Norwegian men was 
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61.7%. Dividing these men’s incomes into five categories (high, somewhat high, 
middle, somewhat low, low), we found that 31.9% of Japanese and 50.2% of 
Norwegian men belong to ‘high’ or ‘somewhat high’ brackets. With respect to 
differences in income between husbands and wives, there is a significantly larger 
gap in Japan (almost 3 million yen, or 254,000 NOK) compared to that of 
Norwegian couples (39,587 yen, or 3360 NOK). 
Measurements 
To identify employment status, respondents were asked whether they cur-
rently are employed, employed but taking a leave or not employed. Their 
annual income was measured by categories ranging from ‘none’ to ‘over 
500,001 kroner’ for Norwegian fathers and from ‘none’ to ‘more than 
23,000,000 yen’ for Japanese fathers. With respect to their educational 
attainment, they were asked to state the last school they attended. Spouse’s 
income and education were similarly measured. 
We included three questions to measure the respondents’ competitiveness 
at work: ‘I want to increase my achievement at work to receive higher 
evaluations,’ ‘I want to win the competition at work,’ and ‘Men are self- 
conscious about their status.’ Responses ranging from Not at all to Very 
much so for these questions were added to create a scale of competitiveness. 
The higher score of this scale indicates men’s more competitive attitudes. 
Cronbach’s alpha is a measure of how closely a set of question items are 
related with the higher scores indicating greater scale reliability. These al-
phas were 0.809 and 0.653 for Japanese and Norwegian data, respectively. 
Although the alpha for the Norway sample is lower than that of the 
Japanese sample, we will use this scale in our analysis because we think that 
the questions are quite legitimate indicators of the competitiveness. 
The gender ideology scale was constructed by adding the five variables: 
‘Men should work outside and women should care for the family,’ ‘Men 
should provide financial resources for the family,’ ‘Mothers need to con-
centrate on childcare when their child is under the age of three,’ ‘It is better 
for a woman to do housework and childcare,’ and ‘It is better that women 
care for the elderly family member.’ Again, the responses to these five 
questions are added to create a scale of gender ideology. Cronbach’s alphas 
were 0.857 and 0.835 for Japanese and Norwegian men, respectively. 
Higher scores for this scale indicate more traditional attitudes toward 
gendered roles. 
Finally, for our dependent variable, we created a scale of ‘Fathers’ 
childcare’ by adding response scores for six questions: ‘Take care of meals,’ 
‘Eat with child,’ ‘Help child with clothes and getting ready,’ ‘Take a bath 
together,’ ‘Change diapers’ and ‘Play together.’ The response scores ranging 
from Not at all to Almost every day were added to create the scale of men’s 
childcare involvement. For these scales, Cronbach’s alphas of 0.870 and 
0.814 were obtained for Japanese and Norwegian samples, respectively. 
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Analyses 
The proposed model was analysed using descriptive statistics and Structural 
Equation Models (SEM). 
Findings: Descriptive statistics 
In terms of attitudinal scales, we found that Japanese men are more likely to 
be competitive at work (scoring 8.38 out of 12, with 12 being the most 
competitive) compared to their Norwegian counterparts (7.98). Japanese 
men also report more conservative attitudes toward women at work (11.26 
out of 20) than did Norwegian men (9.57). With respect to gender ideology, 
Japanese men were again found to hold more traditional gender ideology 
(12.93 out of 20) than did Norwegian men (9.57). 
As predicted, for childcare involvement, Norwegian men were involved in 
childcare much more frequently than their Japanese counterparts, though not in 
all categories of childcare or with uniform degrees of difference. The most no-
table difference was found in terms of helping the child during the meals: 49.5% 
and 21.1% of Norwegian and Japanese fathers, respectively, reported taking 
care of their children at the meal time almost every day or four to five times a 
week. Likewise, 30.4% of Norwegian and 21.1% of Japanese fathers frequently 
helped their children get dressed. In contrast, Japanese fathers were found to 
play with (25.6%) and bathe (23.1%) their children more frequently than their 
Norwegian counterparts (18.7% and 20.5%). The difference in playing with 
children may reflect the long work hours of Japanese men. Many return home 
late only to be able to play with their children before bedtime rather than 
providing physical care. Work hours in Norway are shorter compared with men 
in other countries, and fathers of young children in particular have reduced their 
work hours over the last two decades (Kitterød & Kjeldstad, 2003). 
Additionally, the difference in bathing may reflect the structural difference in 
which the Japanese bathroom is built to accommodate several family members 
at the same time. 
Despite these variations, we also found that the wives in both contexts 
are likely to be more involved in housework than their husbands; Japanese 
and Norwegian husbands are involved in 32.5% and 44% of the total 
housework, respectively. In addition, 35.4% and 53.5% of the total 
childcare is performed by Japanese and Norwegian fathers, respectively. 
This confirms the previous finding that even in Norway, wives are ‘default’ 
providers of housework and childcare. 
At the bivariate level, we found that Japanese men’s competitiveness at work 
is significantly correlated with conservative views toward women at work and 
adherence to more traditional gender ideology. More conservative views toward 
women at work were also positively correlated with more traditional gender 
ideology. 
Caring masculinity 47 
Findings: Structural equation model (SEM) 
Table 3.1 shows the results of SEM based on our analytical model (see 
Figure 3.3). Concerning the effects of independent variables on intervening 
variables, it was found that Japanese men with higher income are sig-
nificantly more competitive at work and have more conservative views 
toward women at work compared to those with lower income. Among 
Norwegian men, too, those with higher income reported significantly more 
conservative attitudes toward women at work and a more traditional 
gender ideology than those with lower income, which is consistent with the 
findings of Aarseth (2020). Those fathers who have more children hold 
significantly more traditional views of gender ideology compared to fathers 
with fewer children, and this pattern was the same in Norway and Japan. 
Additionally, for Japanese fathers only, having older children was asso-
ciated with holding a more traditional gender ideology. In addition, 
younger Japanese fathers are significantly less competitive at work, have 
less conservative attitudes toward women at work and have a more liberal 
gender ideology. Finally, Japanese wives’ higher income was associated 
with their husbands’ adherence to less traditional gender ideology. 
In terms of the factors affecting fathers’ childcare involvement, we found 
that Japanese men who have younger children and whose spouse’s income 
is higher are more likely to be involved in childcare. For Norwegian fathers, 
their childcare involvement was not influenced by these factors. These direct 
cross-cultural comparisons show that whereas several sociodemographic 
variables are related to attitudinal variables, factors affecting Norwegian 
and Japanese fathers’ childcare involvement may be quite different. This is 
also shown by the better fit of the model for Japanese data compared to that 
of the Norwegian data. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, we focused on paternal involvement in childcare in Norway 
and Japan by comparing parental leave policies and the publicly available data. 
We then analysed the data collected from Norwegian and Japanese fathers in the 
spring of 2020 to examine factors affecting their involvement in childcare. 
In terms of historical shifts in fathers’ involvement in childcare, we found 
similar changes between the two countries. That is, both Norwegian and 
Japanese fathers were quite involved in childcare in earlier periods but their 
level of involvement decreased due to industrialisation and urbanisation. 
After post-war images of fathers almost hit rock bottom to the point of 
ridiculing and even writing off fatherhood, fathers in both countries made a 
comeback starting in the 1990s. In terms of parental leave policies, the two 
countries share certain motivations such as the emphasis on fathers’ 
childcare involvement as beneficial to children, easing mothers’ stress, and 
ensuring gender equality in the home. 
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Despite these similar historical transitions of fatherhood and the development 
of family policies, Japanese men still show reluctance to take parental leave and 
participate in childcare. Reasons for this gap between fathers’ participation in 
Table 3.1 Factors Affecting Fathers’ Childcare Involvement     
Variables Japan Norway  
Employment → Competitiveness –0.04 0.08 
Employment → View of women at work 0.02 –0.05 
Employment → Gender ideology –0.05 –0.05 
Income → Competitiveness 0.10** 0.00 
Income → View of women at work –0.13* –0.32* 
Income → Gender ideology 0.04 –0.33* 
Number of children → Competitiveness –0.11 0.02 
Number of children → View of women 
at work 
0.07 0.16 
Number of children → Gender ideology 0.19** 0.20* 
Age of the youngest child → 
Competitiveness 
0.29* –0.05 
Age of the youngest child → View of 
women at work 
0.25 –0.04 
Age of the youngest child → Gender 
ideology 
0.34* –0.25 
Age → Competitiveness –0.43*** –0.18 
Age → View of women at work –0.31* –0.25 
Age → Gender ideology –0.33* –0.12 
Education → Competitiveness 0.07 0.17 
Education → View of women at work –0.05 –0.02 
Education → Gender ideology –0.05 0.07 
Spouse’s income → Competitiveness –0.08 0.00 
Spouse’s income → View of women 
at work 
–0.01 0.11 
Spouse’s income → Gender ideology –0.23*** –0.02 
Spouse’s education → Competitiveness 0.03 0.00 
Spouse’s education → View of women 
at work 
0.09 –0.22 
Spouse’s education → Gender ideology –0.02 –0.16 
Employment → Childcare 0.07 –0.14 
Income → Childcare –0.02 0.13 
Number of children → Childcare –0.05 –0.05 
Age of the youngest child → Childcare –0.30* –0.26 
Age → Childcare 0.07 –0.28 
Education → Childcare 0.00 0.03 
Spouse’s income → Childcare 0.15* 0.13 
Spouse’s education → Childcare 0.00 0.00 
Competitiveness → Childcare –0.01 –0.22 
View of women at work → Childcare 0.07 –0.06 
Gender ideology → Childcare –0.12 –0.08 
GFI, AGFI, RMSEA 0.853, 
0.806, 0.063 
0.769, 
0.696, 0.061   
Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Table created by the author.  
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childcare in Japan and Norway may owe to the differences in how parental leave 
policy was formulated and the lack of structural support for childcare, among 
others. First, allowing Japanese men to take parental leave was initiated by the 
government’s concerns over the rapid decline of the national fertility rate. 
Encouraging fathers’ active participation in childcare was identified as one of the 
driving forces necessary to encourage mothers to have more children. The 
Japanese government still seems to believe that fathers’ use of parental leave 
would result in couples deciding to have more babies, despite inconsistent 
findings. Although parental leave and the father’s quota system began as ‘tools’ 
to achieve Norway’s gender equality, it was shown that parental leave is more 
frequently associated in recent decades with the opportunity for father–child 
bonding. 
Second, the parental leave policy in Japan and Norway have become 
similar after the major revisions of the Japanese law in 2010. However, the 
shortage of childcare facilities after the parental leave ends is creating a 
major obstacle to Japanese mothers who wish to return to work. In fact, the  
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2017) reports that more than 
20,000 children have been waitlisted to be admitted to childcare centres 
annually since 2010. This shortage contrasts with the recommendation of 
the 2005 White Paper on the National Lifestyle which emphasizes the im-
portance of the whole society getting involved in childrearing (Cabinet 
Office, 2005). The White Paper also points out that the childrearing gen-
eration is faced with a burden of taxes and pension funding for the ageing 
population. 
The Japanese public became aware of this problem when one mother’s 
online rant caught attention in 2016. In an article entitled, Hoikuen ochita, 
Nihon shine!! (‘Didn’t Get a Slot in Day Care Centre. Drop Dead, Japan!!’) 
(Osaki, 2016), one mother described her frustrating struggle to find a day 
care centre for her child. Several dozen mothers who were inspired by the 
blog also held a rally in front of the Diet (Parliament) building to demand 
an increase in the number of day care centres while other mothers began an 
online campaign demanding a systemic overhaul (Osaki, 2016). Despite this 
campaign, however, we have not seen any significant improvement sur-
rounding mothers who wish to return to work after taking up the parental 
leave. 
Finally, our analyses of the data collected in Norway and Japan revealed 
that although sociodemographic variables, such as income and number of 
children, seem to have similar effects on father’s childcare, none of the 
attitudinal variables explain the extent of paternal involvement in both 
countries. Thus, we need to re-evaluate the analytical model while taking 
into account the differences in the very meaning of paternal involvement in 
childcare in Norway and Japan. To this end, in-depth interviews with 
Norwegian and Japanese fathers asking them about the meaning of fa-
therhood and fathers’ involvement in childcare may provide insightful 
findings. 
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4 Education and gender in Japan 
and Norway from historical 
perspective 
Ryoko Kodama    
Education and gender 
Although gender was known as a concept, its introduction into Japanese 
educational research did not begin until the mid-1980s. What was the 
background of this? Was the change unique to Japan or was it global? 
Focusing on Norway and Japan, this study examines these questions from a 
comparative historical perspective. 
In comparisons of international gender gaps, the World Economic 
Forum's global gender gap index ranking in four subsections – economics, 
education, health and politics – comes to the fore. Japan ranks extremely 
low on the index and in recent years, has become notorious for gender gaps 
in various areas. Among the 156 countries indexed, in 2021, Japan ranked 
120th. Always in the top group, in 2021, Norway ranked second. In stark 
contrast among the four subsections, Norway has a particularly high 
ranking in economics and politics, while Japan has a high ranking in health. 
The most interesting subsection is the education index, however, because 
Japan has paid little attention to its 92nd ranking. True, Japan ranks higher 
in education than in economics and politics but still below the global 
average. In rates of literacy and primary education enrolment, Japan ranks 
first globally, having achieved gender equality. Thus, its 92nd ranking in 
education can be attributed to its secondary and tertiary enrolment rates – 
129th and 110th, respectively. In another stark contrast, Norway ranks first 
in both secondary and higher education (World Economic Forum, 2021). 
Historically, both countries’ gender-equal educational systems began at 
about the same time, shortly after the Second World War. So why are 
present rankings so different? Possible causes of higher education’s gender 
gap in Japan include the hidden curriculum in school education, gender 
tracing in education, family members’ gender-role awareness and socio- 
cultural attitudes towards women. Despite various causes, Japan’s educa-
tional gender gap is most pronounced in higher education, evidently from a 
variety of causes. 
Therefore, this paper analysed factors that led to Japan’s higher educa-
tion gender gap, specifically, changes in education after the Second World 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003185222-4 
War and in political and social trends during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
method employed was a comparative historical sociology approach. By 
comparing statistical data – mainly from government publications on 
education after the Second World War – we first clarified differences be-
tween Japan and Norway from a gender perspective. 
Higher education at present 
As for the gender gap in higher education enrolment rates, differences be-
tween European countries and Japan are illustrated in Figure 4.1, at which 
Japanese people are very surprised. They expect more men than women to 
be enrolled in higher education, so the reverse gap in several Western 
countries comes as a surprise. 
Among many Western nations, percentages of women entering higher 
education are significantly higher than in Japan. In all Nordic countries, for 
instance, more women than men graduate from higher education, and only 
in Japan, Korea and Germany are men more likely to enter higher educa-
tion.1 Figure 4.1 In Norway, more female students and, in Japan, more 
male students enrol in higher education. However, we should pay attention 










































Figure 4.1 International comparison of higher education enrolment ratios. 
Note. Source: Gender Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office (2018) Danjokyodosankaku-hakusyo 
2018 [The white paper on gender equality 2018]. [Report]. p. 92.  
56 Ryoko Kodama 
Began at the same time but in different ways 
Both Japan and Norway established educational gender equality in the mid- 
20th century, with men of both countries initially more likely to attend 
higher education than women. From a gender perspective, the two coun-
tries’ current educational systems have their origins in mid-20th-century 
educational reforms, but despite similar timing, social changes magnified 
their small initial differences. In Norway, the School Act (Lov om 
Folkeskolen) was implemented in 1959, providing nine years of compulsory 
education and the same curriculum for men and women. In the mid-1980s, 
the number of female students began to exceed that of males. 
In Japan, gender issues in the educational system changed significantly in 
1945. According to previous studies, before the Second World War, men 
and women could study together at pre-school and primary levels, but in 
secondary education and above, men and women were separated 
(Hashimoto, 1992; Hirose, 1982; Koyama, 1995). Certainly, expanding 
higher education opportunities and improving secondary education for 
women were discussed after the First World War. In practice, however, 
women’s enrolment, with a few exceptions, remained restricted during the 
1920s, and secondary education was only partially reworked despite es-
tablishment of public and private vocational schools for women. Until the 
end of the Second World War, the gender-separated school system was 
maintained at the secondary level, and women had a lower level of edu-
cation than men (Koyama, 1995, p. 6). As a defeated nation after the 
Second World War, Japan initiated gender equality in all systems, including 
enactment of a new democratic constitution. The educational system was 
no exception. Post-Second World War reforms were driven by the Ministry 
of Education, the Education Reform Commission and the Civil Information 
and Education Section of the occupation forces organised with democratic 
and liberal principles by the United States (US). Democracy in education 
stressed equal treatment and equal opportunities for all students, thus 
promoting co-education in secondary and higher education. 
However, a Japanese system in which both men and women could receive 
the same level of secondary education was created, but in addition to co- 
educational schools, separate secondary schools for men and women re-
mained. Women were allowed to attend universities, but new universities 
for women only were also established, thus mixing co-educational and 
gender-separate schools. Japanese post-war educational reform emphasised 
the need to promote women’s education, mainly from the perspective that 
education was necessary for women to play an important role in society as 
wives and mothers (Hirose, 1982, p. 64). Furthermore, universities and 
junior colleges were established. In Japan’s post-war educational reform, 
various new forms of higher education systems were created because of the 
previous higher education system’s multiplicity. Many of the new schools 
lacked teachers with the necessary career experience to be recognised as 
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university faculty. Post-war educational reform called for higher educa-
tion’s expansion, but many pre-war institutions of tertiary education did 
not meet conditions for recognition as universities. Some were temporarily 
recognised as junior colleges – partly in response to the initial expansion of 
community colleges in the US – and afterwards, establishment of junior 
colleges was approved. 
In addition to four-year universities, two- and three-year junior colleges 
are now recognised as higher education institutions. Initially, similarly to 
four-year universities, more male than female students attended junior 
colleges. Not until the 1960s did the number of female students surpass that 
of males (Katayama & Yonekawa, 1993, p. 79). 
Overall, educational reform that included establishment of women’s 
university and junior college systems had significant effects on higher 
education’s gender balance in post-war Japan. 
Increase in the percentage of female students in higher 
education 
University enrolment rates in both Norway and Japan rose sharply in the 
20th century’s latter half, but examination of those rates by gender reveals 
highly contrasting changes, as shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. In 
Norway, education was reformed after the Second World War based on 
gender equality, but then, more men than women went to university, and 
this trend continued until the 1970s. In the 1980s, however, the ratio of 
men to women reversed and has continued to widen. As Figure 4.1 shows, 
many European countries mirror this phenomenon. 
But what about Japan? Similar to Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3 shows differ-
ences in numbers of male and female students enrolled in Japanese uni-
versities during the same period. Although the enrolment rate at universities 
expanded during the 1970s and 1980s, gender reversal did not occur in 
Japan. The percentage of men in higher education expanded significantly in 
the 1970s, and in the 1980s, the gender gap widened. The percentage of 
women attending university finally began to rise sharply during the 1990s, 
narrowing but not reversing the gender gap. 
Why does such a difference exist between Norway and Japan? Why does 
the number of Japanese women in higher education not exceed that of men, 
as in Western countries? Several reasons might explain why this trend 
differs in the two countries differ. One is the Japanese education system that 
allows segregation by gender. Although various systems in post-war Japan 
supposedly aimed at a gender-equal society, the process actually created a 
unique school system designed for women but left the existing male- 
favouring university system untouched. One of the most notable women- 
only school systems is the Japanese junior college system. Although many 
women attended them, they were not included in Figure 4.3’s statistics. 
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Women’s junior colleges in Japan 
Figure 4.4 shows the post-war trend of higher education enrolment rates in 
Japan, including both universities and junior colleges. Unlike Figures 4.3, 
which show that the gap between men and women’s enrolment rates has 
not been bridged, in Figure 4.4, the rates are reversed. In the mid-1980s, 
more women began enrolling in higher education than men, and with this, 
the phenomenon reversed. During that period, the same trend was also 
apparent in Norway. 
The key to this reversal is the increase in the number of women attending 
junior colleges, which accounts for large part of women’s participation in 
higher education. In other words, from the 1970s to the 1990s, the majority 
of women in higher education attended junior colleges in Japan. 
Conversely, the number of men attending junior colleges has remained 
consistently low. However, Figure 4.4 shows that if we include both uni-
versities and junior colleges in the statistics, more Japanese women than 
Figure 4.2 Gender differences in university enrolment rates in Norway (1971–2020). 
Adapted from Source: World Bank EdStats, accessed 15 Dec. 2020,  https://datacatalog.worldbank. 
org/dataset/education-statistics.  
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men enter higher education – just as in Norway. Indeed, the ratio of female 
junior college students can be represented by a trapezoidal shape, rising 
from the late 1960s, remaining unchanged until around 2000 and then 
falling. During this period, many women chose junior college as the path to 
higher education, even if only temporarily. 
Figure 4.5, which displays a shape consistent with the trapezoid – like the 
line of only junior college women in Figure 4.4, provides a clue as to major 
changes in the number of junior college students. In Figure 4.5, the trape-
zoidal shape represents Home Economics, which, despite some variation, 
has clearly been the dominant major in junior colleges. In other words, the 
high number of Home Economics majors supported the increased number 
of women’s junior colleges. The same was true of universities, where many 
female students entered departments of humanities and Home Economics 
(Kodama 2014). 
Among junior college students, the second most common major is edu-
cation, especially early childhood and elementary education. In the 1990s, 
Figure 4.3 Gender differences in university enrolment rates in Japan (1971–2020). 
Adapted from Source: World Bank EdStats, accessed 15 Dec. 2020,  https://datacatalog.worldbank. 
org/dataset/education-statistics.  
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junior colleges temporarily offered majors in humanities and social sciences, 
but enrolment quickly dwindled, and, again, Home Economics and early 
childhood education majors dominated. These majors in domestic science 
and childhood education might indicate that female students were expected 
to become housewives and mothers. In the 2000s, however, the percentage 
of women entering junior colleges gradually declined because women pre-
ferred university, thus leading to many junior colleges’ closure and gradual 
replacement with universities. 
Two perspectives can clarify why such a difference exists between 
Japanese men and women entering higher education: One is the post-war 
educational system, and the other is post-war Japanese society’s gender 
consciousness. Post-war educational reform supposedly established gender 
equality, but establishment of women’s colleges perpetuated the pre-war 
higher educational system. Simultaneously, junior colleges did not have the 
necessary conditions for higher education even though, initially, junior 
colleges were not created as schools for women, and more men attended 
them. Despite this, both women’s colleges and junior colleges provided 
opportunities for more women to enter higher education. Importantly, 
despite the call for educational equality, Japanese society still held the no-
tion that women needed education to suit their roles as housewives – 
supporting their husbands and raising their children. As Japan’s economy 
recovered after the Second World War, this notion gained strength. 
Figure 4.4 Gender differences in university and junior college enrolment rates in 
Japan (1954–2020). 
Adapted from Source:  Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. 
(2021). Gakko kihon chosa [Basic survey on schools], accessed 15 Dec. 2020,  https://www. 
e-stat.go.jp/stat-search/files?page=1&toukei=00400001&tstat=000001011528.  
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A recovering economy and the number of female workers 
As previously explained, from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, many 
Japanese women were attending junior colleges, majoring especially in 
Home Economics. Simultaneously, many women were disappearing from 
the job market. Figure 4.6 shows the trend in women’s employment by age 
group, with two noteworthy points: First, from the 1960s to the 1970s, the 
labour force participation rate declined among women of all ages. Second, 
participation rates of women in their late 20s and early 30s declined, in-
dicating that young women significantly disappeared from the labour scene. 
As Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show, many women attended junior colleges and 
withdrew from the labour market during same period – linked to Japan’s 
post-war economic recovery and changes in social structure. The mid-1950s 
to the early 1970s is known as Japan’s period of high economic growth; the 
country overcame war’s devastations, and average annual economic growth 
increased. People moved from rural to urban areas, increasing the scale of 
major cities such as Tokyo and Osaka. As the economy grew, workers’ 
wages increased overall. During this period, labour unions demanded that 
companies pay a wage that would enable a man to provide for his wife and 
children. The ideal was for the husband to earn a salary and for the wife to 
concentrate on the home and family without having to earn a living. 
Workers’ demands for higher wages were thus realised (Figure 4.6). 
In addition to increased salaries, various institutions promoted male fa-









Figure 4.5 Junior college students by major in Japan (1950–2015). 
Source: Suzuki, S. ( 2018). Sengonihon no tankidaigaku nikansuru kekyu: Kento no tameno 
jikikubun wo chushin ni [A study on junior college in Japan after the Second World War: 
Focusing on time division]. The Bulletin of the Graduate School of Education of Waseda 
University. Separate Volume, 25(2), p. 35.  
62 Ryoko Kodama 
was granted a special ‘dependent’s allowance’ to support his wife and 
children. Furthermore, if the wife did not work, tax exemptions for de-
pendents increased the husband’s total income. In the 1970s, this system 
undeniably led to women’s withdrawal from the labour market. When the 
average Japanese woman married in her early 20s, she withdrew from the 
workforce in her late 20s or early 30s to give birth and care for her young 
children. Thus, the role of women as housekeepers and educators of chil-
dren, not as breadwinners, was promoted by institutions supported by 
economic growth. In particular, children’s education became Japanese 
mothers’ most important task. 
Figure 4.7 compares how women’s (age 20–54) labour force participa-
tion rates in Japan and Norway have changed over the past 50 years. 
As seen in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, the labour force participation rate of 
women, especially those who raised children, declined in Japan as the single 
male earner system developed during post-war economic reconstruction 
and the high-growth period of the 1970s. In contrast, during the 1970s in 
Norway, the female labour force participation rate increased to surpass 
Japan’s, which had previously been higher. Earlier, the female labour force 
in Japan was rather higher than that in Norway, but in the mid-1970s, the 
Figure 4.6 Trend in employment rates of women by age group in Japan, 
1968–2010. 
Source:  Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. (2014). White paper on 
land, infrastructure, transport and tourism in Japan, 2014. [Report], p. 24.  
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two countries reversed the trend. Like Japan, Norway once strongly tended 
to see women’s role as homemakers (Furuichi, 2019; Matsuda, 2020), but 
in the 1960s, Norway experienced a labour shortage and women’s parti-
cipation in the workforce became necessary. Significantly, Norway has been 
promoting gender equality laws and policies since the 1970s (Leira, 1993). 
In contrast to Norway, Japan had a large working population and pro-
moted policies based on male patriarchal roles. This explains the difference 
in labour force participation rates, but Figure 4.7 also shows the gap again 
narrowing. 
Economic growth and educational expansion 
Social changes and changes in the work environment subsequently affected 
the education system. Many families who moved to cities were not guar-
anteed the property they had inherited from their parents, for instance, a 
house. Even if they did inherit such property, they could not benefit from it 
as straightforwardly as those who led a life in the countryside, especially 
considering that they needed to build a life and support a family in the city. 
Consequently, they believed that education was key for a more prosperous 
urban life as wage earners. Entering the workforce after nine years of 
compulsory education was not uncommon, but at this time, parents wanted 


































































Figure 4.7 Comparison of female labour force participation rates between Japan 
and Norway (women aged 20–54, %), 1968–2020. 
Adapted from Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan and Statistics Norway. Statistics Bureau of 
Japan, Labor Force Survey, accessed 15 June 2021  https://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/ 
roudou/index.html. Statistics Norway, Labor Force Survey, accessed 15 June 2021  https:// 
www.ssb.no/en/arbeid-og-lonn/sysselsetting/statistikk/arbeidskraftundersokelsen.  
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national average of students attending high school was 42.5% in Japan. By 
1955, the rate had risen by nearly 10%, to 51.5%. As early as 1957, 
parents implored the government to build more high schools so that all 
children could attend high school (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology [MEXT], 1992). 
These parental demands were compatible with development of national 
education and science policies. Japan’s educational policy was also influ-
enced by the US Education Law (1958), adopted in response to the shock of 
the Soviet Union’s Sputnik launch. In Japan, such theories as those of 
manpower, educational investment and human capital have directly linked 
education and the economy. The 1960s witnessed a policy argument that 
more money should be invested in education to develop the economy. 
Although compulsory education was never extended beyond nine years, by 
the mid-1970s, over 90% of students went to high school. 
Furthermore, upper secondary schools’ expansion was linked to uni-
versity education’s subsequent expansion, and, as Japan’s post-war 
economy recovered, the percentage of students attending its national, 
local government and private universities also increased. Importantly, tui-
tion fees were not cheap. Although tuition at national and local government 
universities was relatively low, it was not free. Needless to say, tuition fees 
at private universities were much higher, but even so, the increased number 
of students attending universities after the Second World War was largely 
due to the increase in private universities. 
Increased university enrolment rates also reflected that less affluent fa-
milies were also pursuing higher education, sending sons to university and 
daughters to junior college. Even with greater opportunity for higher edu-
cation, women did not need a four-year university education; two years of 
junior college was considered sufficient. Parents hoped their sons would get 
a better education and, consequently, a better job; they wanted their 
daughters to marry and become housewives and mothers, who needed a 
different education from that for a professional. 
In 1959, a Japanese politician made a statement in parliament: 
The role that junior colleges have played in women’s education has 
been extremely significant. If the junior college system had not been 
established after the war, many women would not have had the 
opportunity to receive higher education. The reasons for this are the 
age at which women marry and the financial burden on their parents. 
Junior colleges are what saved women’s education. (Koyama, 2008, 
p. 331)  
Not until the 1970s, more than a decade later, did junior colleges become 
dominant educational institutions for women (Figure 4.4). Interestingly, the 
statement quoted above predicts the general status of women’s education 
during the following two decades. 
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Even though the existence of gendered junior colleges has widened uni-
versities’ gender gap, they played a significant role in promoting and ex-
panding higher education for Japanese women during the post-war period. 
At the same time, however, junior colleges seemed to encourage women to 
become housewives and mothers, thus further widening various gender 
gaps (e.g., economic, political) in Japanese society. 
A faculty member who accepted a position at a women’s junior college in 
the mid-1960s said in the mid-1990s, ‘I have been complicit in dis-
crimination against women and have resisted discrimination against women 
through my tenure at the women’s junior college and through my education 
and research’ (Yasukawa, 1996, pp. 24-5). Because junior colleges tend to 
prepare women to become housewives and mothers, engaging in such 
education seems complicit in discrimination against women. Even so, the 
author is a well-known researcher who has been conducting ideological 
research on the structure of discrimination against women in women’s 
colleges. This author–researcher’s dilemma well represents the structural 
problem of education in post-war Japan. 
In fact, the situation of women’s junior colleges changed after the 1990s, 
when Japan ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women in 1985, six years after the United Nations 
adopted the Convention in 1979. Then Japan’s rapid economic growth 
declined, and wives’ employment rates rose because their families could no 
longer live on their husbands’ income alone. Women began to look for 
better jobs and better education. More female students aimed for uni-
versities instead of junior colleges, and as a result, many junior colleges 
closed or downsized. During this period, the gender structure hidden in 
Japanese education came into question, despite the system’s ostensible 
equality. Also during this period, universities promoted gender and wo-
men’s studies to provide women with empowering higher education. 
Current universities and their problems 
As explained above, the percentage of men who go to university is higher 
than that of women in Japan. However, if junior colleges are included, no 
gap exists between genders. Although not as high as in Europe and the US, 
the rate of women entering higher education is high and rising. Moreover, it 
must be emphasized that female students in junior colleges had a compe-
titive motivation for learning, as pointed out by a researcher who surveyed 
women’s junior colleges in the 1990s (Matsui, 1997). Even so, women’s 
junior colleges earlier functioned as affirmative action, securing a place for 
female students to study. 
Importantly, the gender gap in Japan’s higher education enrolment rates 
disappeared during the 1980s. Also in the mid-1980s, the gender gap in 
higher education enrolment rates reversed in Norway. That the percentage 
of females in higher education exceeded that of males in both Japan and 
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Norway at the same time indicates that the 1980s were an important 
turning point in feminism’s global history. Even though female students in 
Japan became more motivated to study, especially at university, in the 
1980s, their enrolment in women’s junior colleges did not help close 
Japan’s economic and political gender gap because many junior colleges 
base education on women’s role as housekeepers and caregivers. Japanese 
junior colleges were dualistic, on the one hand, encouraging women’s 
higher learning and on the other, keeping women in the home. 
Since the 1990s, the number of junior colleges in Japan has been de-
creasing, and more and more female students are going to universities. In 
addition, women’s employment rate is now increasing. It will be interesting 
to see how gender equality in Japan will progress in the future. 
In 2018, however, a major incident came to light regarding gender in 
Japan’s higher education. The Japan Times revealed several university 
medical schools to have discriminatorily manipulated university entrance 
examination scores in favour of men (2018). In the year following the ar-
ticles’ publication, female students’ acceptance rate increased in many 
medical schools, in turn suggesting that the discrimination was real. 
According to the articles, medical schools wanted to avoid a doctor 
shortage at their universities’ affiliated hospitals, believing that female 
doctors often resigned or took long vacations after marriage or childbirth. 
Japanese society was shocked to discover that such blatant discrimination 
against women still exists in universities. In contrast, male doctors are ex-
pected not to take long vacations, thus also revealing Japanese doctors’ 
harsh working conditions. 
Obviously, educational issues cannot be considered separately from 
economic, social and political issues. At first glance, education in Japan 
might seem to approach gender equality, but it also harbours a deep-rooted 
discriminatory structure that has made visible major gender discrimination 
in economics and society. The gender gap index does not and cannot reveal 
the deep-rooted structure of discrimination, thus indicating that we still 
have a lot of work to do. 
Note  
1 In particular, the high rate of male enrolment in higher education in Japan and 
Korea can be analysed as an Asian characteristic. 
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5 Creating more equal partnerships: 
Home Economics education and 
gender equality in Japan and 
Norway 
Jennifer Branlat and Junko Sano    
Over the years, Home Economics in Japan and Norway has developed 
along different trajectories but with the shared goal of opening the subject 
to co-educational participation. In Japan, the subject became a requirement 
for all students in 1994. In recent years, it has attempted to lead more men 
towards active participation in home life by keeping domestic and family 
issues on the curriculum. Norway made Home Economics classes co- 
educational in 1959 during a period of educational reform for gender 
equality. However, as the other Scandinavian countries, it has over the past 
decades opted to narrow its focus to ‘food and health’ in order to meet 
health-related social challenges that have supposedly become more urgent 
than the matter of gender equality. 
Home Economics has in the past played an important role in establishing 
gender equality in the private sphere by educating both men and women 
towards domestic competence. More recently, as many countries come to 
promote novel forms of sustainability education, which lies at the inter-
section of gender equality and environmentally friendly ways of living, we 
see Home Economics as having a valuable role to play. Equal levels of 
household competence may reduce the double burden on women and 
support both partners in the establishment of more sustainable households. 
Our focus here will be Japan and Norway. In comparing these two different 
national frameworks, we ask: When it comes to Home Economics educa-
tion, what are the key differences and similarities between the Japanese and 
Norwegian national contexts? What can educators and educational leaders 
from Norway and Japan learn from each other in order to secure a more 
promising future for the subject? 
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing the history of Home Economics 
education to provide one possible explanation for the subject's diminished 
status in Norwegian and Japanese education. Home Economics has gone 
from being a subject for girls only to one which provides each individual, 
both boys and girls, with the skills to become independent and able to 
function in a gender-equal society. In the Norwegian context, we draw 
attention to what might be called a ‘post gender equality’ attitude that 
marks a shift in thinking about the rightful place for children and young 
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adults to learn to perform domestic tasks and duties associated with family 
life. We go on to examine the current position, goals and challenges of 
today's Home Economics education in both countries, complementing 
statistics with the qualitative interviews we carried out with educators in 
lower secondary school and teacher training. The choice to include their 
perspectives in this chapter was motivated by a desire to show that although 
gender equality remains an important goal for family and equality policy, 
Home Economics teachers lack the resources – primarily due to the sub-
ject's negative associations with ‘women’s work’ – to meaningfully support 
this societal aim. 
Today, the Scandinavian welfare state is represented internationally as a 
‘model’ for promoting work-life balance based on the dual-earner/dual- 
carer family model (Cousins & Tang, 2004; Ellingsæter, 2009). One of the 
most widely documented effects of this model has been that employment 
rates for mothers of young children remain among the highest in Europe. If 
we dig deeper, however, we obtain a more fine-grained understanding of 
the division of household labour as it pertains to the same group. Kitterød 
and Rønsen (2012, p. 671) have shown that the equal sharing of paid work, 
which concerns only 40% of Norwegian women, is much more common 
than non-traditional arrangements whereby a woman would work more 
than her partner (10% of women). Even if the gap between the total time 
spent by men and women on household tasks and childcare has been greatly 
reduced since the 1970s, women with young children still spend approxi-
mately twice as much time on household tasks and childcare than men. This 
unequal sharing of household tasks creates a double burden situation 
whereby women have the responsibility for paid work in the labour market 
as well as an unequal share of unpaid work in the household. Household 
work duties are also highly segregated by gender in Norway, as is the case 
for many other countries (Hook, 2010). Drawing on various studies,  
Seierstad and Kirton (2015) have contended that ‘the domestic division of 
labour in Norway seems more impervious to state policy measures’ than 
other arenas (p. 394). 
In Japan, the Cabinet Office’s 2019 survey of about 8000 men and 
women examined the division of housework and showed that among 
couples without children, women spent 2.6 times as much time on house-
work as men in households with couples. When it comes to households 
with children, women spent from 2.8 to 3.6 times as much time on 
housework as men and 2.1 to 2.7 times as much time on childcare (Gender 
Equality Bureau, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan 2020). Even though 
men’s time spent on housework has increased gradually over the past 
decade in Japan, women still bear most of the burden of household work. 
In the light of this current situation for both Japan and Norway, we 
would like to reflect upon the purpose and relevance of current Home 
Economics education by asking: Does the subject have the potential to 
contribute to a more equal distribution of domestic responsibilities? In 
Creating more equal partnerships 71 
which ways does Home Economics education in its current (as of 2020) 
form in Japan and Norway support the creation of a more gender-equal 
society? In regards to the latter, we refer to the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), the fifth of which targets ‘the promotion of 
shared responsibility within the household and the family as nationally 
appropriate’ (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). If Home Economics 
education in Norway and Japan continues facing significant challenges – such as 
meagre budgets for classroom learning activities, low ranking within the ‘the 
traditional curriculum hierarchy’ (Bleazby, 2015, p. 261), the constant reduction 
of required study hours and relatively few male teachers – how will it be able to 
contribute to gender equality? 
Home Economics, modernisation and the legitimisation of 
women’s education 
It is important to note that the history of Home Economics education in 
Japan, as in Norway, is closely related to the history of traditional women’s 
work (Øvrebø & Engeset, 2020; Makino, 2005). Even prior to the mod-
ernisation of Japan in 1868 and the subsequent creation of the national 
education system in 1872, women were responsible for weaving and sewing 
fabric for underwear and bedding, as well as clothing for their families. 
Sewing, considered to be a distinctly women’s art, endures even today as a 
part of the Home Economics curriculum. In Japan, during the late 1930s as 
part of the war effort, Home Economics was doubled in number of hours, 
and classes were dedicated to the production of supplies in support of the 
nation. The subject also contributed in pedagogical terms to the emergence 
of the ‘good wife, wise mother’ ideology whereby women performed citi-
zenship through raising and educating children while men became part of 
the national community by engaging in production activities or military 
duties (Koyama, 2014, p. 97). 
In the Norwegian public school system, Home Economics education has 
undergone many changes since its initial adoption into school curriculum in 
1908, but the subject traces its roots back even earlier to 1865 and the 
creation of the first ‘housewife school’ (‘husmorskole’). Such schools, which 
arose alongside agricultural schools and where women obtained specialised 
instruction in domestic subjects, were part of the modernisation of Norway. 
From its very beginnings in a rural context, the question of healthy eating 
habits has always occupied a central position (Øvrebø & Engeset, 2020, 
p. 11). The increasing number of housewife schools from the mid-19th 
century onward reflects the state’s objective to both formalise and pro-
fessionalise knowledge (Larsen & Hagemann, 2011, p. 267) with respect to 
the home – an initiative that was reinforced by the schools’ connections to 
developments in nutritional science and the natural sciences, particularly 
microbiology. This initiative gave women a new standing in the family and 
society, even as it marginalised them. The schools were also instrumental in 
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the development of the ‘housewife ideology’ in Norway, which aimed to 
‘strengthen the position of the housewife in modern society’ and delineate 
the nature of suitable work for women (Melby, 1989, p. 184). In particular, 
the Statens lærerinneskole for husstell (The State Teacher Training School 
for Housekeeping), created in 1909 in the city of Stabekk, became what  
Larsen and Hagemann (2011, p. 268) called a ‘hub’ for the development of 
housekeeping as an academic subject, making great strides towards ex-
panding housekeeping outside the home and pushing towards its recogni-
tion as a science. The creation of the school in Stabekk, with its attendant 
networks of public and private actors, also significantly marked ‘a cohesive 
attempt to define housework as something more than just housework. It 
was about knowledge, work, identity and consumption’ [emphasis in ori-
ginal] (Larsen & Hagemann, 2011, p. 268). 
The school reform of 1959, which led to the creation of the mandatory 
nine-year school (niårig skole), aimed to erase disparities between urban 
and rural areas and offer equal opportunities to all pupils. This reform 
secured gender equality a prominent place in the post-war modernisation of 
Norway. The act also had implications both for Home Economics as an 
emerging science and for the development of gender equality among pupils. 
On the one hand, one can see the first manifestations of legal-based gender 
equality reform in the Norwegian public school system in that all curricular 
differences between girls and boys were abolished, leading to the elimina-
tion of reduced hours in theoretical subjects for girls. Until that time, a 
gender-divided curriculum stipulated that boys be offered more hours in 
math and sports, and while girls were offered courses in sewing and do-
mestic arts, boys learned carpentry and crafts. From 1959 onwards, both 
home knowledge and handcrafts became obligatory subjects for all chil-
dren. The school reform of 1959, with aims toward gender equality, ir-
onically marked the end of the traditional women’s higher education 
institutions. This was particularly the case for the aforementioned activity 
clustered around the Statens lærerinneskole for husstell, which was, along 
with other women’s-only institutions, transformed into a co-educational 
teaching college (Larsen & Hagemann, 2011). Considered in this light, it 
emerges that initial efforts to create gender-equal conditions in schools were 
also responsible for dismantling a pillar of women’s knowledge, food and 
nutrition science, which connected women to the more prestigious natural 
sciences, like microbiology. 
As for post-war Japan, in 1968 the field changed dramatically when ju-
nior high school ‘Vocational and Home Economics’ became ‘Technology 
and Home Economics,’ and the Ministry of Education divided the subject 
content along gendered lines with designated content reserved for boys and 
girls. This change is reflected in how, throughout the 1960s, Japanese 
corporations strategized to get more workers skilled in STEM by pressing 
the government to use education to build a skilled workforce. As a result, 
girls were offered cooking, clothing production, home mechanics/home 
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crafts, design/drawing and childcare, while boys’ instruction included wood 
and metal working, design and drafting, electricity and mechanics. This 
emphasis reflects the fact that Japan’s rapid economic growth was depen-
dent on the government’s promotion of a gendered division of labour, with 
men engaged in production work and women doing domestic work (see  
Murase, 2005). 
After the Second World War, Home Economics education in Japan was 
influenced by the government’s policies and ideals of gendered citizenship 
and differentiated education. During the period of rapid economic growth 
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, the number of full-time housewives 
increased. In high schools, Home Economics in Japan went from an elective 
subject to a compulsory subject for girls, starting in 1970. The 1994 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, which Japan signed, became the driving force behind making 
Home Economics a co-educational subject for all students. According to  
Kano (2011), the years 1995 to 2005 may go down in history as a decade 
when ‘gender’ became one of the most visible and hotly contested terms in 
Japanese political discourse. 
In Norway, the progressive emergence of the dual-earner model and the 
distancing of women from the home during 1970s feminist movements 
meant that both boys and girls could learn to participate on equal terms in 
family and domestic life. Continuing in the same direction, support for 
family policy and gender equality reached a peak with the election of what 
is known as the ‘women’s government’ of 1986 under the leadership of 
Norway’s first female prime minister. The subsequent 1987 issue of the 
school plan marked a pinnacle for Home Economics teaching in Norwegian 
public schools. Not only were the number of teaching hours increased, but 
the curriculum had been revised to establish a clear focus on the practical 
skills (diaper changing, food preparation and housekeeping skills, to name a 
few) necessary for the equal division of household labour. In 1987, the 
presence of gender equality as a curricular theme was also strengthened. 
Following this peak for gender equality in Home Economics education, 
practical domestic skills were progressively phased out and hours reduced, 
making it today the subject with the least amount of teaching hours. In 
addition, the decline of domestic skills and gender equality as a curricular 
theme can be traced to the broader shift towards more neoliberalist and 
individualistic thinking in public policy and to a perception that gender 
equality has been achieved. 
Home Economics education from 2000 onward 
Home Economics in Japan now encompasses a wide range of fields, in-
cluding not only food, clothing and shelter but also learning about family 
and childcare; it moreover engages students in consumer and environmental 
education (Ito, 2019). Currently, it consists of three main subjects: Family 
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and home life; food, clothing and housing; and consumer life and en-
vironment. It is intended as a practical, ‘hands-on’ subject that engages 
pupils in experiential learning to acquire not only knowledge but also skills 
and techniques. Since 1994, it has been a compulsory, co-educational 
subject in primary, lower secondary and upper secondary school while the 
required teaching hours for Home Economics have steadily decreased 
since 1947. 
In Japan, Home Economics in high schools has also undergone significant 
changes. The 1994 revision of the national Courses of Study boosted the 
required hours considerably, making mandatory a four-credit course for 
boys and girls. However, in 2003, during the conservative backlash of that 
decade, an alternative format was introduced – a two-credit course called 
Basic Home Economics. According to a survey by Nonaka et al. (2015), 
63% of high schools in the Tokyo metropolitan area have switched to this 
reduced version of the course. As a result, the number of full-time Home 
Economics teachers has also decreased, with many schools having only one 
full-time teacher. This decline in teacher numbers raises questions about the 
consequences of a weakened professional network and the implications that 
it has for curricular innovation, teamwork and experience-sharing among 
teachers. 
In Norway, from 2006 onward, the subject has been more clearly con-
textualised in a health and healthy lifestyle perspective to meet the societal 
challenge of preventing obesity and diet-related chronic diseases like dia-
betes. Today, the subject area is therefore represented by a compulsory 
‘Mat og Helse’ (Food and Health) course that is further broken down into 
three subject areas: Food and lifestyle, food and culture, and food and 
consumption. 
It is helpful to situate the current Food and Health curriculum – which 
aims to establish a solid foundation for enhanced physical and mental 
health and social well-being and social equity – more broadly within the 
2020 governmental school reform. In light of this new framework, Food 
and Health is designed to teach students that skills related to food and meal 
preparation are of great importance to mental, physical and social well- 
being, and that the promotion of healthy eating habits and knowledge 
about nutrition have the capacity to lower social inequalities with respect to 
health. 
Food and Health therefore has an ambitious mandate within the 
Norwegian societal context, but numerous studies have shown that the 
subject’s lack of prestige within the public-school system have led to uneven 
and substandard practices in schools (Vik et al., 2020). In a recent study,  
Vik et al. (2020, p. 53) showed that in spite of national requirements, only 
half of current Home Economics teachers in Norwegian lower secondary 
schools possess formal qualifications to teach the subject. More recently,  
Bottolfs (2020) has shown through empirical research that teachers with a 
high level of formal competency in Home Economics demonstrate 
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significantly better teaching practices with respect to ‘choice of dishes, study 
materials and [sufficient] focus on the student’s health and the theme of 
obesity’ (p. 191). 
In contrast to Norway’s focus on dietary health, Japanese Home 
Economics has retained a broader thematic focus. In elementary school, for 
example, Home Economics’ goals include developing the ability to relate 
better to others. It is also overtly focused on cherishing the notion of 
‘Japaneseness,’ whereby children are educated on the importance of 
Japanese lifestyle and culture with regards to food, clothing and housing. In 
junior high school, cooperation continues to be emphasised; students learn 
about issues and practices in family and community life. At the senior high 
school level, themes include social change and the promotion of a sus-
tainable society, dietary education, cooperation between men and women 
to build a family, understanding of the role of parents and child-rearing 
support, understanding the elderly, lifestyle planning, consumerism and 
environmentally friendly lifestyles, and the inheritance of Japanese lifestyle 
and culture (Sato, 2021). Despite this rather comprehensive list of themes 
connected to contemporary society, there is little to no explicit mention of 
gender issues in the teaching plan. Self-reliance, however, appears to have 
become greatly valued in today’s high school curriculum in Japan, just as it 
has in Norway – which makes sense given the introduction of in-
dividualistic, neoliberal values into curricular thinking and rationales. 
On the matter of gender equality in Japan, much attention has been paid 
in recent years to the question of whether the introduction of co-education 
in Home Economics in 1994 has brought about any significant changes in 
the attitudes and behaviour of women and men. Concerning women, a 
survey of 502 employed mothers in 2014 found that Home Economics 
courses influenced their ability to plan for the future and enhanced their 
sense of life fulfilment (Sano, 2016). Men who studied Home Economics in 
its co-educational form since it began in 1994 are now part of the child- 
rearing generation. Compared to men who studied before 1994, their views 
on family and gender roles point in a revolutionary and gender-free1 di-
rection (Nakanishi, 2011). Ishii-Kuntz (2013) has argued that the recent 
‘Ikumen phenomenon’ in Japan – the rise of so-called ‘good-looking’ men 
who actively participate in raising children – has been closely linked to 
Home Economics education. Overall, Home Economics education has clear 
contribution to make in reducing Japan’s gendered division of labour and in 
promoting men’s behaviour in housework and childcare. 
Current teachers’ perspectives on Home Economics 
In this section, we present the results of our qualitative study of teachers’ 
perspectives on the relationship of Home Economics education to gender 
equality. Interviewees were asked about the following: Their motivation for 
working in the field, what they believe is unique about the subject of Home 
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Economics in terms of academic content, the ways in which they approach 
teaching, salient differences (including gender) in the classroom, how they 
would like to see the subject evolve in the future, and the ways (if any) in 
which the curriculum and/or teaching approaches integrate the concept of 
‘gender equality.’ The data was collected over a three-month period, from 
October to December 2020, in the form of semi-structured interviews. The 
survey participants were recruited in a snowball style from our initial 
contacts. The interview duration was one to two hours. Interviews in 
Norway were conducted in English and interviews in Japan were conducted 
in Japanese. A total of five university-level educators in Home Economics 
at national universities and three high or middle school-level Home 
Economics teachers were interviewed (see Table 5.1). 
All of the university faculty members are principal members of the 
Japanese Society for Home Economics Education2 and have published 
Home Economics textbooks. As university faculty, Mika, Mariko and Emi 
are quite passionate and proactive, and while they can be considered leaders 
in the field of Home Economics education, they may not provide a re-
presentative picture of Home Economics teachers across Japan whose 
motivations and professional qualifications may differ. On the Norwegian 
side, it proved difficult to contact formally educated Home Economics 
teachers, given that roughly half of teachers in Home Economics in 
Norwegian lower secondary school do not have any formal education in the 
field and not all teacher training programs offer such a specialisation. Two 
Table 5.1 Breakdown of Interviewees by Name, Country, Age and Current Position       
Name Sex Age Affiliation Current 
position  
Mika (Japan) F 50s National university, Advanced 
Practice of School Education 
Associate 
Professor 




F 50s National university, Family Studies 
Pedagogy, Department of Life 




Emi (Japan) F 50s National university, Graduate 


















F 40s Public lower secondary school Middle school 
teacher    
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university-level educators in Home Economics, Lisbeth and Solveig, were 
recruited from a prominent teacher training program in southern Norway 
offering a Home Economics specialisation. At the lower secondary level, we 
reached out to three schools in the Sør-Trøndelag region and recruited two 
teachers currently teaching in Home Economics: Gunhild has three to four 
years of experience in primary and lower secondary education, and Marit 
has over 15 years of experience in various primary and lower secondary 
schools in the region. As part of the data collection phase corresponded to 
the shift to online teaching due to pandemic-related school closures, all 
interviews took place online. 
Teachers’ overall focus 
Much like the Japanese teachers, the Norwegian teachers report that there 
is no intentional or explicit focus on ‘gender’ or ‘gender equality’ in the 
school curriculum. It is assumed that all pupils participate equally in the co- 
creation of food and other practical exercises, irrespective of gender. When 
asked about how they approach the subject, their responses reflected a 
narrow focus on food preparation. The keywords that emerged from the 
interviews in Norway were ‘creativity,’ ‘challenge’ and ‘diversity,’ sug-
gesting that experimentation and improvisation are important skills to free 
students from the idea that one mistake will ruin a recipe. Developing these 
attitudes takes priority over skill building. As Marit explained, 
Everyone needs to be able to participate and feel the joy of cooking. I 
want my students to learn how to be independent. They can do this by 
learning and exploring their creativity. I don’t want them to feel that 
cooking is rigid and that they are bound by rules.  
Both current classroom teachers put great emphasis on the ways in which 
they perceived the practical subjects like Food and Health to be more in-
clusive and welcoming to diverse student abilities. According to Marit, 
‘Students should be able to read a recipe and collaborate in groups with the 
understanding that everyone has something to contribute….Creating a cosy 
environment is key; it opens up something different than the theoretical 
subjects. Discovery is important.’ Similarly, in Japan, Yumi explained, ‘I 
choose assignments that can be completed in a short period of time and 
value the students’ sense of accomplishment. In Home Economics, kids who 
don’t stand out in other subjects can show their individuality.’ 
In Japan, in 1947, after the Second World War, the topics covered in 
Home Economics were not limited to food and nutrition, but shifted from 
sewing to democratic family relations, and now include a wide range of 
topics such as food, housing, childcare, consumer education, environmental 
issues and even financial education. The interviews with teachers suggest 
that the goal of Home Economics in Japan is for students to acquire 
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knowledge and skills to support self-reliance. Equally, they should develop 
the ability and desire to understand the function of the family and to im-
prove their lives. Mika explained, 
I want students to be aware of everything and learn new things. I want 
them to be able to do things if they try, and to value a sense of 
accomplishment. I want them to have life skills and to have a 
perspective on their life stages.  
Gender equality as an implicit value 
Both Japanese and Norwegian teachers claim at first that they do not 
consciously teach about gender-related issues in her classroom, nor do they 
perceive any gendered division of labour in the practical tasks. Norwegian 
classroom teachers reported no gender-related differences in skill level 
among their students. They did, however, point to differences related to the 
level of home support, pointing out that socio-economic factors influencing 
the home may play a more significant role than a student’s gender: ‘For 
some students [cooking activities] give them a greater chance to thrive and 
showcase their skills, for others [who have no chance to cook at home] it’s 
like going to the moon’ (Gunhild). 
In Norway, Solveig shared the belief that the conceptualisation of Food 
and Health as an essential subject at the political level, which has an in-
creasingly individualistic and neoliberalist approach, has contributed to a 
sidelining of gender equality and women’s contributions to the field: 
It’s the politicians who obviously don’t understand that Food and 
Health could be a foundation…for the new curriculum. They don’t see 
it as connected to the interdisciplinary theme of ‘democracy and 
citizenship’, which is crazy because think of gender, for instance, which 
is so important in Food and Health. The pioneers of the field in the 
19th century saw gender as a focus, and they even made Food and 
Health schools for boys in Sognefjord. Much of the aim of the subject 
was of course to level the differences in the society – that has a lot to do 
with democracy and citizenship, so it’s a missed opportunity.  
The transition to Food and Health from the 1980s focus on domestic tasks 
and gender equality reflects the view that newly emerging societal problems 
such as obesity should take priority because gender equality has already 
been achieve in Norway. Solveig sees the potential contribution of Food 
and Health in a broader perspective regarding the role it can play in re-
ducing social inequality overall. 
For their part, Japanese interviewees claim that male students participate 
in the class without any tangible sense of discomfort. However, in 
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conversations between students during class, Yumi sometimes sees them 
making value judgments based on gender, such as, ‘It’s strange that you’re a 
girl and you’re not good at Home Economics,’ or ‘It’s amazing that you’re a 
boy and you’re good at sewing.’ In schools, there is a tendency to emphasise 
theoretical subjects related to university entrance examinations, and 
therefore home economics classes that involve practical skills are neglected. 
She also feels that the content of the classes, with the recent reductions in 
required hours and the resulting time constraints, have rendered the classes 
broad and shallow, making it difficult for students to learn skills such as 
cooking and sewing in a meaningful way. 
Mariko, associate professor at another university that also trains Home 
Economics teachers, also responded that she herself does not talk about 
gender equality emphatically to her students. One of the classes she teaches is 
called ‘Research on Teaching Materials,’ in which student teachers freely 
choose teaching materials and present them during seminars. Mariko has 
noticed a recent increase in the students who choose ‘gender equality’ as their 
theme. She worries that university students are interested in marriage – 
couples working together to do housework and childcare in their own lives – 
but they are unable to develop teaching materials where they can actually try 
their hands at it. In fact, she has little experience in teaching with hands-on 
teaching materials. Many classes end with writing on a printout or reading a 
textbook. Home economics classes need to have a balance between ‘theory 
and practice,’ she said. 
According to the response of the students in Emi’s college class and 
feedback from in-class discussions, most male students would like to take 
childcare leave in the future. However, when asked who will cook the meals 
and clean the house during the period of leave, few of these male students 
answered that they will do it themselves. Rather, they assumed their future 
wives will do it. In response, Emi stated that it is essential for everyone to 
learn domestic skills in Home Economics classes. 
No more washing temperatures, no more ironing: A home life built 
on creativity 
When asked about the absence of skills related to housework and other 
domestic tasks in the current Food and Health curriculum, the university 
educators in Norway were not entirely in agreement. Lisbeth expressed a 
sense of relief that the subject no longer addresses domestic tasks such as 
laundry and ironing: 
I’m glad that [Home Economics] doesn’t include learning about these 
kinds of tasks anymore. In the past, there was nothing in the curriculum 
about gender equality in the kitchen because there was no gender 
equality. It was more about how to iron your tablecloth and how to 
divide different clothes to different washing temperatures. I’m happy 
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that that’s out. That should be taught in homes so that in school we are 
free to focus on something else. The household division of household 
labour in the home fits more in the social sciences than my view of 
Home Economics as a topic.  
For Lisbeth, domestic tasks reflect an outdated image of the subject, re-
flecting a time when Home Economics played a role in locating women’s 
work in the home and, in her view, was associated with the carrying out of 
very unimaginative tasks. Lisbeth expresses a sense that the subject today 
should be more open and concerned with building a life based on in-
dependence and creativity. Regarding her student teachers in Food and 
Health, she reports, 
I want for them to feel so secure in their skills, the specific cooking 
skills, but also the didactics, so that they can also leave the control to 
students and let them be creative. Because it seems now that by the time 
we get our student teachers into their third year of teacher education, 
we have somehow ‘uncreativitied’ them. When they are finally able to 
think outside the box, that that’s when the fun starts and that’s when 
the magic happens. It’s not just about replicating some oppskrift 
[recipe] or doing something the way we always did. That’s not how 
to build a life.  
From this perspective, Lisbeth wants to promote the idea that a home life 
shared together is less about the carrying out of uninventive, uninspiring 
tasks than it is about innovation and creativity. In her view, taking an 
academic approach to the household division of labour would be more 
fitting to the social sciences. Solveig on the other hand perceived the 
omission of domestic skills as an unfortunate legacy of feminism’s en-
deavour to liberate women from the home. This suggests a tension in Home 
Economics in Norway between teachers who wish to focus on skills and 
those emphasising attitude development. 
Domestic skills for a fulfilling life 
Both concerns – skills and attitude development – emerged in the Japanese 
interviews, too. The keywords that emerged from the Japanese educators’ 
interviews are ‘housework skills’ and ‘sense of accomplishment.’ The stu-
dent teachers expressed that they wanted both boys and girls to learn 
housekeeping skills and to have a sense of accomplishment that they could 
do this if they tried. For example, Emi states, 
I see value in raising children well, building strong marital relation-
ships, balancing professional and family life, and this can be achieved 
through domestic skills. No matter how many ideas of gender equality 
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and caring and kind words we have, it will be completely meaningless 
without domestic work skills. It is very important for both men and 
women to have the ability to live independently. I have the impression 
that Home Economics is divided into two areas, one dealing with 
human relations and the other with things.  
Achieving gender equality in Japan will require individual independence, 
and consumer, environmental and financial education: Critical knowledge 
about food, clothing and housing is essential. Although the subjects of this 
survey responded that they did not pay special attention to gender equality 
in their classes, they spoke of their intention to not pursue gender equality 
actively in their classrooms but rather to help all students acquire the life 
skills required to realise a gender-equal society. 
Discussion 
In both Norway and Japan, the challenges associated with the field of 
Home Economics as described in the research literature came up in the 
interviews with teachers. They identified tangible roadblocks that prevent 
them from accomplishing the curricular objectives. In particular, in 
Norway, the reduced number of hours, lean budget and low status of Food 
and Health as an academic topic perpetuate attitudes that the subject is less 
important than theoretical subjects. Further, the idea that learning about 
domestic tasks and the equal sharing of household work should take place 
in the private sphere – and not take up valuable space in the school curri-
culum – was suggested as one of the benefits of the relatively new focus on 
Food and Health. The Japanese case is similar. Although Home Economics 
has been recognised as fundamental to developing individual independence, 
gender equity, collaborative ability and life skills, it too has experienced 
diminished support in terms of hours, budget and prestige. Many high 
schools have only one full-time teacher, who is eventually replaced by a 
part-time teacher. In addition, in both countries, a high percentage of Home 
Economics teachers are women, and the percentage of students studying 
Home Economics education at universities is also overwhelmingly female. 
This trend has not improved to date. The image that Home Economics in 
Japan is an activity for women has not been completely eradicated. 
The most significant difference between Norway and Japan in Home 
Economics education today concerns the place allocated to the learning of 
domestic skills in the curriculum. With the focus narrowed to Food and 
Health following public health concerns over obesity, domestic skills in 
Norway are today absent from the school curriculum and relegated to the 
private sphere. In Japan, domestic skills still form an important part of the 
curriculum. They are based on the idea that such skills make, in the words 
of one teacher, ‘raising children well, building strong marital relationships 
[and] balancing professional and family life’ more possible. However, like 
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Japanese teachers, Norwegian educators expressed ideals of a home life 
based on freedom, creativity and the cultivation of joy in food preparation. 
The trained Home Economics educators in higher education were divided 
on the absence of domestic skills in the current curriculum. Some of the 
interviewees viewed domestic skills rather negatively, associating them with 
the housewife era and an outdated image of women’s work. Others la-
mented the loss of these skills that potentially reduce social inequalities. In 
the words of Solveig, ‘How can we assume that such skills can be acquired 
at home when we don’t assume the same for other subjects? Why should 
domestic skills be an exception?’ 
Today the notion of gender equality in Norway, one of the so-called 
‘model’ countries for work-life balance and gender equality, is covered only 
theoretically in the social studies curriculum in spite of persisting inequal-
ities within the home concerning the sharing of domestic tasks. We might 
ask for future research, what is lost when students approach gender 
equality in theoretical terms (e.g., in social studies) and fail to gain the 
embodied knowledge provided by the development of hands-on skills? Our 
study also supports the literature on the current challenges facing the 
subject by introducing teachers’ lived experiences with such difficulties. 
While the curricular content of Home Economics in Japan has become 
increasingly broadened, Norway has chosen to narrow its focus to food and 
health. Domestic skills and family care, which figured most prominently in 
the curriculum during the mid-1980s, have been phased out. This may be 
due to a prevailing cultural attitude that these skills are best cultivated 
within the space of the home, but more research on Norwegian attitudes 
towards domestic work is needed to complement the body of literature on 
time sharing within the home. 
Although similar cultural attitudes may be in play in Japan, there is a 
movement to rethink housework in a ‘modern’ way, as represented in the 
KonMari Method3 by Marie Kondo whereby rooms are cleaned and or-
ganised in creative and meaningful ways. Our interviews with Home 
Economics educators in Norway suggest that, much like their Japanese 
counterparts, they embrace the development of creativity and ingenuity as 
valuable assets in the curriculum, but their potential impact on the home 
has been limited due to the subject’s instrumental turn toward Food and 
Health in the 2000s and by negative cultural attitudes concerning domestic 
tasks due to their association with the housewife era in Norway when 
women’s workplace primarily limited to the home. We believe that Norway 
can learn from the idea that daily housework and domestic tasks may 
provide an outlet for creative thinking. Developing a more positive asso-
ciation with such activities can help students to lead more fulfilled lives. 
On the other hand, Japanese Home Economics may have a good deal to 
learn from the Norwegian context. According to Furuichi (2019), gender 
equality in Norway did not start with an ideology. As the expansion of the 
welfare state in the 1960s led to a shortage of labour and rising prices, it 
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became difficult for a single man to make a living, which in turn led to the 
participation of women in the workforce. Japan is currently experiencing a 
labour shortage due to the declining birth rate and ageing population, 
putting it in much the same situation as Norway 60 years ago. Japan also 
needs to learn from Norway’s policies, social welfare system and awareness 
of gender equality. 
Finally, in both countries, Home Economics should be given a more 
prominent and prestigious place in the overall curriculum as societies 
around the world seek out more sustainable and ecological ways of living 
both at the household and societal levels. Research and practice should be 
used to show how environmentally friendly and gender-equal home man-
agement can contribute to society in the future, and adequate class time 
should be reserved for this. 
Notes  
1 ‘Gender free’ is a Japanese term meaning free from the imposition of historical, 
cultural and social gender differences. But this term also incited right-wing 
backlash in Japan.  
2 Landslaget for mat og helse i skolen (LMHS) is one of the Norwegian equivalents.  
3 The KonMari Method (2021) encourages tidying by category – not by location – 
beginning with clothes, then moving on to books, papers, komono (miscellaneous 
items), and, finally, sentimental items. Keep only those things that speak to the 
heart, and discard items that no longer spark joy. 
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6 Teaching with feminist values: A 
dialogical narrative analysis of 
gender studies educator narratives 
Jennifer Branlat    
Gender studies education in a transnational perspective 
This chapter explores the ways in which Gender Studies educators in Norway 
and Japan position themselves in educating their students. With a curriculum 
that leads students to examine critically the complex web of gender and its 
intersections with sexuality, race, power relations, marginalisation and colo-
niality, both teacher and student may be naturally led to reflections on in-
equalities within the institution of higher education itself. Indeed, teaching in 
higher education takes place within an institutional context that has tradi-
tionally excluded women and their histories from the realm of what constitutes 
‘legitimate knowledge.’ The overarching question I ask is the following: How 
do Gender Studies educators in Norway and Japan situate and position 
themselves pedagogically within the discursive landscape surrounding Gender 
Studies as it exists in the academy today? To what extent is there room for a 
transnational ‘we’ in Gender Studies education that might benefit from col-
lective pedagogical strategies? What is to be gained by examining Gender 
Studies education in Norway and Japan in a cross-cultural perspective? 
This study is exploratory in the sense that there is no well-defined body of 
scholarly literature on Gender Studies pedagogy in either Japan or Norway. 
In addition, proceeding with numerous uncertainties about the extent to 
which cultural distinctions effect educator positionings, I found it fitting to 
use a method unobtrusive enough to allow me to listen for influences and 
possible connections between teaching practice and feminist theory. Arthur  
Frank (2012) borrows from Bakhtin’s concept of ‘polyphony’ to show how 
one’s voice is never entirely one’s own, but instead is rife with ‘the voices of 
specific others’ (p. 3). In this chapter, I analyse four narratives by Gender 
Studies educators (two from Norway, two from Japan) and use the term 
‘voice’ to signal moments where the listener – in this case a fellow teacher 
and researcher – can perceive such echoes most clearly. 
Gender Studies – formerly ‘Women’s Studies’ – in both countries became 
institutionalised in the wake of second wave feminism, yet the processes 
leading to the legitimisation of the field over the years have been quite dif-
ferent. The same can be said for other factors – namely, the place of feminism 
DOI: 10.4324/9781003185222-6 
within Norwegian and Japanese academic institutions, co-educational versus 
segregated learning environments, the culture of the workforce students are 
prepared for and the increasing internationalisation of higher education. All 
of these contextual elements and more have the potential to influence how 
educators position themselves in their classrooms. Most importantly, an ex-
ploration of these different positionings may tell us more about the possibility 
of transnational cooperation. Is there a ‘we’ to be found among Gender 
Studies educators in Norway and Japan? It is my hope that this exploratory 
comparative approach will also serve as the basis for future educational 
collaboration between the two countries. As a backdrop for further analysis, I 
will in the following section review literature on pedagogy in higher education 
to bring out differences in the Norwegian and Japanese contexts. 
Pedagogy, feminism and the role of the educator in higher ed 
‘Pedagogy’ is a term more widely used than ever before in the context of 
higher education research literature. It has been defined by Stommel and 
Morris (2018), scholars and critical pedagogy educators as the bigger pic-
ture of teaching: 
Pedagogy is praxis, insistently perched at the intersection between the 
philosophy and the practice of teaching. When teachers talk about 
teaching, [they] are not necessarily doing pedagogical work, and not 
every teaching method constitutes a pedagogy. Rather, pedagogy neces-
sarily involves recursive, second-order, meta-level work. Teachers teach; 
pedagogues teach while also actively investigating teaching and learning. 
(paragraph 5)  
It is no longer limited to the field of educational science alone.1 Concerns 
for pedagogy have gradually come to find a place within many fields and 
often recognise the specificity of disciplinary knowledge and adapted 
teaching practices (see, e.g., Chick et al., 2012; Land et al., 2008). This has 
occurred in higher education institutions all over the world as different 
strands of pedagogy have emerged. Paolo Freire’s model of critical peda-
gogy, for example, questions traditional modes of knowledge transmission 
and advocates for a shift away from what is known as the ‘banking model’ 
of education whereby students are seen as passive recipients of knowledge 
(1970). The practice of critical pedagogy has led to more active and 
discipline-specific ways of engaging students by promoting the value of 
questioning traditional models of knowledge transmission. 
In Japan, however, it has been quite rare to discuss the notion of 
‘pedagogy’ in higher education. It is much more common to do so at the 
middle school and high school levels. According to Japanese sociologist and 
well-known feminist Chizuko Ueno, critical and feminist pedagogy’s 
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distance from the disciplining space of higher education can be explained in 
the following way based on her own experience: 
The method that I used [in my classroom teaching] was a Western-style 
teaching method based on the principle of efficiency. It is a method that 
allows students, from beginner to advanced-levels, to read an enormous 
amount of literature in accordance with the context of the course, so 
that they will be able to make international-level arguments in a short 
period of time. In Women’s Studies, which is supposed to be free of 
efficiency and productivity, it is a dilemma to prioritise efficiency. As a 
result, the distance between professionals and amateurs [in Women’s 
Studies] has become wider and wider. (1999, [my translation])  
Ueno’s words reflect an understanding of the university as a professiona-
lising space dedicated to training students as researchers adept in scholarly 
debates and competitive as professionals of Women’s Studies in a male- 
dominated academic job market.2 As a result, pedagogy in Japanese higher 
education, Women’s/Gender Studies included, has not been a primary 
concern. 
With higher education’s institutional focus on the end result of teaching – 
internationally competitive researchers – attention is drawn away from the 
effective pedagogical practices of teachers. This is also exacerbated by the 
fact that research is often more highly valued than teaching. Much less 
scholarly attention has been devoted to what Schulman (1987) calls the 
‘wisdom of practice’ – that is, the knowledge that guides the actions of 
skilled teachers (p. 11). He is particularly interested in what might be 
considered the ‘art’ of teaching or the ways in which teachers are guided by 
or manage ideas within classroom space. Very seldom do colleagues have 
the opportunity to bear witness to each other’s wisdom in action since there 
is an obvious ‘I’ singular in the act of university teaching, resulting in a lost 
opportunity: Or,…the best creations of its practitioners are lost to both 
contemporary and future peers’ (Schulman, 1987, p. 11). In Women’s/ 
Gender Studies, Schulman’s ‘wisdom of practice’ has primarily been 
documented in the literature on feminist pedagogy emerging from an 
Anglo-American context. 
Speaking with educator narratives: A dialogical narrative 
approach 
The pedagogy narratives presented in this study are set into dialogue with 
one another using Arthur Frank’s Dialogical Narrative Approach (DNA) 
(Frank, 2005; 2012). The central role that narratives play in this study is 
underscored by Jerome Bruner’s (2003) claim that autobiographical nar-
ration in its diverse forms ‘should be viewed as a set of procedures for “life 
making”’ (p. 692). Bruner questions what meaning-making we engage in 
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when we ‘construct ourselves autobiographically,’ asking how that process 
may reflect a constructivist approach to narratives as quintessentially ‘in-
terpretive’ events rather than a verifiable transcription of what actually 
happened. In this study, particular consideration must be given to possible 
differences in the Norwegian and Japanese contexts: 
Indeed, one important way of characterizing a culture is by the 
narrative models it makes available for describing the course of a life. 
And the tool kit of any culture is replete not only with a stock of 
canonical life narratives… but with combinable formal constituents 
from which its members can construct their own life narratives: 
canonical stances and circumstances, as it were. (Bruner, 2003, p. 694)  
Frank further claims that individuals have finite means at their disposition – 
‘stability of narrative resources’ (2012, p. 5) – but that these never fix our 
identities into stable creations. DNA asks of the researcher that she respect 
five ‘commitments’ in approaching human stories. The first commitment 
involves acknowledging that the notions of ‘voice’ and ‘story’ are never the 
pure and individual forms of expression we believe them to be. An in-
dividual’s voice exists rather as a patchwork of previously verbalised 
fragments, a ‘dialogue between voices’ (Frank, 2012, p. 3). It is up to the 
researcher to discern the presence and tease out the relationship between 
these different voices rather than construct a static, ‘objectified image.’ In 
this light, the researcher’s role is that of a careful listener. Thus, my analysis 
teases out the multiple voices interviewees use in narrating their experiences 
of teaching in the Gender Studies classroom. 
Fieldwork was conducted in Norway from February 2019 to October 
2020 at the Center for Gender Research of a prominent state-funded re-
search university. Although the Center does not currently have a BA pro-
gram, it does offer a one-year program, as well as MA and PhD programs in 
Gender Equality and Diversity. The MA program, which is taught primarily 
in Norwegian, attracts students from rural and urban areas with diverse 
disciplinary backgrounds and typically enrols between 7 and 15 students 
per year. Faculty teaching in these programs noted a steady uptick in recent 
years’ enrolment, however, which they attribute to the change in the pro-
gram’s name from ‘Gender Studies’ to ‘Gender Equality and Diversity.’ The 
new name reflects current societal ways of discussing themes related to 
gender, making it more appealing to students. 
I interviewed a total of ten educators, six from Norway and four from 
Japan. Informants reflected different generations (four senior teaching faculty 
in their 60s, two in their 50s, three in their 40s, and one in her late 30s – all 
identify as women) and diverse disciplinary backgrounds (sociology, litera-
ture, anthropology and rural studies). My position in this study was that of a 
researcher, teacher and colleague to my informants. This chapter is part of a 
larger study on teaching and learning in Gender Studies that involves both 
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students and teachers in Norway. Planned fieldwork in Japan (spring 2020) 
was interrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which shifted data collection 
from a face-to-face to an online mode. I recruited four educators (all pro-
fessors, all women) through my professional network and through sub-
sequent snowballing from Gender Studies programs at one women’s 
university and one co-educational university in the Tokyo area. The four 
interviews presented in this chapter were all conducted in English and were 
selected based on my interest in: 1) Presenting an equal number of Japanese 
and Norwegian interviewees, 2) reflecting a diversity of educator positions 
and 3) limiting the number so that the interviewee’s stories speak for 
themselves to the greatest degree possible. 
Life experiences and disciplinary teaching 
This first story was told by Noriko, a senior professor at a women’s uni-
versity in Japan. After completing her postgraduate studies and cultivating a 
successful career abroad, Noriko returned to Japan in 2010, motivated by 
the sense that she had much to offer the highly motivated women students 
at the women’s university where she currently works. In our interview, 
Noriko talked about her initial contact with the discipline of Women’s 
Studies as a ‘coincidence, a pure accident,’ but one which allowed her to 
subsequently engage in deep meaning-making processes about her own 
family life: 
I grew up in a family where my father did most of the housework and 
childcare. Constantly throughout my childhood, I asked myself why my 
family was so different from other families in Japan. Because at the time 
moms were doing the cooking and other domestic tasks. In my family it 
was always my dad who did them. My mother never really participated 
in domestic tasks: Childcare, housework, cooking and cleaning. I grew 
up with this big question in my head that was never really answered 
until I went to university and took courses in Women’s Studies and 
family sociology. So that was a very, not just intellectually, but 
personally, stimulating experience for me, to have finally found my 
answer…not one but many answers.  
Here, Noriko invests the discipline of Women’s Studies with personal meaning 
by talking about how it provided ‘not one but many answers’ to the dissonance 
she experienced early on between gender roles in her family and those of 
Japanese society in the 1950s. She narrates her entry into the discipline with an 
introspective voice, representing it as the end of a quest – the arriving at an 
explanatory framework for her earlier lived experience of difference. Her use of 
the reflexive tense in ‘I asked myself’ and the way in which she suggests that the 
burning question was ‘in [her] head’ locate the pursuit as an interior one, unable 
to find an outlet in other ‘objective facts-based courses’: 
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I couldn’t really relate to the content of ‘objective’ facts courses like math 
or Spanish, and therefore couldn’t get excited about learning. I received 
good grades, but that’s because I studied hard, it’s not because I was 
truly motivated to learn. When I first took family sociology or sociology 
of women, I was really inspired by this professor who was teaching the 
course. She was in her late 40s or something. She often talked about her 
own family, her own upbringing, and her own personal kinds of issues, 
not all of which I could relate to simply because we came from two 
different cultures. I was, however, kind of inspired by the fact that she 
was a single mom with five kids whose husband had deserted her… [I 
saw] how a very tragic experience turned into very positive one. Instead 
of using professional vocabulary, she was really trying to explain, to use 
her own examples about certain concepts that otherwise may have been 
difficult for students to understand.  
Noriko speaks very positively of her Family Sociology course and locates 
her eagerness to learn in the professor’s willingness to share personal ex-
periences. When I asked Noriko if she perceived her Women’s Studies or 
‘sociology of women’ courses to be unique in this way, she offered a clear 
distinction between ‘objective’ subject areas that require the memorisation 
of facts and the motivational and inspirational dimensions of Family 
Sociology – which encourages a more ‘investigative’ process. Noriko’s use 
of the comparative voice shows how she sets Women’s Studies against the 
grain of an academic tradition that values objectivity and professionalism, 
and formulaic ‘hard’ work. Her storyteller voice then enters to express awe 
and give shape to the professor’s transformation (‘how a tragic experience 
turned into a very positive one’) in a way that mirrors Noriko’s own period 
of uncertainty followed by understanding, which served as a catalyst for a 
lifelong interest in the field. 
The initial encounter with the Family Sociology professor and the 
opening of an alternative academic world in which life experiences have a 
role to play in student learning led Noriko to develop her own style of 
teaching. When I asked Noriko if she saw this as a distinctly ‘feminist’ 
approach, she traced her genealogy back to a ‘great teacher’ rather than 
particular feminist ways of thinking: 
But if you ask me if I have always been aware of feminist thinking or 
ideology, I would say no. I just did it in my own style, which has been 
influenced by many great teachers I’ve had in the past.  
Noriko proceeds to elaborate on her own teaching style and the ways in 
which she approaches her students today. She draws from an understanding 
of her classroom as a family as she begins to narrate about her practice: 
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By sharing my own experiences and my family’s experiences, [students] 
get interested. They are always interested in our personal lives. Even 
without revealing too much, I can talk about, particularly in family 
sociology class, sibling rivalry. I talk about my daughters, my two 
daughters always fighting with each other [laughs], and things like that. 
Students can get very interested in things like that. I don’t mind, I’d 
rather be talking about my own experiences if that helps my students to 
understand.  
The mother’s voice became most prevalent at the end of our interview when 
Noriko explained how she was known on the campus as the ‘mother’ and 
that she had come to see her students as her ‘children.’ This mother’s voice 
carries several sub-voices and emerges as something quite complex: A 
caring voice that wants the students to develop through learning, an em-
pathetic voice and an expert voice as reflected in ‘a consciousness of how 
they might learn something’ based on her more than 20 years of teaching: 
I am known as ‘mother of [university neighbourhood campus]’. 
Students come to me as a mother figure. Even the students who I 
only know a little bit through my regular class! They might come to me 
with their love problems to seek my advice. I say, ok, I can listen to you. 
I’m not a counsellor, so I cannot give you counselling, but… As I’ve 
gotten older, I’ve begun to think of my students as my own kids. What 
would my kids think if I taught it this way? As a parent of a student 
attending a university, I want my kids to be interested in the topic and 
want [them] to learn more. So, it’s not just how I feel, but it’s also the… 
how do you call it? An awareness or consciousness of how they might 
learn something. I don’t know how to explain it. But I tend to think 
that way.  
Noriko’s story of her approach to teaching is presented in a long-term 
perspective and grounded in her own experiences with Women’s Studies as 
a student. She finds her own experiences in the classroom more helpful than 
any formal notion of ‘feminist pedagogy.’ Her recognition that a teacher’s 
personal experiences – narrated as stories – have an important contribution 
to make in the learning encounter can also be explored in dialogue with 
student resistance to learning, as we will see in Takako’s story. 
Alienation and student resistance 
Takako is also a senior professor and experienced teacher whose back-
ground is in Arts. She teaches in Gender Studies but also in liberal arts 
courses that bring in gender perspectives. In our interview, Takako spoke 
from the standpoint of someone who teaches at both a women’s university 
and a co-educational university in the same city. Takako also related her 
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current identity as an educator and teaching strategies to her own experi-
ences as a student, having attended only women’s universities herself: 
I went to a girl’s high school and then on to a women’s university and 
the graduate school of that same women’s university. During my 
studies, I attended a literature club at a nearby co-ed university. That 
was quite a culture shock to me! I knew that when I wanted to do 
something, nobody would stop me among those girls. I wasn’t the 
leader type, but I still had the awareness that I could do anything I 
wanted. At the co-ed university, the roles of girls and boys were strictly 
divided. I couldn’t have been a leader there even if I had wanted to. As 
girls at an all-girls high school, we had to do everything on our own.  
When I asked if she perceived this environment to be ‘empowering,’ Takako 
was quick to answer to the contrary: ‘To me it was very natural. When 
somebody wanted to do something, nobody would stop her. Rather, they 
would encourage her and support her.’ The atmosphere of the all-girls high 
school is voiced in terms of the lack of gendered obstacles. She describes her 
own response to this environment as positive in that it enabled her to take 
control over her life course. Takako’s teacher’s voice, presented in a nur-
turing collective voice, emphasises the continuity of past and present: ‘At [a 
women’s university] we encourage our students to do whatever they would 
like to do, and there is no limit. The unwritten or implicit pressures from 
the larger societal environment are of course still there.’ Takako presents 
external societal pressures as potentially undermining the teacher’s collec-
tive efforts, and the nurturing voice is suddenly silenced by the looming 
observation with which she ends her thought. 
I invited Takako to talk about how she engages students in learning. She 
began by stressing the importance and power of representation in natur-
alising a particular worldview: 
I think the power of representation has a stronger capacity to make us 
think that something is ‘natural’. If you were told not to attend higher 
education and just get married, then you rebel; but if you’re shown 
pictures and images over and over, it becomes natural for you to believe 
that this is the world. We examine traditional representations, but then 
I show them something that alienates, the Guerrilla Girls performance 
group, for example, their poster of a nude with a gorilla head [with the 
text, ‘Do women have to be naked to get into the Met. Museum? Less 
than 5% of the artist[s] in the Modern Art section are women but 85% 
of the nudes are female.’] But anyway, I try to have them think, and 
each time I try to have them articulate responses [in] their own words. I 
don’t think I teach them how to fight, but I get them to think of about 
the power structures of this world.  
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Takako’s story presents thinking and fighting as two possible feminist 
stances with respect to the world outside the classroom. ‘Not teaching them 
to fight’ argues against the implicit voice of a more radical feminism. This 
stance comes up again in the interview in a different context when Takako 
discusses educators’ obligation not to produce radical feminists but women 
who can go off and work in society. The moderate feminist and teacher’s 
voice come together to advocate for thinking over fighting as a means to 
work for change within a system. 
Takako comes across as a reflective, experienced educator adept at na-
vigating students’ emotional thresholds. Using a strategy of alienation, a 
technique developed in experimental theatre to shock the audience and keep 
them from investing too much emotionally in a performance, she exposes 
her students to difficult themes. Her story reflects an awareness that it is 
pedagogically desirable to push students outside their comfort zones, but 
that such a strategy can lead to student resistance and shutdown: 
A certain percentage of students who have been raised in a conservative 
milieu, sometimes they just can’t take it. At [a women’s university], the 
students – almost all of them are very serious. They might come to me and 
say: It’s too hard for me to deal with this stuff. And then I give them a 
different question or a different perspective. I start out with the mythology 
and move on to art, performance art, and Disney, how women’s bodies get 
commodified in anime these days – practices that disgustingly commodify 
teenage girls’ bodies. When they see themselves in this representation, in 
their own daily life, suddenly they are like ‘ooooh!’ But I do want them to 
be aware that their own sexuality, the young female body, is fetishised, 
commodified and circulated in the market. They are the objects. I want 
them to be aware of that.  
Takako explains student resistance in terms of individual student backgrounds 
and recognises that not all students are able to confront the images she chooses 
to use initially in class. With this in mind, she skilfully balances a sensitivity to 
students’ reactions with pushing students towards the discomfort of alienation. 
It is only once the students are more comfortable that she proceeds with more 
provocative ideas and images. Her somewhat firm voice during this passage is 
counterbalanced by a conciliatory voice that makes room for students to work 
at their own comfort level. Her teacher’s voice finds purpose and meaning in 
creating the distance that allows for critical reflection: 
Through writing you can create a distance, that’s the purpose of alienation. 
You can look at [a work of art or image] more objectively. I don’t force 
them to judge anything, but as long as you understand something 
analytically then you can take it or leave it, fight for it or fight against it. 
That’s my goal. I don’t agitate them, sometimes I want to, but I don’t do 
that. I just want them to think critically. Take a step back. 
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Here, Takako introduces writing as a pedagogical strategy for facing the 
potentially disturbing nature of the curriculum and the possible flight re-
sponses it may generate. The writer’s stance requires that an object be 
contemplated, distanced, thought and written. We conclude the conversa-
tion with a question about what Takako wants her students to carry for-
ward from her classroom into their lives after the university: ‘Have an 
infinite imagination. To imagine, put yourself in somebody else’s shoes, or 
just to be able to imagine what it’s like to be (an)other.’ 
Embracing liminality 
Solveig is a professor in her 40s who entered the field of Gender Studies by 
chance during her master’s thesis. Her motivation for working in the field 
lies in the fact that she has the possibility to engage in questions with a high 
degree of relevance for contemporary society. Solveig says, ‘I feel that both 
in research and teaching, you can actually make a difference, maybe not a 
huge one, but at least we are relatively free still to form the purpose of what 
we do, what we teach and how we teach.’ The sense of freedom and ex-
citement she expresses is also connected to the ‘openness’ of the field and 
the enjoyment of inhabiting an ‘unstable place,’ which she perceives as 
dynamic and full of shifting perspectives – unlike the field where she pur-
sued her BA degree. 
Solveig’s sense of freedom extends to the ways in which she carries out her 
teaching and advising, not according to checklists and objectives but according 
to differences in individual students: Their aims, their academic level, their ease 
in the academy and how much she can ‘push’ them. There is a distinct ‘caring’ 
voice in Solveig’s story that runs counter to neoliberal discourses of branding 
(Gender Studies as an ‘unstable field’ rather than a marketable identity), 
competition (attending to student insecurities and needs) and the achievement 
of ‘excellence’ (hacking the ‘academic game’ is sometimes necessary to carry 
out personally meaningful projects) in higher education: 
They understand the academic game that we need to play, and, in my 
dream world, I would not have to put a letter grade on their work. I just 
hate the fact that you then have to stamp or ‘freeze’ the work, this 
moment in time, finalise it when we know they will continue to develop.  
In line with a feminist ethics of care, she recounts how she privileges the 
relational dimension of her teaching and advising, not assuming that stu-
dents have the same starting points: 
You realise as you get to know the students that some of them really 
want more safety. Some of them need something that can be transformed 
easily into something that can be reflected in a job title. Personally, I 
wouldn’t want that. [For] those who can handle it, I try to get them to 
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appreciate inhabiting ‘an unstable place,’ being more comfortable with 
not always knowing where they are going… I think we deal a lot with 
this insecurity in the beginning and then we facilitate their landing in the 
thesis. As long as they own their own Master’s project… it’s challenging 
for us supervisors and teachers because we have to sort of accept that we 
cannot steer them. We have to read up and be able to follow a very 
broad range of projects, very diverse projects in fact. But I think that’s 
also a good thing that they are actually given the opportunity to land 
their own idea. But it’s a long process.  
Throughout the conversation, I perceive an oscillation between the I/we, 
suggesting room for both individual practices and judgements, and a col-
lective sense of shared purpose: 
We only have two years with our students, but our students really 
notice that we do things differently [than in other departments at the 
university]. We give them two advisors, we attend to their anxieties and 
insecurities all while pushing those who can handle it. The thing I think 
students have a hard time with at first is that I – and I think most of my 
colleagues would agree – we acknowledge that we don’t have all the 
answers. We don’t know everything [laughs]. Then they come to feel 
more at home in this ‘vulnerability,’ seeing each other as co-researchers 
rather than teacher/student.  
Solveig’s story establishes the contours of her identity with a distinctly 
feminist voice with its references to care, co-production and the destabili-
sation of the student/teacher hierarchy. She does not explicitly mention her 
strategies or those of her colleagues as belonging to ‘feminist pedagogy,’ but 
at the very least, her identity as a teacher emerges against an institutional 
context that does not place value on notions like ‘trust,’ which she sees as 
essential to the completion of an MA thesis: 
As long as [the students] trust that [the faculty] can oversee it in a way 
that makes them comfortable. And as long as we are not expecting 
them to have everything settled in advance. I think that’s also part of 
what’s going on now in the second semester when they start developing 
their Master’s project. It’s a lot of active work from our side, I think, in 
making them understand that now we’re not assessing your work. It’s a 
work-in- progress which forms a tool for collaboration— that’s new for 
some of them also.  
Finding a home in activism 
The next story is told by Astrid, a junior professor who, like Noriko, spent 
time abroad before returning to Norway. She sees herself has a highly 
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committed feminist academic who is part of a research group on racism. 
Astrid’s approach to teaching is grounded in an awareness, like Takako’s, 
that Gender Studies asks students to confront uncomfortable realities about 
themselves, their families and the society in which they live and will develop 
their careers. She, too, finds that this can be problematic in classroom 
practice. Astrid started out by stating her own relationship to feminism: 
I had some very solidarity-based idea[s] about feminism as being 
relevant outside of myself; it felt like it fit into this idea of me wanting 
to save the world. Then after taking classes [abroad], it all became very 
personal for me. I think they used to talk about Gender Studies as 
putting on a whole new way of seeing the world – a new pair of glasses 
that you can never ever take off again, even to watch movies.  
Astrid explains that her initial entry into feminism was motivated by the 
material conditions, injustices and inequalities that she saw operating 
outside her home country. Later she had the experience of being both a 
student and teacher in the global south where she began to deeply question 
the (theoretical) centrality of Western feminism, claiming ‘it all of the 
sudden became very personal for me.’ By drawing from codes of social 
justice (‘solidarity’ and ‘saving the world’), Astrid recognises the potential 
in feminism to work to solve societal problems. At the same time, she sees 
the development of feminist insight as irreversible. She continues to narrate 
her own coming into the discipline in an introspective voice using the me-
taphor of ‘finding a home’: 
I had this idea of myself being a feminist academic with no disciplinary 
home, and then working outside Gender Studies you realise that people 
[in the academy/university] invest great meaning in the theories and 
methods you use and how you identify yourself. What’s unique in 
Gender Studies is the possibility of finding a home.  
Astrid sets her first-person feminist narrative against university departments 
that are perceived as operating according to a different set of values and 
established practices. By suggesting that an identification with particular 
theories and methods is a key part of academic life elsewhere outside of 
Gender Studies, Astrid is carving out a unique space for an interdisciplinary 
‘home’ for Gender Studies and feminist academics. She explains this further, 
switching to a collective ‘we’: 
The idea of having a home. It’s like a collection of people who come 
from many different places but who aren’t puritan about one’s 
disciplinary ‘traditions.’ We’re doing this interdisciplinary work and 
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it’s overtly political and we want to change something. There’s some-
thing wrong in the world and we want to do something about it.  
Astrid’s story about what she is trying to accomplish in the classroom 
points to the fact that she desires a politically engaged disciplinary home. 
Her story resonates with Noriko’s story of acquiring a novel means to 
understand one’s own life. Both found that the lens of gender relations 
helped make sense of their lives up to that point. 
We get young adults to take experiences that they have and extrapolate 
[from] them, abstract them and say there is something in the world, a 
different way of speaking about these experiences that isn’t just about 
me and my relationship to another person or my family. To theorise 
injustice, I guess.  
When I asked Astrid about her students in Gender Studies, she was quick to 
point out their ability to ‘speak the language’ and do things in an expected 
academic manner: 
I meet these students that are theoretically fluent – they can speak the 
language, they can do the things and say the things and then when I 
push them on applying it to something that is proximal to themselves or 
their own communities, they can’t. It falls apart. I’m currently at this 
stage where I’m saying, ‘What do I do?’  
Her story’s activist voice makes salient the difference between theoretical 
understandings that allow students to discuss and manipulate ideas at a safe 
distance as opposed to the real-world confrontation of privilege or injustice. 
Her question about how she can manage to get students to examine issues 
that concern them directly is met with the rhetorical question, ‘What do I 
do?’ that doesn’t seem to have an immediate or obvious answer. The next 
part of her story suggests that to a certain extent, she expects Gender 
Studies education to be difficult since the field should respect certain values. 
This requires an authoritative presence: 
In the classroom, I’m strict about what you can say and what you cannot 
say, and I’ll respond quickly if something is said that I don’t think is ok 
[e.g. comments that marginalised students might find offensive]. Part of it 
is control, but there is also something…I don’t think we should be 
comfortable. I know that we are working with things that are personal 
and we have to dig in our own lives, our own families and histories, our 
own bodies and our own minds and sexualities. That stuff is hard. That’s 
one way that I think the feminisms we have in our classrooms should be 
hard, the learning that we want to happen. But it should also be hard in 
terms of confronting one’s own privilege. 
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The questions and difficulties that Astrid’s activist voice raises are not 
connected to specific ways of approaching students beyond confrontation. 
Elsewhere in the interview, Astrid says she accepts that students will 
sometimes leave her classroom angry or frustrated. Her story is narrated in 
the second-person (‘what you can and cannot say’), which comes across as 
authoritative but also distances her from that position. The subsequent 
slippage to the first-person plural when she discusses comfort and feelings 
of safety suggests that she sees herself as part of this process as well. She 
speaks from a feminist voice when she talks about the necessity of con-
fronting privilege, borrowing codes of struggle and confrontation from 
feminist discourse. 
We do a lot of ‘safe’ teaching in Norway. I say ‘safe’ in my teaching 
portfolio, and I say that I want people to be ‘safe’ in my classroom, but I 
also want them to be feminist and anti-racist spaces that aren’t safe for 
privilege. In retrospect I can say that when I was uncomfortable, I 
learned. For me and people like me in that classroom, we shouldn’t be 
safe. We are safe everywhere else. It sucks to be a woman sometimes, but 
when you are a (…) woman in Norway, you are mostly safe [from harm] 
and you benefit from diversity and gender balance projects. If I’m not safe 
in my own classroom, if I go out feeling uncomfortable, that’s ok.  
Astrid introduces the notion of safety by using vocabulary from the field of 
teaching and learning. While, on the one hand, she recognises that ‘safe’ is a 
buzz word in the discourse of teaching and learning, on the other, she states 
that such safety should not be extended to ‘privilege.’ She recognises the 
need from an institutional standpoint to demonstrate that her classroom is 
‘safe,’ but she suggests that the concept cannot hold all possible config-
urations of protection simultaneously. In a moment of shifting subject 
positions, Astrid rationalises the construction of a potentially unsafe 
classroom as a tool to destabilise privilege from feminist and anti-racist 
points of view. What is interesting is the way that she sees a lack of safety 
being extended to her own self as the teacher of such a classroom. 
Gender studies educators: Feminist values and unbound  
learning spaces 
The four educator narratives presented here show that feminist values 
substantially inform the ways in which Noriko, Takako, Astrid and Solveig 
position themselves in their Gender Studies classrooms and make sense of 
their identity as educators. One of the most striking aspects of the stories 
concerns the storytellers’ unbound notions of learning space. There is no 
mention of lecture hall or physical classroom space. The student’s own self 
becomes one of the primary entry points into learning processes. Noriko 
uses her own life experiences, which she brings to life in story form (as 
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opposed to using ‘dry facts’ from textbooks), to illustrate the relevance of 
gender research and provide possible points of connection to her female 
students’ own lives. She also finds validation in making space for a motherly 
voice within the university – perhaps due to the unique context of a wo-
men’s university – that responds with care to her students’ dilemmas and 
problems outside the classroom. In Takako’s story, she defends a pedago-
gical practice grounded in defamiliarisation techniques, but claims that such 
strategies depend on a sensitivity for students’ emotional thresholds. 
Astrid’s activist voice describes her attempts to politicise the classroom 
space and acknowledges the difficulties in doing so. Finally, Solveig’s story 
represents a clear recognition of Gender Studies as an open field where 
teaching and advising are best carried out, in line with feminist alternatives 
to neoliberal thought (see, e.g., Connell, 2019), with care, responsiveness 
and vulnerability that help students develop a researcher identity. 
The four educators presented here position themselves as feminists in that 
their pedagogical practices deviate from what can be considered the neo-
liberal ‘norm’ in higher education. None of them clearly mention ‘feminist 
pedagogy’ as an explicit influence, but this may be due to the absence of 
feminist and critical pedagogies from teacher training programs or to dif-
ferent cultural meanings attached to ‘feminism.’ ‘Feminist pedagogy,’ a 
term that can be traced back to the 1980s and early 1990s, reflects the claim 
that Women’s and Gender Studies classrooms represent an exception to 
‘traditional’3 ways of teaching. In Norway, the term ‘feminist pedagogy’ 
has not been as widely used as in the Anglo-American context to describe 
the praxis of feminist educators. This may be due to the fact that what is 
recognized as ‘feminist’ doesn’t find a similar contrast in the Norwegian 
education system which has long traditions emphasizing gender equality 
and the value of ‘sameness.’ It may also be related to the visible presence 
and acceptance of academic feminism in Norway. 
The idea of ‘feminist pedagogy’ also suggests that feminist values can 
open up for novel ways of teaching in line with ‘what’ we teach in Women’s 
and Gender Studies (hooks, 1994). It is not clear, however, the extent to 
which these are individual strategies informed by the teacher’s own dis-
ciplinary background and previous education experiences or whether there 
is some common ground to be discerned. 
One might argue that it is risky to use the term ‘feminist pedagogy’ in a 
transnational study, given that the concept is not explicitly used in either 
Japan or Norway, nor is it covered in university pedagogical training 
programmes. There has even been significant resistance as to the possibility 
of feminist pedagogy in Gender Studies departments as they exist today in 
Japanese higher education, and Ueno (1999) warns that ‘educating in a 
feminist way is not the same as educating in feminist theory’: 
[I]t has not always been easy even for many liberal educators to make 
visible and explicitly problematise the gender norms that pervade the 
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reality of ‘school,’ a hierarchical space. In any case, it is a contradictory 
practice for teachers, who are in absolute power, to educate for 
‘liberation’ in a system where [students] cannot choose [what consti-
tutes] ‘school,’ ‘classroom,’ or ‘homeroom.’ (p. 84)  
Ueno goes on to show the ever-widening divide at the turn of the 21st 
century between grassroots women’s movements, which took as their point 
of departure the experiences of everyday women, and academic Women’s 
Studies: ‘Women’s Studies can no longer start with a simple “let’s talk 
about our experiences.” [But] [w]e have to start by learning the language of 
experience…. In a sense, people without experience to refer to have entered 
Women’s Studies’ (p. 86). In this way, an authentic feminist pedagogy, with 
its consciousness-raising and analysis of women’s lived experiences, is more 
at home among more democratic grassroots movements than it is in higher 
education. 
In contexts where feminist pedagogy has been applied, educators have 
used it as a tool to raise consciousness about the ways in which inequalities 
are reflected and reproduced in educational settings and institutions 
themselves. Feminist educators often try to open up an alternative class-
room space to counter the ‘messages [that] are relayed to students about the 
relative power positions of different groups and individuals; and about the 
subjects and aspects of those subjects which are deemed appropriate for 
them to study’ (Murphy, 2008, p. 28). Further, feminist pedagogy at a basic 
level promotes an awareness of social axes of difference (e.g., race, class, 
sexuality and ability) and the ways in which they structure individual ex-
periences and opportunities in higher education. Murphy (2008) points out 
some of feminist pedagogy’s key features4 that emerge in the research lit-
erature: Breakdown of traditional classroom hierarchies (destabilisation of 
teacher/student binary), focus on student transformation, development of a 
critical consciousness, awareness of the relationship between ideology, 
culture, power and subjectivity, classroom conceptualised as a political 
space with power relations that reflect those of the society at large, 
awareness of implicit learning about gender that takes place outside the 
classroom, democratisation and student voice (p. 93). In addition to this 
list, we might add: A valuing of the relational dimensions of teaching 
(Hooks, 1994), a recognition of the politics of knowledge production in 
higher education, and an intersectional approach to understanding gender- 
based oppression. In Hooks’ (1994) view, it is an individual educator’s task 
to reflect on and develop a teaching practice that brings in any combination 
of these elements, while remaining open to others. 
These stories are to some degree individual (based on educator’s own 
lived experiences) and field-specific (related to educator’s academic spe-
cialisation) but do not reflect strong cultural distinctions. On that account, 
the stories provide a basis for future research. Given the individualised 
nature of the stories, more research is needed to examine the extent to 
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which a transnational ‘we’ might be possible, and how such collective 
strategies might be linked to learning objectives and assessment. Setting 
these stories in dialogue through dialogical narrative analysis allows me to 
present these teachers as ‘unfinalized’ (Frank, 2005, p. 966) and to conclude 
with the certainty that making these stories accessible to Gender Studies 
colleagues and students will ensure that they continue to take form. 
Notes  
1 A literature search in the database Scopus on English language publications 
containing the keywords ‘pedagogy’ and ‘higher education’ shows an increase 
from the occasional one or two entries per year in the 1980s to a high of over 700 
entries in 2020. 
2 Ueno points out that the overarching goal of professionalization has led to wo-
men’s studies being open to male scholars who are (more) often able to meet the 
unquestioned criteria of ‘excellence.’  
3 What is meant by ‘traditional’ ways of teaching remains to be explored.  
4 The starting point for this enumeration is Murphy, 2008, p. 93. 
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Inclusion into professorships 
Professorships are hard to achieve in most countries for both men and 
women due to a scarcity of permanent positions in academia (Fumasoli 
et al., 2015). Becoming a professor means entering the academic sphere and 
then competing for funding and positions to stay in often-precarious job 
situations for many years. What facilitates and/or hinders researchers’ 
trajectories toward professorships? In this chapter we investigate how men 
and women professors in Norway and Japan account for their career tra-
jectories with an emphasis on what has helped them persevere and manage 
to stay in academia. The aim is to contribute insights on what are important 
inclusion factors and whether, and if so, in what ways, these are gendered 
and contextual in becoming a professor in Norway and Japan. 
Whereas increasing numbers of women are entering universities, the 
proportion of women in full professor positions has remained dis-
proportionately low in most countries, including Norway and Japan. In 
Norway, women constitute 34% (Tungesvik, 2021) of all full professor-
ships and, in Japan, only 10% (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 
2015, p. 87). Clearly, academic careers do not unfold in identical manners 
across national contexts, and individuals are not independent from local, 
institutional and national contexts (Le Feuvre et al., 2019). Thus, it is in-
teresting to explore factors that are emphasised by men and women pro-
fessors as important for becoming professors in two contexts as different as 
Norway and Japan. Since there are clearly many potential factors playing 
in, our study is predominantly an explorative one where we ask: What do 
men and women professors consider the most important factors for en-
tering and managing their career in academia? 
We shall start by consulting literature on what has been found to be 
important for entering and sustaining careers in academia. A substantial 
part of this literature is from a Western context. However, we shall also 
outline the main features of the national contexts for Norway and Japan for 
making an academic career. Then we present our analysis of the empirical 
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data. In the discussion, we reflect on how the inclusion factors that were 
emphasised in our interviewees’ accounts should be understood in a larger 
societal and scholarly perspective. 
Research on entering and sustaining academic careers 
Early efforts to study professors (who were usually men) focused on psy-
chosocial aspects, like early childhood experiences, background variables 
and personality traits (Lindholm, 2004). Later, studies of professor careers 
(still usually of men) have pursued a class perspective emphasising cultural 
and social capital (Bourdieu, 1988). Another strand of studies is concerned 
with social cognitive factors, such as the combination of self-efficacy and 
expectations of outcome and goals (Lent et al., 1994). For example, pro-
fessors in Lindholm’s study (2004) from the US spoke of a ‘true calling’ and 
a ‘match’ between them and academia (pp. 611–24). Studies of academics 
have often found that a passion for academic work, an appreciation for 
being in an academic job and flexibility are important drivers for staying in 
academia. In Riordan’s (2011) study of senior academics from six different 
countries, opportunities for individual expression and autonomy were 
emphasised. According to Cannizzo (2018), discourses of ‘passionate’ la-
bour, self-authenticity and personal freedom are central to how academics 
talk about and govern their work. 
Another factor often stressed as important for entering and remaining in 
academia is cultural and social capital (Bourdieu, 1988), the former parti-
cularly in the form of an academic family background. A study from the 
Netherlands (Van Balen et al., 2012) found that social capital (via men-
torship and network) was more important academic background for whe-
ther talented academics stayed or left academia. Social capital may include 
social networks, but also people who help and support to remain and ad-
vance in academia (Van den Brink & Benschop, 2014; Etzkowitz et al., 
2000; Heffernan, 2020). Mentorship and supervisors have been found to be 
of crucial importance for academic advancement (Blackburn et al., 1981;  
Van Balen et al., 2012). Another aspect often found to increase the prob-
ability of succeeding in academia is a willingness to be geographically 
mobile, due to increased competition and internationalisation (Kim, 2017;  
Ortlieb & Weiss, 2018). Being transnational has also been seen as con-
stitutive for academic identities. Nonaka (2020) has reflected on how her 
transnational research career influenced her identity as a Japanese woman 
professor and helped her advance. A study by Cohen et al. (2020) from 
New Zealand has shown how discourses of academic mobility were con-
sidered essential to academic work but that heteronormative discourses of 
motherhood produce gender inequities in academic mobility. 
While most studies on inclusion in academic career inclusion in the 
Western context have comprised predominantly studies of men, studies of 
women in academia have mainly focused on exclusion (also in a Western 
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context). One argument is that academia is a ‘greedy’ line of work which 
makes for a difficult work-life balance because of traditional household 
divisions and caring responsibilities (Ivancheva et al., 2019; Salminen- 
Karlsson et al., 2018; Ward & Wolf-Wendel, 2012; Ylijoki, 2013). Family 
situations and caring responsibilities have been seen as an important reason 
for why women opt out of academia (Acker & Armenti 2004; Van Anders, 
2004). Women who remain in academia have been found to struggle with 
parental guilt and a sense of work-life imbalance (Castaneda & Isgro, 2013;  
Dubois-Shaik & Fusulier, 2017; Ghodsee & Connelly, 2011). However, 
studies suggest that having children does not seem to affect scientific output 
as such (Aiston & Jung, 2015; Heijstra et al., 2015). This is also the case in 
Norway, where the combination of an academic career and childcare has 
been more common than in other countries (Vabø et al., 2014). Here, a 
study showed that having children has not seemingly affected scientific 
output for Norwegian women academics, while it had a positive effect on 
the scientific output for Norwegian men (Hovdhaugen et al., 2004). 
Much literature has focused on how many women have been and con-
tinue to be disadvantaged through institutional, cultural and organisational 
forces at work in academic settings (see, e.g., Fox et al., 2017). Gender 
discrimination, sexual harassment and sexism have been seen to impact 
women’s careers, and the term ‘chilly climate’ has been used to describe the 
alienation and isolation reported by women (Bevan & Learmonth, 2012;  
Britton, 2017; Savigny, 2014) – not only on the basis of their gender, but 
also their class, race and ethnicity (Essed, 2004; Gutierrez et al., 2012;  
Ostrove et al., 2011; Stewart & Dottolo, 2005). Also, the notion of ‘ex-
cellence’ and what it means to be a ‘good academic’ have been found to be 
masculine constructs (Lund, 2020a, 2020b). 
Finally, a gendered division of work impedes women’s careers in aca-
demia. Women spend more time on non-meriting tasks, such as teaching 
administration and service work, also referred to as the ‘academic house-
work’ (Angervall & Beach, 2017; McFarlane & Burg, 2019). Guarino and 
Borden (2017) have found that women faculty perform significantly more 
service work than men, controlling for rank, race/ethnicity and field or 
department. 
In Japan, a study found that even though work-life balance created stress 
among men and women faculty because research was often disrupted by life 
events, job satisfaction was higher than in other types of work (Fuchigami 
& Sugita, 2021). Yet another study found that taking childfcare leave did 
not diminish work performance (Takeishi, 2008). However, there is a need 
for more qualitative studies on academic life in Japan in general (Poole, 
2010), especially with a gender perspective (Yukawa et al., 2019). In 
Norway, women also struggle with combining parenthood with academic 
jobs because of increasing workload (Thun, 2019). Women are also less 
able to fulfil the criteria for being a ‘good academic,’ because they are doing 
disproportionally more carework in the home and academic housework 
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than men (Lund, 2020). Moreover, ‘excellence’ is still a gendered concept in 
Norwegian academia, where traditionally men-dominated disciplines are 
more frequently associated with excellency (Henningsen & Liestøl, 2013). 
To sum up, there has been many studies showing how women are excluded 
from academic careers in a multitude of ways. However, there have also been 
policy efforts aimed at getting more women to become professors. In the 
following text, we will outline some of the policy work that has taken place 
with regard to gender balance in professorial positions in Norway and Japan. 
Gender balance and academic career trajectories in Norway 
and Japan 
According to Husu (2015), Norway has had the most comprehensive and long- 
standing effort to improve gender equality in academia within Scandinavia. 
However, the share of women in professorial positions (as of 2021) is 34%. The 
Humanities and Social Sciences have a better gender balance than STEM dis-
ciplines, even if there are large variations in the proportion of women professors 
between disciplines in the STEM fields and also within disciplines in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences (Sørensen & Lagesen, submitted 2021). 
In Japan, the percentage of women full professors is only 10.8%, and 
even fewer are leaders in academia. The Japan Association of National 
Universities has established a Gender Equality Headquarters at each na-
tional university, with the goal to reduce gender imbalance in various areas. 
Also, a program to support research activities of women researchers was 
launched in 2013. More than 20% of women professors are working in the 
fields of the Humanities and Fine Arts and fewer than 5% in the fields of 
Science and Engineering (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2015). 
The typical academic career path in Norway goes from PhD to post-
doctoral researcher to associate professor, eventually ending in a full pro-
fessor position. Since 1993, Norwegian associate professors have been not 
only able to advance to professorial status by applying for vacant professor 
positions, but also by applying for a promotion to become professor on the 
basis of their research competence (Olsen et al., 2005). 
There is also a third way – by applying for a vacant professorship in an 
open competition, being found competent but not the best qualified by the 
evaluation committee and then asking to be promoted to full professor in 
your own institution. Applying for promotion is now a more common 
strategy to become professor in Norway than applying for a vacant pro-
fessorship (Kyvik, 2015). Due to having several pathways, there is a higher 
share of professors in Norway than in most other countries, and 40% of 
Norwegian faculty has a full professor position. 
In Japan, there are also several ways to become a full professor. 
However, the most common way is that one applies to a tenure track po-
sition, which normally starts at the assistant professor or lecturer level. 
Based on the number of publications and years of teaching experience, the 
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universities decide upon promotion to professor. Unlike in Norway where 
criteria for promotion are subject to national regulations, each Japanese 
university has its own criteria for promotion (Poole, 2010). 
Support systems for women academics in Japan who are raising children 
differ widely by institution and the woman’s professional status. In Japan, 
women are in general expected to care for their own children, as well as for 
other family members, such as the elderly. Full-time academic staff can get 
financial support for hiring babysitters or nursery teachers. They normally 
also have flexible working hours and can even work from home at times. 
However, this benefit does not typically extend to part-time academic staff. 
Also, in Japan a study found that having children did not statistically affect 
scientific output for women academics (Takeishi, 2008). 
In Norway, the situation is different in that childcare facilities are more 
easily available for all, and parental leave schemes are extensive and de-
signed to promote gender equality (Kvande & Brandth, 2019). Having 
children while pursuing an academic career is also more common in 
Norway, compared to other countries (Vabø et al., 2014). 
Even so, recent research in both contexts has also found that women 
academics struggle more with having children due to increased workload in 
academia (Thun, 2019), and that life-events create work-life balance stress 
for faculty (Fuchigami & Sugita, 2021). Thus, it is pertinent to further 
explore what women and also men professors in the two contexts consider 
important for sustaining their academic careers. 
Data and methods 
We did in-depth qualitative interviews with 28 academics: 13 professors in Japan 
(8 women and 5 men) and 15 in Norway (10 women and 5 men). All inter-
viewees were between 35 and 70 years old, with the majority being between 50 
and 60. Interviews with professors in Norway were conducted in 2017 and 2018 
as part of a larger research project aimed to improve gender balance among 
professors at a Norwegian university. The interviews with professors in Japan 
were conducted in 2020, as a spin off from the first project; it was made possible 
through the INTPART-funded research collaboration with Ochanomizu 
Women’s University. The Norwegian professors were from the same university, 
while the professors working in Japan were recruited from eight different uni-
versities. These universities are located in different parts of Japan and cover a wide 
range of academic profiles. Interviewees in both countries represented different 
disciplines and research areas, and most of them worked in departments strug-
gling with gender imbalance among full professors. Norwegian professors were 
recruited randomly and approached directly via e-mail. The Japanese professors 
were recruited by the assistance of mediators, who suggested potential participants 
and made the first-contact approaches. All participants were informed that the 
interview was part of a research project on gender balance. Almost all the pro-
fessors we contacted accepted the invitation to participate. 
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The interviews with the professors in Norway were done face to face by 
Norwegian researchers in Norwegian, the mother tongue of the interviewer 
and most of the interviewees. The interviews with the professors in Japan 
were done by the same Norwegian interviewers and conducted in English, a 
foreign language for both interviewers and interviewees. In most cases, the 
interview guide was shared with the interviewees beforehand. This made it 
possible for the interviewees to prepare and thus also helped reduce the 
language barriers. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews with 
Japanese professors were conducted online via zoom. 
The interviews lasted from 30 to 60 minutes. We began by asking the 
interviewees to give an account of their personal career trajectories, and 
then we followed up with questions about how they perceived inclusion in 
this process. The questions were open-ended. All interviews were tran-
scribed verbatim. In the next section, we explore what kind of inclusion the 
professors emphasised in their accounts of career trajectories. We start by 
analysing the main features of inclusion factors that were brought forward 
by our interviewees in both Norway and Japan. Each interview excerpt is 
cited with the interviewee’s country and participant number. Then we will 
focus on what were seen as the greatest challenges. At the end of each 
section, we will discuss how our findings relate to the previous literature. In 
the last section, we offer some overall reflections on our findings. 
Passion, hard work and personal sacrifices 
Similar to much previous research, many of our interviewees in both 
Norway and Japan described the path to professorship as one of dedication 
and passion for academic work, as well as a willingness and ability to work 
hard and make what they saw as the necessary sacrifices for staying in 
academia. Such sacrifices could typically be long working hours and hence 
less time with family and friends, and/or long periods of hard and stressful 
work. For example, when asked to characterise her academic journey, a 
woman professor in Japan formulated it this way: ‘It was very challenging. 
It was never easy. It took a long time and along the way I had to make a lot 
of tough priorities’ (JAPAN 8). 
However, such stories about hard work were also followed by engaged 
talk about research fields and teaching activities. A man professor put it like 
this: ‘My career is exciting and fun!’. When he was asked directly if it had 
not also included ‘hard work and efforts’, he followed up with this answer: 
Yes, effort is always important. We should work hard, but it’s quite 
natural. I would say it’s also my father’s influence. I would see my 
father work hard at home. My friends in university also work at home – 
hard. I think it is quite natural that I should work hard. It’s no stress for 
me. (JAPAN 2)  
Making it in academia 109 
This emphasis on hard work was also highly present in the interviews with 
the Norwegian professors, both women and men. A telling example is to be 
found in the interview with a man professor in his early 60s: 
The road to becoming professor has been cumbersome, tough and 
hard. Yes. And exhausting. But I have been so dedicated as a scholar, so 
I will claim it was worth it. But I am not sure I would have done it 
again. (NORWAY 3)  
This quote clearly illustrates how academic work was considered re-
warding, and so it compensated for the cumbersomeness of the process of 
becoming professor. But the quote also shows a good deal of ambivalence, 
emphasizing how hard such a process could be. Sacrifices made in order to 
get or keep a job in academia was also mentioned and were sometimes quite 
considerable. One international woman professor living in Norway gave 
birth to her children in another country, before she got a job in Norway. 
Since her children still lived there, she had to commute and spend much 
time away from her family. Still, she found the sacrifice worthwhile, be-
cause she loved the job: 
I miss my children and my family very much. I find it difficult to 
leave when I am there. But so far it is going well, and I have a 
fantastic job. I enjoy the job immensely! But I do long for home 
sometimes (…) but thriving in the job is an extremely important 
factor. (NORWAY 14)  
There were also other interviewees in the same situation, having chosen 
to work far away from their families. Others travelled together with 
family. Our data illustrated well how important it was to be geo-
graphically mobile to secure employment in academia. However, 
sometimes the decision to move was for scholarly reasons, such as being 
with the most relevant research group and/or being able to pursue their 
own research interests. Thus, working in an academic job was con-
sidered extremely valuable and enjoyable by many of our interviewees, 
both in Japan and Norway, and considered worth quite substantial 
sacrifices by many. 
We did not find substantial differences between Japanese and 
Norwegian professors with regard to this strong dedication to their 
academic work, which was emphasised by most as a major motivation 
for their careers. Nor were there differences between men and women 
professors in this matter. Thus, passion and the attractiveness of a 
permanent job in academia are important inclusion qualities. In the 
next section, we will discuss what kind of supported inclusion was 
experienced by our interviewees. 
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Supported inclusion 
Many of our interviewees talked about how other people had been important 
for supporting them in their career. Many mentioned mentors or role models 
that either had inspired or encouraged them to pursue an academic career, either 
by evoking an interest for a particular topic or a research area, or by showing 
that barriers can be pushed. In the interviews with Japanese professors, this 
inspirational role was in quite a few cases played by parents or other family 
members who were academics or professors themselves. This opened a door to 
the academic world by showing that it is possible to pursue this line of work. 
This represents the cultural capital argued by Bourdieu (1988) The role of a 
parent in motivating their child to take up an academic career can be exemplified 
in the following interview extract with a professor in his late 40s explaining why 
he had chosen academia: 
It´s an important question! Maybe it´s the influence of my father. My 
father looks quite happy because he worked with his students and got 
an exciting result. He was always excited to talk about the results that 
students gave him. (…) So, maybe when I was 10 years old, I said I will 
work in university someday. (JAPAN 2)  
This way of framing the choice as inspired by a parent, usually a father, was 
more prominent in the interviews with Japanese professors than among our 
Norwegian interviewees. A Norwegian professor shared that seeing his father 
with the status of professor made the job seem more normal and less daunting: 
One thing I have reflected on is that I have never really had a lot of 
respect for professors and other academics. When my father could be a 
professor, anybody could [laughs]. It wasn’t something special, it was 
just a job and an okay one. (NORWAY 7)  
We see that both interviewees presented their father’s role as important for 
demonstrating that a professorial position is attractive but also obtainable. 
Having such a role model instilled motivation and confidence to embark on 
an academic career path. 
Women professors often mentioned women in academia as role models 
who had been important for them in pursuing an academic career: 
An older woman professor has been an important role model for me. 
She has three children, husband and a home, and then I thought, okay, 
it is possible. (NORWAY 1).  
What was common in the accounts of women professors in Norway was 
that they saw it was possible to combine a job as a professor with having a 
family and caring for children. 
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Many of our interviewees in both Norway and Japan talked about im-
portant mentors and supervisors who had guided them into an academic 
career by directly or indirectly giving them possibilities for career ad-
vancement. For many, this role was typically ascribed to their supervisor: 
Interviewer:  How did you succeed? 
Professor:  I have a very good mentor, [who is] a very good person, 
adviser and supervisor at this university. He was very 
supportive. I think that is an important reason (…) He 
gave me many chances to get positions and encouraged me. 
(…) He gave me possibilities at [my current] university, 
which was important for me. (JAPAN 1)  
We see that support from a mentor was fundamental in this professor’s 
career, and he credited much of his possibilities to have an academic career 
to this mentor. This was a very common narrative among the Japanese and 
Norwegian professors we interviewed, no matter their gender. Similarly, 
those who had not had such a mentor were often stressing this, indicating 
that having a mentor to guide and help a young scholar was perceived as 
crucial. A woman professor in Norway explained, 
After my PhD, I have had to make it on my own, always. I believe I 
have been pretty strong, because I haven’t had anyone to mentor me or 
to consult. I have, sort of, had to do everything myself. And it turned 
out well. (NORWAY 5)  
While not having a mentor was considered a disadvantage, it also instilled a 
certain self-efficacy as well as pride in having become a ‘self-made’ pro-
fessor. Most women professors in Norway, and to a lesser extent in Japan, 
talked about how they had been supported, and surprisingly few talked 
about overt gender discrimination as a pressing issue. One exception was a 
woman professor in Japan who had changed her field of research because of 
a lack of support from the men professors supervising her work. Entering a 
new field with a new mentor, who was a woman, made it possible for her to 
have an academic career: 
The most crucial moment was deciding to change my specialties. It 
was my decision, but I think it was planned by men professors. So, 
the men professors they didn´t teach me well, and I felt they were 
ignoring me. (…) When I changed my specialty, my mentor was a 
woman professor. (…) Women professors supported me a lot. I was 
helped by them. One of them who accepted me became the main 
judge in my doctoral thesis. I think they saved me in the academic 
journey. (JAPAN 3)  
112 Vivian Anette Lagesen et al. 
These narratives demonstrate how mentors and role models played a crucial 
part in professors’ careers. Others were also identified as important sup-
porters along the way, such as colleagues, friends and, most importantly, 
family members. This was particularly evident in women professors’ ac-
counts, both in the Japanese and the Norwegian context. Support related to 
childcare was emphasised by most women professors, but by very few of 
the men professors. 
Women professors in Norway often emphasised their partners as an 
important support, particularly in regard to having an equal division of 
domestic labour. Whether the interviewees found combining an academic 
career with parenthood to be stressful or not depended on whether their 
partners took on a fair share of the work: 
I have had good support at home. An encouraging man and unproble-
matic children so-to-speak. So, there has not been heavy burdens there 
(NORWAY 9)  
Another interviewee described this successful home dynamic as having a 
functional ‘ground control’ (NORWAY 8). 
Having a reliable support system at home was not the only context- 
dependent difference in the data between women professors. Norwegian 
women professors often mentioned women-centred collectives and net-
works as an important source of motivation and support in their academic 
career. Encouragement and ‘push’ from leaders and supervisors to promote 
or stay in academia was frequently mentioned, as well as being awarded 
help and support by policy efforts, such as extra funding or extra leave to 
qualify for professorship. These kinds of effort were not mentioned often by 
women professors in Japan. But many mentioned their mothers as an im-
portant support, who had encouraged and supported them in their choices 
and their path to become a professor. 
Work-life balance 
As discussed in the theory section, women researchers often experience 
‘parental guilt’ and a troublesome work-life balance. The experience of 
feeling torn between competing obligations at work and home, and the 
feelings of inadequacy this created, has been found among women across 
national settings (Acker and Armenti, 2004; Dickson, 2019; Ward & Wolf- 
Wendel, 2004). How did Norwegian and Japanese professors organise their 
personal and professional lives, and how did they make sense of their own 
time management and priorities in this regard? Were there gendered or 
contextual differences in how this was narrated? 
Negotiations of time and priorities seemed to be different between men 
and women professors in both the Japanese and Norwegian contexts. In 
both contexts, the topic of work-life balance was negotiated with regard to 
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societal gender norms on the one hand, and personal desires and life- 
choices on the other hand. Pursuing an academic career while raising a 
family was considered challenging, but doable. Women professors with 
children in our sample described feeling conflicted about how best to divide 
their time and attention. A quote from a senior Norwegian woman pro-
fessor illustrates this conflict well: 
Really, my glorious years were from 1988 to ‘97. In that period, I 
worked a lot, and I achieved a lot. Those ten years, without children, 
and few commitments, when my colleagues were my friends – during 
those years, I got a lot of work done. But, then, after ‘97, the years with 
young children, was more like [being] in a fog. (NORWAY 1)  
A Japanese woman professor similarly described her experience of raising 
young children while trying to maintain her academic work. When asked 
about crucial moments in her career, she replied, 
I had to write papers at the same time [that I was immersed in] child- 
bearing. When I was 30, I had to do two things: Writing papers and 
caring for my baby. It was a very tough time for me because I wanted to 
spend much more time with the child, but every day I thought, ‘I have 
to write a paper, I have to do research.’ (JAPAN 9)  
In both Japan and Norway, the timing of having children in relation to 
career timing was portrayed as crucial. However, particularly in the 
Norwegian context, there were also many stories about combining work 
and family without much conflict. Some told how they combined high 
ambition research with motherhood: 
The day I defended my PhD, I was pregnant. (…) After I had my 
first child, it only took a month before she was with me in the lab. 
With my second child, it took a week before he was with me in the 
lab. (…) You had to be at the research front, you had to keep up. 
(NORWAY 4)  
This professor described herself as being ‘equally hungry for work as for 
family.’ She did not see these desires as contradictory but framed the si-
tuation as a matter of practical arrangement. However, we also heard 
stories of women who chose to work 80% in order to prioritise the family, 
which meant their career had taken a longer time to develop than others’: 
When you wait so long to have children, it becomes more important 
than anything in the world. That has been my priority, and I did not 
care if anyone bypassed me. (NORWAY 6)  
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The flexibility of academic work was also emphasised by the Japanese 
women professors as something that made it possible to combine 
work with family. One Japanese woman professor also had a more 
critical outlook, claiming that the long working hours were far from 
efficient: 
Well, the good part is we can decide some part of the job by ourselves. 
Many professors stay until midnight, but I come back home. In my 
opinion, we need to work certain hours and then we have to have 
private lives to refresh ourselves. That will make our concentration in 
the work[place] better. (…) Traditionally in Japanese society, if you 
stay longer, even if you are just drinking coffee maybe, people think 
that you are a hard worker, even if you are not really working. 
(JAPAN 11)  
Thus, prioritising private lives could also be seen as a way to enhance, 
rather than diminish, the quality of professional work. 
A difference here between the two contexts was that work-life balance 
was considered easier in Norway than in Japan. While some Japanese 
women professors said they had chosen to refrain from having children in 
order to advance in their careers, none of the Norwegian women professors 
expressed anything of the same. Moreover, international women professors 
in Norway found it to be an apt location for having children because of the 
good work-life balance opportunities: 
Both my husband and I got good positions, and then we decided to 
stay on. One of the reasons was the balance between work and family. 
If I compare with my friends in my home country, I see that the 
balance is much, much better here… We have never been struggling, 
we don’t have to have grandparents and nannies [help us]. 
(NORWAY 10)  
Women professors in Norway seemed to take it for granted that they 
would be able to combine family and an academic career, due to the 
welfare services provided and their expectations of relatively equal 
shared responsibility in home-making. Most assumed that their part-
ners would contribute fairly equally to household-related work. 
Japanese women professors, on the other hand, emphasised the need 
for support from one’s extended family in order to pursue an academic 
career, as most couples in Japan still do not have an equal work divi-
sion at home. Nonetheless, the position of professor was considered 
better suited for combining work with family compared with other 
professions because of the relatively flexible working conditions. 
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Concluding reflections 
The main aim of this chapter is to contribute to existing literature on what 
it is that include men and women to work in academia as a professor, and 
gendered and contextual aspects of inclusion factors. We have sought to do 
so by exploring how men and women professors in Norway and Japan 
accounted for how they entered and manage to remain in a top-level job in 
academia. Professors of both genders in both contexts conveyed a strong 
motivation for and desire to stay in academia. To achieve their goal, they 
had worked hard and endured precarious job situations; some had also 
made quite substantial sacrifices. Many highlighted the same factors as 
important for surviving in academia which were mentors or supervisors 
who had provided help and were important role models. Some interviewees 
who had not had much support described their trajectory as difficult and 
challenging but still rewarding. Thus, a shared common inclusion factor 
was a strong motivation to stay in academia, and the willingness to make 
the necessary choices to be able to do so. In some cases, this meant making 
substantial sacrifices. But, many had received much support and help in 
order to succeed. Such help and support may to some extent be accidental, 
which explains how academics often emphasise this notion of ‘luck’ to 
succeed in academia (Lindholm, 2004; Loveday, 2018). 
If we disregard idiosyncratic factors, gender and context made a difference, 
primarily in terms of domestic work division and childcare. Women professors 
with children and families reported that they faced greater challenges than their 
male counterparts. This was handled by adapting and taking advantage of the 
opportunities for help that existed, which could be family members or childcare 
services. The latter was more easily available in Norway than in Japan. Also, 
many women professors in Norway emphasised that they had partners who 
contributed significantly to housework. This was not mentioned by Japanese 
women professors. Nevertheless, academia was perceived to offer a flexibility 
that made work-life balance a bit easier compared to other workplaces for 
women professors in Japan. Childcare was rarely mentioned as an impediment 
by men professors in either context. Moreover, Norwegian professors – men and 
women – assumed that academic careers could be combined with having chil-
dren, which was not taken for granted among Japanese professors. However, 
compared to previous literature, surprisingly few women professors talked 
about a ‘chilly climate’ or explicit gender discrimination. This is a fruitful and 
important starting point for further studies. 
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8 Masculinity in contemporary 
Viking and Samurai comedies: 
‘It’s not really me, that fear-based 
leadership style stuff’ 
Jennifer Branlat and Priscilla Ringrose    
Living up to modern masculinities 
In this chapter, we examine contemporary TV comedies about Norwegian 
and Japanese manhood in crisis. Norsemen (original title: Vikingane; 2016) 
is a Norwegian comedy series about a group of vikings living in Southern 
Norway around the year 790 C.E. The series is a high-quality production 
with a rich visual texture that parodies the ultra-realistic diegetic worlds of 
more pretentious blockbusters, such as Vikings (2013–2020) and Game of 
Thrones (2011–2019). The characters are clad in period dress, with an 
emphasis on draping wool and well-worn leather. Norsemen was filmed at 
a location in a coastal village in Norway, and it was recorded simulta-
neously in both Norwegian and English-language versions by filming each 
scene twice. Its humour is delivered in a Monty Pythonesque deadpan style. 
The series premiered in Norway on the national TV channel NRK and was 
later aired on Netflix in both Norwegian and English. Samurai Shifters 
(original title: Hikkoshi Daimyo!, 2019) centres around a community of 
samurai living in the Himeji domain of southeast Japan in the 1680s, during 
the Edo period. Released in 2019, the comedy features a star-studded cast, 
including the musician Gen Hoshino in the leading role. The film follows 
many of the codes and traditions of the familiar jidaigeki, or period drama, 
in its foregrounding of honour, sacrifice and sword-fighting. Although the 
jidaigeki genre influences the overall narrative structure, it is playfully ri-
diculed in farcical moments of subversion. 
Norsemen and Samurai Shifters tell stories about the difficulties of living 
up to contemporary societal expectations concerning manhood. They give 
these stories a comic twist by transposing the characters back to a distant 
past – the Viking Age (800-1050) and the Edo period (1603–1867) – eras, 
which as represented in popular culture, are famously unconcerned about 
matters like gender equality, being a good partner and the equal sharing of 
domestic duties. The main characters of these comedies repeatedly find 
themselves in dilemmas that pit their millennial sensibilities against the 
values of the past: How can you be an effective leader when you are an 
introvert, bibliophile, recluse? How can you relocate an entire clan over a 
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vast territory when you rarely leave your living quarters? Is it possible to be 
an intimidating warrior and still be sensitive enough to attend poetry 
readings with your wife? The protagonists perpetually and comically find 
themselves at odds with what society expects of them. 
A brief look at the opening sequences shows how the films’ creators 
frame the spectator’s entry into the narrative space. In the opening sequence 
of the Norsemen, Arvid, the main character, is torn between his love of 
raiding and his desire to settle down. As his ship nears home, he confides in 
his chieftain superior: 
Can’t exactly say I’m looking forward to coming home now…My focus 
has always been on pillaging and ravaging and things like that, when all 
the other guys have settled down with wives, kids, farms and stuff. I’m 
feeling kind of alone here. (Helgaker & Torgersen, 2016)  
From Arvid’s initial apprehension, the series proceeds with a satirical ex-
ploration of the unrealistic pressures to be the ‘perfect man.’ In a similar 
staging of masculinity and impossible expectations, Samurai Shifters opens 
with a hand drawn map that foregrounds the daunting task given to 
Katagiri, the unlikely ‘shut in’ samurai: Faced with limited time and budget, 
he is tasked with executing a master plan for the clan’s distant relocation 
across land and water. As parodies or spoofs on the historical action drama, 
these narratives are less concerned with reproducing an accurate version of 
the past than they are with poking fun at the present. 
In this context we understand film as a social practice that ‘constructs 
narratives and meanings,’ which enable us to ‘locate evidence of the ways in 
which our culture makes sense of itself’ (Turner, 2006, p. 3). Our decision 
to bring comedy into a discussion of masculinity reflects an attempt to 
liberate discussions of manhood from its polarising formats in media de-
bates. We have also taken comedies from two different national contexts in 
the hopes that readers will come to see their common project: To defami-
liarise contemporary societal expectations concerning masculinity. By 
taking the imperatives and pressures related to ‘caring,’ ‘sensitive’ manhood 
and staging them in a past dominated by representations of militaristic, 
hegemonic hierarchies – far from today’s preoccupations with ‘gender 
equality’ or ‘work-life balance’ and ‘caring fathers’ – a comic effect is 
achieved. The comedy genre therefore allows us as spectators to step out of 
the realm of ‘political correctness’ operating in daily life and laugh at our 
own cultural attitudes, practices and their excesses. In this way, the process 
of defamiliarisation opens up a space between spectators and their own 
culture, a space in which reflection can occur in a playful manner. We ask: 
What dimensions of modern masculinities do these comedies explore? To 
what degree do these comedies uphold or challenge the prevailing social 
orders in Japan and Norway? Are there any similarities and differences that 
can be found in the representations of masculinity? 
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Theoretical framework 
Theories of humour and comedy have remained relatively stable over past 
decades, even as humour – most prominently over the past decade in the 
form of American satirical news programs – has come to the fore as an 
important 21st century tool for social and political critique. In this chapter, 
we draw from social theories of humour which call attention to the re-
lationship of comedy to broader social discourses. Incongruity theory, one 
of three main strands of humour theory, is useful for this purpose. As 
Critchley noted in his work On Humour, ‘in order for the incongruity of 
the joke to be seen as such, there has to be a congruence between joke 
structure and societal structure – no social congruity, no comic incongruity’ 
(2011, p. 3). He further reflected that ‘humour returns us to common sense; 
by distancing us from it, humour familiarizes us with a common world 
through its miniature strategies of defamiliarization’ (p. 17). By ‘common 
sense,’ Critchley is referring to the social codes, rules and understandings 
that communities share. For the gender-related humour explored in this 
chapter, the comic relief is produced by seeing the obvious similarities be-
tween the contemporary welfare state with its discourse on gender equality 
and the viking settlement staged in Norsemen. Similarly, Samurai Shifters 
activates our common understanding of figures like the samurai, salaryman 
and the hikikomori, a concept referring to a severe form of social with-
drawal, and it depends on our judgement that a hikikomori young man 
would be ill-suited for the grand exploits required of samurai nobles during 
the Edo period. 
The idea that humour can be seen as an important factor in the pro-
duction of meaning in a given culture is also presented by Michael Mulkay 
in his well-known book entitled On Humour: Its nature and its place in 
modern society (1988). His theorising of humour is based on two funda-
mental modes: The ‘serious mode’ and the ‘humorous mode.’ In the hu-
morous mode, there are plural realities (i.e., no one discourse has the upper 
hand) allowing for different discourses to coexist within the same context, 
unapologetically showcasing the contradictions, flaws and pretension of a 
‘serious’ discourse. Both Norsemen and Samurai Shifters can be regarded as 
functioning in the ‘humorous mode’ as gender comedies that expose the 
tensions and contradictions in current societal discourses on femininity and 
masculinity. 
Finally, within comedy studies, ‘stereotypical humour’ has been seen as 
particularly taboo because it often serves as a vehicle to ridicule margin-
alised groups. In a bold and ground-breaking work on the perils of racial, 
ethnic and gender humour, Leon Rappoport explains that this type of hu-
mour is more complex and much less straightforward and unidirectional 
than one might believe (2005, p. 2). It is above all characterised by ambi-
guity and is highly context dependent: It can involve any constellation of 
minority versus minority, majority versus majority, urban versus rural, 
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women versus men and vice versa. Its ‘appropriateness’ may be determined 
by its proximity to mainstream attitudes (Rappoport, pp. 2–3). Our aim in 
drawing from Rappoport’s reflections is to show that the extreme nature of 
many of the stereotyped figures in Norsemen and Samurai Shifters make 
them recognisable and yet so distant from what is culturally acceptable that 
it becomes laughable. 
Masculinity in Norway and Japan 
Recent literature on masculinity in both national contexts has brought to 
light the diversity of emerging masculinities, locating the 21st century as a 
time of intense change for both Norway and Japan. The literature on visual 
representations of Norwegian masculinity over the past two decades has 
tended to crystallise around particular types of images: Caregiving father-
hood as a means to become a ‘worthy’ member of the national community 
(Dancus, 2011), immature and anxious men in a broader Western context 
of a ‘crisis of masculinity’ (Donnar, 2015) and intrepid, viking masculinity 
in the resurgence of the explorer drama (Sandberg, 2019). In terms of 
Norwegian masculinity exported to an international audience, one may 
look to Kristofer Hirvju’s role as Tormund Giantsbane, the bearded raider 
of HBO’s Game of Thrones (Benioff & Weiss, 2011-2019). In interviews 
featured in the Norwegian media, Hirvju insisted on the difference between 
his off-screen identity as a supportive partner to a woman with a high- 
commitment career and a caring father, and his on-screen persona as a 
dreaded warrior and raider (Marthinussen, 2018). 
In Norway, there is a lack of research exploring men’s experiences such as 
those brought to light in interviews with Hirvju: The ideals of work-life balance, 
‘having it all’ and being a good parent and supportive spouse. This lack may 
owe to the tenor of contemporary debates that focus on men’s failings or dif-
ferent dimensions of masculinity viewed separately rather than holistically. The 
comic effect of Norsemen lies partly in the clash of two kinds of masculinity: A 
masculinity oppressed by the intimidating task of ‘having it all’ and meeting all 
the requirements of a gender-equal society in the 2000s, and the stereotypical 
hegemonic masculinity of the Viking Age associated with warrior militarism, 
‘risk-taking, the enforcement of command structures and disciplinary hier-
archies, physicality, aggression, violence, and overt expressions of hetero-
sexuality’ (Hinojosa, 2010, as cited in Raffield, 2019, p. 818). 
In Japan, research on masculinity over the past decades has revealed more 
nuanced and fine-grained understandings of Japanese masculinity, in-
tentionally displacing the ‘salaryman’ as the dominant stereotype: 
If (representations of) the middle-class, white-collar, heterosexual salaryman 
powerfully invoke(s) ideologies of national, class and sexuality in Japan, the 
practices and performance of other people must be seen as acts of challenge 
and change –potential, playful or purposeful. (Roberson & Suzuki, 2003, p. 5) 
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In the post-war period of economic growth, the salaryman became sy-
nonymous with hegemonic masculinity in Japan, symbolising the kigyō 
senshi or corporate warrior (Dasgupta, 2010, 2013; Hidaka, 2010;  
Sugimoto, 2010; Vogel, 1963). Masculinity scholar Futoshi Taga (2006) 
paints a vivid vignette of the stereotypical salaryman, recognisable to most 
Japanese people: 
He is working for a large company or in the public sector and living a 
middle-class life with a wife and two children in an urban area; his wife 
is a housewife or a part-time worker, and he is expected to be the 
breadwinner of the family; he enjoys the benefits of lifetime employ-
ment and the seniority-promoting system; in exchange for these 
benefits, he has a strong sense of loyalty to his workplace and works 
long hours every day; he is also busy in the evening and on weekends at 
business entertainment events or associations with colleagues, so he 
scarcely does much housework or child care; his uniform is a dark 
suit. (p. 108)  
While this figure has been intrinsically linked to Japan’s process of in-
dustrialisation and nation-building, its antecedents may be traced back as 
far as to the Edo period. Much like the samurai warrior, the salaryman 
would be expected to display qualities related to the bushidō code requiring 
loyalty, dedication and self-sacrifice. The economic downturn of the 1990s, 
however, fuelled doubt about the salaryman’s efficacy. More recently, as  
Taga (2013) points out, factors such as ‘globally-expanding feminist 
agendas,’ the equation of masculinity with work, underpinned by stable 
connotations of gender, class, sexuality and nation, have all been challenged 
(p. 1). This problematising of the whole equation of masculinity and work 
(and the equation of femininity with the household) in Japan has emerged 
in various social, political and cultural arenas and is evidenced in academic 
and popular writings, in recent television programs focusing on issues like 
datsu-sara (leaving white collar work to start up one’s own enterprise) and 
even in official publicity campaigns (Dasgupta, 2010). The relationship 
between masculinity and work has been most seriously interrogated in the 
figure of the ikumen or ‘Japanese child caring men,’ the object of a gov-
ernment campaign to get more men to actively participate in child rearing 
(Ishii-Kuntz, 2019). 
In their work on masculinity in Japan, Roberson & Suzuki (2003) argue 
the salaryman’s dominance – a phenomenon they call the ‘ideological he-
gemony of homogeneity’ – has left other forms of masculinity unexamined 
(p. 4). While in the late 1990s it could be claimed that Japanese popular 
culture reinforced the salaryman’s hegemony in the cultural landscape, 
today academic and popular texts as well as recent television programs 
challenge this. For example, TV dramas focusing on issues like datsu-sara 
have contributed to representations of the diversity of masculinity in Japan. 
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Samurai Shifters fits in this movement, with its playful (un)coupling of the 
salaryman’s associations with the samurai. Director Inudō Isshin positions 
the counter-figure of the hikikomori as achieving success, thanks to his non- 
samurai qualities: Vulnerability, shyness, lack of ambition and lack of 
combat skills. 
Norsemen and Samurai Shifters: Sensitive men wielding weapons 
In Norsemen, viking warriors return from their raid in the south with 
treasures and slaves, having found a map to a new world of wealth. Season 
one centres around the tough viking Chief Olav, his hapless brother Orm, 
Orm’s wife (the feisty Frøya) and the conflicted warrior Arvid. Back on land 
after his voyage, Arvid plans to set himself up with a wife and farm – he has 
neither – and decides to challenge a local farmer for his wife Liv and land. 
Arvid then literally slices the unfortunate farmer in half before proceeding 
to take over his household and marry Liv to quell his anxieties about how 
he will measure up compared to peers who have already settled down with 
farms and families. But in spite of his new acquisitions, Arvid struggles to 
adjust to social life on land and the responsibilities it entails. His warrior 
skills are put to use defending the village, but in the private sphere he re-
mains stuck as the quintessential henpecked husband. He fails to be a good 
enough partner to the demanding Liv, not least because she insists on his 
presence at home, forcing him to leave work on time to attend poetry 
evenings with other couples. 
Norsemen therefore stages Arvid in a comic work-life balance dilemma 
that raises questions at the core of his identity and critically calls into 
question the demands of modern relationships. This dilemma forces Arvid 
to confront his own ideas about being an attractive mate, the importance of 
material possessions and meeting societal benchmarks for men. Once home, 
he discovers the difficulties of serving Orm, an incompetent boss while 
maintaining a healthy work-life balance in partnership with his nagging 
wife Liv. In particular, he wrestles with the task of being a culturally- 
sensitive partner who can participate in Norheim’s poetry club with other 
couples. Others admonish him for his lack of interest in ‘finding other 
couples to hang out with.’ The poetry club scene with Liv, Arvid and the 
other more cultured couples of Norheim serves to reinforce Arvid’s feelings 
of isolation as he is asked to read his own poem out loud (Helgaker & 
Torgersen, 2016):  
Liv: So, maybe Arvid, you can read yours? Do you have a poem that is 
dear to your heart? 
Arvid: One two three 
Take out your wee wee 
Four five 
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Grab your bride 
Six seven eight 
Open up her gate 
Nine ten 
Fuck her then!  
With Arvid’s poetry leaving everyone aghast, he is ridiculed among Liv’s 
sophisticated friends, thus prompting self-reflection about whether he can 
actually achieve anything in his private life. 
Satirising platitudes and banalities serve as a frequent comic device in 
Norsemen as men grasp at seemingly ‘wise’ words to cope with their dif-
ficulties or justify their shortcomings. Arvid declares, in an attempt to boost 
his sexual self-confidence, ‘It’s not about the size of the boat, it’s about the 
motion of the ocean.’ Other male characters use truisms, statements that 
sound profound but are so obviously true that they preclude further dis-
cussion, that sound as if they come straight from self-help books on re-
lationships or leadership. For example, Olav advises Arvid, ‘You mustn’t 
lose yourself in the relationship’ to which Arvid responds, ‘You know about 
relationships. It’s about give and take.’ Orm, in particular, as he takes over 
as Chieftain in the most incompetent manner possible seems to be making it 
up as he goes: ‘And punctuality is a virtue. Which is something I’ve decided 
to start saying.’ Other truisms sound like they come from current trends in 
Anglo-American leadership coaching: ‘Be a little solution-oriented,’ or ‘You 
have to prioritise.’ As spectators, we are encouraged to see these platitudes 
as comically insufficient coping strategies to deal with a perplexing mas-
culine condition. It is certainly not from truisms that the male vikings will 
be able to derive some sort of meaningful life guidance. 
When Chief Olav decides to leave on a new pillaging mission, the village 
changes dramatically as his weakling brother Orm takes over. Freed from 
his aggressive brother’s oversight, Orm seizes the opportunity to lead the 
village in another, more cultured direction. In a satire on largesse and 
hierarchy, he appoints his slave Rufus as creative director. Next, Orm or-
ders all villagers to surrender their weapons to Rufus in order to create an 
art installation. Unfortunately, this decision leaves the whole clan vulner-
able to attack. As the foolhardy Orm blunders on with his cultural fantasy, 
his fearless, well-muscled wife Frøya enthusiastically joins the men of an-
other tribe in raiding and pillaging their own defenceless village. 
In an interview with the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet, actor Kåre 
Conradi (Orm), the ‘sensitive viking’ leader who fears war and goes to great 
lengths to introduce the viking village to culture, talked about how he be-
lieved it was high time to do something ‘fun’ with the vikings (2016). The 
result is a cosmetically plausible viking world. However, digging deeper 
into the comedy reveals a carnivalesque reversal in the Bakhtinian sense of 
the modern Norwegian welfare state (Bakhtin, 1963, p. 127). In what 
might be called an ‘anti-welfare state,’ we see a viking community that 
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uncritically engages in acts of (sexual) violence and pillaging. The satire is 
clear, however, when conflicted warrior Arvid flippantly declares that 
‘taking stuff is so fun.’ This gratuitous violence stands in stark contrast to 
the Norwegian self-image of a peace-promoting, generous nation 
(Skånland, 2014) whose history lies outside of European imperialism 
(Gullestad, 2005). The comedy also spoofs the Norwegian welfare state’s 
focus on intergenerational fairness and helping the elderly live fulfilled lives. 
This occurs when Orm’s mismanagement of the village’s resources leads 
village elders to engage in the senecidal Ættestup ritual, throwing them-
selves, or being thrown, to their deaths when they were no longer able to 
lead independent lives or contribute resources to the village – a potential 
solution to historical shortcomings in the food supply. 
Samurai Shifters takes on the concerns of work relocations and down-
sizings, controversial issues in Japan since the 1980s. Yet, sudden reloca-
tions were also common in the Edo period involving the same stresses, 
‘unexpected notice, an unfamiliar destination, limited time and funds,’ as 
such moves do today (Haneda, 2019, para. 1). The dilemma of Samurai 
Shifters starts as the Lord of the Himeji domain is given two months’ notice 
to shift an entire clan of several thousand warriors and their families to a 
new territory 600 km away. The new territory is half their current land size; 
moreover, they must make this move with limited resources and reduced 
manpower. This herculean and unpopular task is delegated to film’s un-
likely hero, Harunosuke Katagiri, a librarian and recluse, who prefers the 
company of books to people. Katagiri is expected to develop a master plan 
for the entire relocation, as well as to dismiss over half of the clan’s sa-
murai. With no prior experience and extreme lack of social skills, Katagiri’s 
only desire is to escape. As luck would have it, however, he must eventually 
accept his new position despite his reluctance. The story evolves as Katagiri 
enlists the help of the loudmouth swordsman Genemon Takamura and the 
strong-minded Miss Oran, the daughter of the former relocation officer, to 
develop ingenious downsizing and relocation strategies. As he gains ex-
perience, Katagiri gradually earns the respect of fellow clansmen, im-
pressing them with his honesty, empathy and egalitarian principles, in what 
increasingly plays out as a tongue-in-cheek riposte to the rigid hierarchical 
frameworks of contemporary Japanese working life. 
In what follows we examine the ways in which comedy makes a state-
ment about the current state of masculinity. We argue that the humour here 
depends on spectators’ recognition of the difficulties associated with being a 
man in Norway and Japan today. 
Hikikomori masculinity and the pressures of 
Samurai–Salaryman life 
The opening scenes of Samurai Shifters confirm Katagiri’s status as an 
unlikely hero. A reclusive librarian, his cloistered lifestyle and paralysing 
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shyness resonate with the tensions of modern-day hikikomori masculinity. 
The hero’s embodiment of the tragic social misfit is playfully communicated 
through the teasing banter that his friend Genemon Takamura engages in, 
poking and prodding him to take on his new role as relocation officer. At 
the same time, the pressure he is put under by the clan to accept the new job 
after initially balking at the task and his ultimate inability to refuse his 
superior’s orders leads to his feelings of powerlessness. This sense of having 
no recourse vividly stages the pressures of the modern-day salaryman. 
Hikikomori as a social phenomenon has been observed amongst Japanese 
young people, mostly young men, since the 1970s. It has gained even more 
attention since the late 1990s: ‘Hikikomoru is a compound verb made up of 
the two characters for “to pull back” [hiku] and “to seclude oneself” 
[komoru]’ (Kato et al., 2019, p. 427). The term hikikomori refers to in-
dividuals who have withdrawn from the group, whether school or the 
workplace, for months or even years, spending most of the day alone inside 
their home (Kato et al., 2019, p. 427). The opening narration of Samurai 
Shifters draws on viewers’ familiarity with this phenomenon, foregrounding 
Katagiri as a ‘hikikomori samurai.’ We meet this paradoxical figure of the 
librarian-hikikomori anti-hero in the heart of his place of refuge, his library: 
Narrator:  The hero of this story is a librarian. The book this young man is 
now reading is a documentation of the Takeda clan’s military 
strategies. (Inudô, 2019)  
The film’s journey will thrust the hapless Katagiri, nicknamed ‘the snail’ 
and ‘shut-in’ by his fellow clansmen, out of his closeted cocoon and into the 
limelight. When Katagiri’s friend Genemon Takamura breaks the news to 
him that he is the favoured candidate for leading the massive relocation 
project, Katagiri is shocked. Here, the references to ‘sunlight’ and to 
Katagiri’s response to the call of the outside world evoke the closeted in-
terior lives of hikikomori (Inudô, 2019). 
Genemon Takamura:  I know a man who is perfect for the job. 
Harunosuke Katagiri:  Who is that? 
Genemon Takamura:  It’s Snail. Come! It’s time to get out into the 
sunlight. 
Harunosuke Katagiri:  Leave me alone! No! Ha, it’s too bright! My eyes… 
my eyes! I…I am not good at talking to people!  
While sociological discourses often understand hikikomori as ‘passive ob-
jects’ (Overell, 2018, p. 209), they can also be seen as ‘wilful subjects,’ who 
refuse to meet social obligations (Ahmed, 2014, as cited in Overell, 2018, 
p. 206). As such they can be read as queering normative masculinity in 
Japan, in the sense Sarah Ahmed ascribes to someone who deviates from 
given modes of being in the world (Ahmed, 2014, as cited in Overell, 2018, 
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p. 210). The wilful subject is ‘perverse and irritating’ (Ahmed, 2014, p. 17). 
Katagiri embodies the contradiction of the hikikomori, appearing as a 
passive recluse obsessed with book learning and at the same time wilfully 
refusing to take on the job offer. He makes his refusal clear in words, but 
also by trying to run away. He only concedes to take the position when he is 
given the ultimatum to either accept the role or commit seppuku, a form of 
Japanese ritual suicide by disembowelment. Rosemary Overell argues that 
hikikomoris can be understood as ‘queer subjects who are out of place and 
pace with the dominant heteronormative masculinist culture of con-
temporary Japan’ (2018, p. 206). As we will see, as with other Katagiri 
hikikomori dramas, such as Train Man/Densha Otoko based on the pur-
portedly true account of 23-year-old hikikomori’s heroic intervention to 
stop harassment of a young women on a train, the lonely recluse moves 
from the margins and finds his way back into society. 
At the same time, the Herculean task Katagiri is assigned brings into 
focus another emblematic symbol of modern Japan – the salaryman. The 
stereotypical salaryman figure is associated with an all-consuming, intensive 
workload alongside the demands to perform ‘loyalty, diligence, dedication, 
and self-sacrifice’ (Dasgupta, 2017, p. 40). The apparent impossibility of 
Katagiri’s task, combined with his sense of powerlessness, the burden of his 
friends’ and fellow clansmen’s expectations, and the multiple logistical and 
financial pressures the task will involve function as a millstone around his 
neck. This professional salaryman-type burden is so heavy around the neck 
of a shy librarian that it becomes comical, especially, as we will see, as 
Katagiri takes it on in such a way as to destabilise the hierarchical under-
pinnings of masculine leadership on which they are founded. 
Tidying up with Katagiri: The Marie Kondo School of Samurai 
Masculinity  
♪ Sorting, throwing, giving away 
Packing, handing, finish in time 
(Inudô, 2019)  
As Katagiri starts to embrace his new role, his unconventional leadership 
style plays with gendered ideas about domesticity. As he begins to work out 
ways for the clan to downsize in anticipation of moving to a smaller ter-
ritory, he comes up with a ‘novel’ decluttering strategy, amusingly re-
miniscent of modern day Japanese domestic trends. Inudo himself confirms 
that this strategy is a ‘cheeky’ reference to the philosophy of Japanese de- 
cluttering expert Marie Kondo, whose 2016 cult bestseller Spark Joy and 
Netflix Show Tidying up with Marie Kondo (2019) are all about ‘throwing 
away anything that does not spark joy’ (Pringle, 2019). In Samurai Shifters, 
the clansmen homes end up being Marie Kondo-ed, in a move that turns 
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these samurai warriors into reluctant domestic goddesses. The Marie 
Kondo scene takes place when Katagiri comes up with the bright idea of 
asking all the local clansmen to get rid of any possessions that they do not 
need. He suggests they eliminate all objects that ‘no longer spark joy,’ a 
direct reference to Kondo’s philosophy. In the spirit of egalitarianism, he 
decides to lead by example, turning on his own possessions and burning 
dozens of books from his personal library. 
However, Katagiri’s order to de-clutter does not ‘spark joy’ in all the 
clansmen. One member of the clan insists that he cannot comply with the 
order because his collections are extremely valuable. Demonstrating his 
newfound quick-wittedness, Katagiri puts the clansman’s dependency on 
his possessions to the test. He covers up everything in the man’s room and 
then asks him to make a list of all his possessions, now out of sight. Katagiri 
then orders all the valuables which do not appear on the list to be thrown 
away. The implication is that if that you cannot remember your posses-
sions, then you do not need them. Mimicking the familiar resistance of TV 
hoarders, the clansman begs Katagiri to relent, while the former holds his 
ground with Marie Kondo-like self-assurance, substituting the rhetoric of 
joyfulness to that of attachment (Inudô, 2019): 
Clansman:  Wait! That one came from China and is priceless! 
Katagiri:  But you didn’t remember it. It means that you felt no 
attachment to it. So, you don’t need it.  
As Katagiri is again reinvented, this time as a Samurai Marie Kondo, the 
film playfully de-couples domestic preoccupation from the world of 
women, poking fun at established gendered divisions of labour within the 
Japanese home. The scene produces an imagined comical juxtaposition 
between the rough and ready clansmen and the ‘petite’ Marie Kondo. At the 
same time, the idiocy of tossing valuable antiques represents a playful cri-
tique of the more extreme dimension of Kondo’s one-size-fits-all philo-
sophy. While the implied ludicrousness of the idea of men tidying up may 
appear misogynistic, the scene also sanctions such behaviour in the sense 
that it is initiated by the film’s new hero. 
The caring sharing leader: Vikings and Samurais in a double-bind 
Season one of Norsemen exposes workplace expectations that place men in 
a double-bind. Even vikings are simultaneously and humorously expected 
to be both ambitious leaders with a clear vision and sensitive to relational 
issues among their subordinates. Returning momentarily to the opening 
sequence that stages Rufus’s arrival in Norheim, we see Chieftain Olav 
returning to the settlement after several years of raiding and pillaging. He 
brings back to the village a Roman slave (Rufus), who is exceptionally 
cultured and ill-prepared for the lack of sophistication he encounters among 
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the vikings. As the ship approaches Norheim, Rufus hesitantly voices cri-
ticism with respect to the lack of comfort during the journey and the work 
and salary conditions he will find in Norheim. In a manner that reveals a 
misrecognition of his own position and resonates with modern management 
culture, he criticises the information flow aboard the overcrowded ship 
(Helgaker & Torgersen, 2016): 
Rufus:  Not to complain, but I think the flow of 
information here on this boat is 
extremely arbitrary. And that’s totally 
uncalled for, when we’re so crammed 
together in such a small craft. I didn’t 
know until yesterday that we were even 
going to Norway. 
Chieftain Olav:  So, you think the information flow is 
under par? 
Rufus:  Yes. 
Chieftain Olav:  So, here’s some information for you. 
Rufus:  Finally! [Chieftain Olav punches Rufus 
in the nose] Ow, ow! Did you see that? 
Did everyone see that? There’s 
something seriously wrong with 
my nose! 
Chieftain Olav (turns to Arvid):  Was that a bit too much? 
Arvid:  No, you’re the chieftain. Aren’t you 
supposed to be a little like that when 
you’re in charge? A little crazy. 
Chieftain Olav:  But it’s not really me, that fear-based 
leadership style stuff. It doesn’t feel 
right.  
The scene’s comic relief unravels at different levels. Olav’s unexpected 
punch fits in with viewers’ expectations about the vikings and their lack of 
diplomacy as well as viking-era power relations between master and slave. 
The Chieftain’s unexpected self-doubt and soul-searching, however, belong 
more to the realm of the ‘soft’ and non-confrontational leadership style 
suited to the flat organisational structure of most contemporary Norwegian 
organisations. During this sequence, the spectator is drawn to see Olav as 
struggling to develop a leadership style with just the right balance of fear 
and feelings. 
As Katagiri plans and executes the relocation, the film continues to cast a 
playful light on the overbearing and unequal practices of the present-day 
corporate culture. Yet, it also showcases Katagiri as an alternative type of 
leader. In the end, our hero, the reclusive hikikomori, faced with the mul-
tiple pressures of a salaryman’s endless debt to the firm and obedience to his 
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superiors, is reformed. He is intent on building team spirit, is not afraid of 
his dependence on others and is determined to call out the classist practices 
of his predecessors. As such, Katagiri symbolises the best of both worlds – a 
leader who can take on an enormous task and but who, at the same time, 
remains a sensitive soul. 
Katagiri’s egalitarian mindset incites explicit comment by other 
clansmen. When Oran discusses the mistreatment her father (the lower- 
class former relocations officer and Katagiri’s predecessor) suffered at the 
hand of his own boss, this becomes the occasion for Genemon Takamura to 
praise Katagiri’s egalitarian mindset in comparison (Inudô, 2019): 
Genemon Takamura:  You must be the daughter of Itagaki [former 
magistrate in charge of relocation]. 
Oran:  Yes 
Genemon Takamura:  Sajima [bureaucrat] always took credit for the 
accomplishment of Itagaki and advanced in his 
career without actually working. I detest that kind 
of attitude. On the other hand, Katagiri has never 
pushed people aside. He treats people equally, 
regardless of their position and class. I admire that.  
This favourable comparison is further emphasised by Katagiri’s actions 
when it is his turn to find out that all Itagaki’s achievements were credited 
to his superiors because of his lower-class status. Katagiri then makes a 
point of going to Itagaki’s grave to apologise, an act which earns him the 
respect of Oran, who was previously unwilling to pass on her father’s 
strategic knowledge to him because of the unfair way her father had been 
treated. Oran’s capitulation then becomes the mechanism for showcasing 
Katagiri’s dependence on a woman – that is to say on the knowledge Oran 
gained from her father, another step in the road of egalitarian leadership. 
This same egalitarian spirit is demonstrated when the head of accounts 
urges Katagiri to take loans from merchants with no intention to pay them 
back. Katagiri makes it clear that he objects to stealing hard-earned money 
from ordinary people just because he is entitled to do so as a ‘superior’ 
samurai. Embodying a new masculinity, Katagiri continually challenges 
classist structures and privilege. He even suggests that the samurai abandon 
their normal privileges and carry their own bags when travelling. 
Finally, one of the final scenes of the movie, a rollicking battle scene, 
demonstrates that successful outcomes in leadership ultimately do not de-
pend on a male top dog. Rather the scene affirms collaborative practices, in 
which each and every member of the team counts equally. The battle scene 
opens when Katagiri’s travelling group encounters enemy agents disguised 
as fishermen. As the enemy threatens to overwhelm them, the wisdom of 
Katagiri’s team philosophy is borne out – men, women and children work 
together to outwit the imposters. Takamura grabs a massive outsize sword, 
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swirling it round with acrobatic dexterity, while a child strategically aims a 
slew of porcelain plates at the oncoming attackers, both sowing terror in 
their wake. But Katagiri’s strategies come into play too. Since he had al-
ready encouraged the samurai to hone their physical skills so that they 
would be able to carry their own luggage, they are now well prepared to 
fight the good fight. 
In the end our hero, the reluctant hikikomori, changes into a ‘New Man’ 
samurai. He exemplifies the best of the bushidō code, emerging as a trusty 
and wise leader who knows better than to rule by fear. Moreover, in the 
process, he conquers his own fears, embodying a masculinity hybrid that 
brings together the best of both worlds, the virtues of traditional bushidō 
masculinity and a novel, more vulnerable manhood. 
Conclusion 
This chapter explores the ways in which Samurai Shifters and Norsemen 
playfully engage with contemporary issues of masculinity, a theme that has 
dominated debates on gender equality in both Norway and Japan in recent 
years. We asked: What dimensions of modern masculinities do these co-
medies explore? To what degree do these comedies uphold or challenge the 
prevailing social orders in Japan and Norway? Are there any similarities 
and differences that can be found in the representations of masculinity? 
Both Norsemen and Samurai Shifters use comedy to establish a frame for an 
alternative to ‘serious’ societal discussions about gender roles and gender 
equality, which tend to focus on men’s shortcomings and reflect ambiva-
lence about masculine roles in both the public and private spheres. Toying 
with recognisable stereotypical male figures, they bring current social ten-
sions relating to men’s domestic and working life to light. Samurai Shifters 
exposes the unbearable burdens of the salaryman, kicks the hikikomori 
back into society and imagines an idealised leader who represents the an-
tithesis of corporate Japan and the best of bushidō values – all while poking 
fun at modern domestic obsessions. Norsemen goes further in exposing the 
persistent tensions and ambivalences of contemporary western masculinity, 
suggesting that masculine ideals are unachievable when considered as a 
whole: Reconciling work-related absences with family-building aspirations, 
the pressure to ‘have it all’ in terms of a meaningful personal life and career 
and the conflicted feelings of so-called New Managers who are supposed to 
embrace the tenants of sensitive leadership. Both comedies focus on the 
near-impossible imperatives of modern ‘caring’ masculinity and both de-
pend heavily on viewers’ recognition of modern experiences represented in 
the remote historical worlds. In order to partake in the humour, viewers 
must recognise their own social world – in particular, the contours, 
boundaries and ‘excesses’ of discourse surrounding New Manhood today. 
The primary difference between these comedies lies in Norsemen pushing 
viewers to laugh at a gender equality ‘gone too far,’ while the Japanese 
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comedy light-heartedly affirms the potential in the egalitarian values that 
meet resistance in Japan’s contemporary rigid social hierarchy. Both of 
these works affirm the essential role of humour in allowing us to step away 
and see the gender equality of our own social worlds from the outside, 
reflected in the metallic sheen of the samurai and vikings swords. 
References 
Ahmed, S. (2014). Willful subjects. Duke University Press. 
Bakhtin, M.M. (1963). Problems of Dostoevsky’s poetics. University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Benioff, D. & Weiss, D.B. (Creators). (2011–2019). Game of Thrones [Series]. HBO 
Entertainment. 
Critchley, S. (2011). On humour. Routledge. 
Dancus, A. (2011). A father’s body, a nation’s heart-caregiving fathers in con-
temporary Norwegian film. NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender 
Research,  19(2), 71–86. 
Dasgupta, R. (2010). Globalisation and the bodily performance of ‘cool’ and ‘un- 
cool’ masculinities in corporate Japan. Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in 
Asia and the Pacific, 23.  http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue23/dasgupta.htm 
Dasgupta, R. (2013). Re-reading the salaryman in Japan. Routledge. 
Dasgupta, R. (2017). Articulations of salaryman masculinity in Shôwa and Post- 
Shôwa Japan. Asia Pacific Perspectives, 15(1), 36–54. 
Donnar, G. (2015). Male anxiety, inadequacy and victimhood: Insecure and im-
mature men in recent Norwegian cinema. Journal of Scandinavian Cinema, 5(2), 
155–168. 
Gullestad, M. (2005). Normalising racial boundaries: The Norwegian dispute about 
the term neger. Social Anthropology, 13(1), 27–46. 
Haneda, R. (2019). ‘Samurai Shifters’ is a comedy full of work efficiency, teamwork 
tips we can all instantly incorporate into our careers. Japanese Film Festival 
Magazine.  https://jff.jpf.go.jp/read/column/3954/ 
Helgaker, J. & Torgersen, J. (Creators). (2016–2020). Norsemen [TV series]. Norsk 
Rikskringkasting AS. 
Hidaka, T. (2010). Salaryman masculinity: The continuity of and change in the 
hegemonic masculinity in Japan. Brill. 
Hinojosa, R. (2010). Doing hegemony: Military, men, and constructing a hege-
monic masculinity. Journal of Men’s Studies, 18, 179–194. 
Inudô, I. (Director). (2019). Hikkoshi Daimyo!/Samurai Shifters [Film]. Shochiku. 
Ishii-Kuntz, M. (2019). Japanese child caring men (ikumen) and achieving work-life 
balance. In U. Meier-Gräwe, M. Motozawa, & A. Schad-Seifert (Eds.), Family life 
in Japan and Germany. Springer. 
Kato, T.A., Kanba S., & Teo, A.R. (2019). Hikikomori: Multidimensional under-
standing, assessment, and future international perspectives. Psychiatry and 
Clinical Neurosciences, 73(8), 427–440.  https://doi.org/10.1111/pcn.12895 
Kondo, M. (Executive Producer). (2016). Tidying up with Marie Kondo. The Jackal 
Group. 
Marthinussen, L.C. (2018, 16 February). Kristofer Hivju: Det å være en samlet 
familie, veier tungt for meg – ‘Game of Thrones’-stjernen åpner opp om 
Masculinity in contemporary comedies 137 
familielivet [Kristofer Hivju: Being a united family weighs heavily on me – ‘Game 
of Thrones’ star opens up about family life]. Se og Hør.  https://www.seher.no/ 
kjendis/det-a-vaere-en-samlet-familie-veier-tungt-for-meg/69522911 
Mulkay, M. (1988). On humour: Its nature and its place in modern society. Polity 
Press. 
Overell, R. (2018). Queer will: Hikikomori as willful subjects. Inter-Asia Cultural 
Studies, 19(2), 206–219.  https://doi.org/10.1080/14649373.2018.1463069 
Pringle, G. (2019, 1 November). Isshin inudo: Life of samurai. Filmink.  https:// 
www.filmink.com.au/isshin-inudo-life-samurai/ 
Raffield, B. (2019). Playing vikings: Militarism, hegemonic masculinities, and 
childhood enculturation in Viking Age Scandinavia. Current Anthropology, 
60(6), 813–835. 
Rappoport, L. (2005). Punchlines: The case for racial, ethnic, and gender humour. 
Praeger. 
Roberson, J., & Suzuki, N. (2003). Men and masculinities in contemporary Japan: 
Dislocating the salaryman doxa. Routledge. 
Sandberg, E. (Director). (2019). Amundsen [Film]. SF Studios. 
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9 Work-life balance and equality 
observed through advertising 
during the COVID-19 pandemic 
in Japan and Norway 
Chihiro Wada and Roger A. Søraa    
Work and home under the COVID-19 pandemic 
The COVID-19 pandemic has altered the ways in which people live and 
work at home. New trajectories have emerged regarding the balance be-
tween work time and leisure. As pandemic lockdowns have confined people 
to their homes, the distinction between one's work life and home life has 
blurred. In turn, these changes have affected individuals’ sense of their re-
sponsibility as workers and co-dwellers. How have people perceived this 
change? What new narratives have arisen to make sense of it? In this paper, 
we investigate how advertisements geared to national audiences represent 
Japanese and Norwegian households’ ways of striking a balance between a 
new kind of work and home life. Specifically, we ask how advertisements 
envision balancing working at home during the pandemic while doing ne-
cessary housework and caregiving. We focus in particular on the percep-
tions of certain domestic tasks as gendered and narratives about the balance 
between work and home in everyday life. 
Work is gendered and situated in material practices. Where we work, 
how we work, what we work with and whom we work with intimately 
shapes human beings as individuals and as members of different social 
groups, such as households. As the COVID-19 pandemic emerged during 
the early months of 2020, societies across the globe began to change 
drastically in multiple ways, particularly regarding how work is enacted as 
a material practice. 
This global observation also holds true for Japan and Norway, the 
countries where we made our observations. Japan, with its customarily long 
workhours, strongly gendered barriers in the workplace and gendered di-
vision of domestic work may offer interesting ways in which a workforce 
faces the challenge of working from home. On the other side of the globe, 
the Norwegian workforce, with its short, efficient work hours, shows ways 
of working in the pandemic that are similar to but also quite different from 
those of the Japanese. The pandemic has changed societies in terms of 
where people work and how society envisions that workers will situate the 
socio-materiality of home and work. The challenges of this unexpected 
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situation offer a ripe opportunity for advertisers to spin new narratives of 
work–home balance that integrates and sells their products. But how do 
advertisers handle this new situation, and what are their focus areas when it 
comes to remote work? 
We compare these two work contexts through the conceptualisation of 
work from home through representations of work and family in adver-
tisements. Social values are often reflected through commercials, which 
portray, satirise and otherwise comment on social structures and events 
(Cheng & Schweitzer, 1996; Klassen et al., 1993; Kunkel & Roberts, 
1991), including the events of the COVID-19 pandemic. Ads also have the 
power to change social norms and impact how we relate to topics. We will 
argue that advertisements in both Japan and Norway have tended to focus 
on the newness of men's attention to housework and parenting amid the 
transition to remote work, while underscoring their essential role as the 
family's primary breadwinner. Similarly, women's roles as primary care-
giver and homemaker remain unquestioned, while commercials express 
sympathy for their need to balance domestic duties with their paid em-
ployment. Family-centred commercials in both countries continue to iden-
tify the family as abled, cisgendered and heterosexual, although ads in 
Norway tend to allow for more diversity in this regard. In Japan, this 
idealised family belies the actual variety in household configurations. 
We argue that advertisements geared to national audiences represent 
Japanese and Norwegian households’ ways of dealing with the balance 
between a new kind of work and home life. Gendered narratives about the 
balance between work and home in everyday life can be seen through 
looking at how ads conceptualise the situation. These representations can 
thus provide valuable insight both on how ‘work’ and ‘home’ is gendered. 
Method and analytical approach 
We selected nationally broadcasted advertisements from Japan and Norway 
by searching for online advertisement videos released prior to December 
2020. We ascertained their release dates based on those indicated on official 
webpages associated with the advertisements and the official YouTube 
channels of the companies that produced the videos. Videos were chosen as 
a media rich in content, narrative, and social commentary. 
We performed content analysis on the framing of working from home in 
these video texts. A total of 54 advertisements from Japan were selected for 
analysis; these included ten advertisements that predated the pandemic 
period (released in the late 2010s), seven broadcast around the beginning of 
the pandemic period (January to March 2020) and 37 broadcast during the 
pandemic period (April to December 2020). Norway has a smaller com-
mercial market than Japan, which implies fewer relevant commercials. 
Thus, for Norway, we selected a total of 49 advertisements: Ten that pre-
dated COVID-19, seven broadcast from around the onset of the pandemic 
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outbreak and 32 broadcast during the pandemic period. A Google video 
search using the keyword ‘COVID-19 commercial’ conducted in June 2021 
found over 101 million videos on the topic globally. By using the keyword 
‘Corona commercials’ (Korona CM in Japanese), about 4.88 million videos 
were found in June 2021; the same search in Norwegian (korona reklame) 
yielded 119,000 results. These numbers show that this study cannot be 
considered a representative quantitative analysis over all possible com-
mercials on the topic. However, this selection does shed light on the topic at 
hand in Japan and Norway, as they tell stories about how societies were 
adopting to new rules and norms during the pandemic. The text of the 
Japanese and Norwegian advertisements was translated into English by the 
authors. 
In our analysis, we first explored gender and representations of home and 
work-life balance in advertisements in Japan and Norway that were 
broadcast before the pandemic, analysing their conceptions of workers. We 
then turned to pandemic-period advertisements with the same questions, 
which constitute the main part of our study. Investigating the topological 
connections between gender and work before and during the pandemic, we 
focused our analytical lens on the ways in which commercial depictions 
engrain and habituate roles, practices and symbolic meanings. 
Pre-pandemic: Work-related advertisements showing 
Japanese salarymen and Norwegian working mothers 
To understand the pandemic period, we first ground our analyses in ad-
vertisement depictions of work before the pandemic. Work and gender roles 
have long served as themes in advertisement and, at times, incited viewer 
outrage. The depiction of women in a 1975 advertisement for ramen by the 
Japanese corporation House Foods, for example, famously sparked con-
troversy based on its celebration of a gendered division of labour in the 
home (The Asahi Shimbun Corporation, 1975, p. 23). A young woman and 
her small daughter are shown standing and singing that they are going to 
make ramen for the husband and father, who is sitting at the table. They are 
accompanied with the slogan, ‘I’m the girl who makes it – I’m the guy who 
eats it,’ (Watashi tsukuru hito, boku taberu hito). 
Though Japanese advertisements often depict conventional gender 
norms, some changes in gender representation have been made. The re-
presentation of men cooking meals has increased since 1986 when the equal 
employment opportunity law was enforced (Yoshida, 1998, pp. 140–1). 
After 1991, when the bubble economy burst and employment amongst men 
fell, advertisements started to depict the emerging reality of men being at 
home with the children (Yoshida, 1998, p. 154). However, advertisements 
conventionally reflect gender norms and often describe women engaging in 
unpaid work at home while men work outside home (Nobeshima, 1998;  
Yoshida, 1998). The image of the suited salaryman, always busy at work, 
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has been the conventional representation of the masculine ideal in post- 
war Japan (Abe et al., 2006; Connell, 2005, p. 200; Dasgupta, 2013). 
Contemporary advertisements continue to reflect these societal gender 
norms, even in the face of changing familial configurations, as seen in 
studies of Japanese television ads in the early 2000s (E, 2003;  
Pongsapitaksanti, 2008). 
While political campaigns try to change the social situation, women still 
take the main responsibility of child-rearing in Japan. In 1999 the Japanese 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) launched a campaign to 
ameliorate the declining birth rate. Further, in 2010, the MHLW launched 
its Ikumen Project, which called on men to participate in child-rearing. The 
neologism ikumen is composed of iku, meaning ‘to raise children’ and the 
English word men – a wordplay on the slang expression ikemen (handsome 
men). However, despite this campaign, only 7.48% of eligible men took 
parental leave in 2019 (while 83.0% of eligible women took maternal 
leave) (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2020). While the number of 
men opting for parental leave is increasing especially after 2012, women 
still make up the overwhelming majority of those taking leave from work to 
raise children (see also Chapter 3 in this book). 
Representation of male engagement in housework and childcare is often 
uncritically accepted by the viewers. In 2017, a diaper advertisement by 
Unicharm Corporation (Moony Promotion, 2017), which depicts a woman 
busy with housework and child-rearing while her husband does nothing, 
sparked controversy amongst the public. We see the reverse scenario in a 
2014 advertisement for softener by Lion Corporation showing a busy house 
husband sawing or shopping all alone, which received no public backlash 
(Miyashita, 2020, p. 101). Miyashita (2020) argued that the commercial’s 
intended viewership (probably women) likely regarded this scenario 
as unrealistic and the representation of a house husband purely fantasy 
(p. 101). 
Advertisements broadcast before the coronavirus pandemic in Japan 
often depicted men in suits working long hours, but several also illustrated 
men working and raising children.1 While these attempts at disrupting 
hegemonic masculinity have sometimes led to mockery,2 such images en-
dured in the pre-coronavirus Japan of the late 2010s. For instance, one 
advertisement for a drink that prevents hangovers in 2019 depicts suited 
men doing ‘nomikai’ – a Japanese custom to drink alcohol with their 
business associates after their work as a part of their business activity – with 
the product as they smile.3 However, nomikai is sometimes ridiculed as a 
bad example of a custom of long-working hours. 
Going against the grain, some advertisements broadcast in Japan from 
the late 2010s show women at work and some even depict men raising 
children. A commercial for a toilet detergent, for example, depicts a woman 
wearing a suit at work and being tired of overwork. She suddenly cleans a 
toilet next to her desk and says ‘It feels great!’ (ST-Corporation, 2019). 
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Although only one out of ten advertisements in our sample describes work 
from home, the protagonist of the advertisement was a man who was en-
gaging in childcare. This coffee ad from Suntory Beverage & Food Limited 
(2017) shows a young man raising children while working remotely, con-
cluding with the motto, ‘A new wind is blowing.’ Reinforcing the ‘newness’ 
of this scene, the advertisement also shows people bringing their pet dogs to 
the office, suggesting the potential for new styles of work in Japan. Thus, 
advertising in the late 2010s, before the spread of the novel coronavirus, 
included depictions of conventionally suited salarymen and career women 
working busily away from home. Much less common were depictions of 
men taking part in housework and child-rearing. 
Turning to Norway, we find an entirely different situation. Since the 
1980s, Norway has required advertisement narratives to support gender 
equality politics (Berg et al., 1979):  
1 In commercials with one person – flip the gender of the person shown 
to the opposite gender.  
2 In commercials with both genders, let men and women change roles. 
Berg et al. (1979) argued that as long as the resulting gender change did not 
require any alteration to the rest of the storyline of the advertisement, it 
would fairly represent and help normalise gender equity. Berg et al. also 
recommended that commercials use the same number of men and women. 
The strongest directive was that to flip gender roles, for example, to show 
compassionate men in caregiving roles and gregarious women meaningfully 
engaged in the public domain. A commercial for Telenor (1997) provides a 
good example of this. Seeking to discover what it calls ‘solutions for the 
country’ (loosely meaning, ‘things that can be improved’), the commercial 
shows a working mother dealing with difficult male bosses. Clearly, they do 
not think that she can become an effective leader since she must care for her 
sick child. With the help of a female secretary, however, the woman 
manages to impress them while excelling at work and providing childcare. 
The message is thus that women can actually do it all just as well as men, 
but also that comradeship and sisterhood among working women should be 
applauded. 
As we see, in both Norway and Japan, commercials have made ground- 
breaking representations of both domestic and working life and have also 
reinforced stereotypes. In both countries, the portrayal of the working- 
mother or career-woman balancing work and home life has surfaced as 
particularly important. Our study found, with few exceptions, the woman 
represented as a parent as well. Notably, Norwegian commercials depict 
women’s careers as enhanced, not limited, by their having children, as we 
saw in the ‘solutions for the country’ video. They regularly portray child-
care responsibilities in a way that shows women being able to handle 
multiple roles, issues and tasks. These positive maternal figures contrast 
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with commercials featuring men, which often depict them as the implicitly 
single and childless career-man – or downplaying and not focusing on their 
role in the home life. Also, after the 2000s, particular scrutiny has been put 
on the retouching of commercial posters, and out of context body-focus, as  
Engesbakk (2007) discussed. Examples include companies selling contact 
lenses, but showing nude women sitting around (with little focus on their 
eyes), and the sexualisation of women drinking coffee and the general re-
touching of commercial posters, such as in H&M underwear commercials. 
The long-held social norm which positions the husband/father as the 
primary breadwinner and the wife/mother as primarily devoted to house-
work and child-rearing remains a powerful trope of middle-class life, 
especially in Japan. This conventional portrait often overshadows actual 
diversity in society, such as the increasing existence of single and LGBTQ+ 
households. In Japan, there has been little media representation of this 
variety, while in Norway, diversity of cast has been increasingly represented 
in recent years. In fact, in 2021, it is quite common to see portrayals of 
queer couples in commercials. This coincides with the Norwegian Labour 
and Welfare Administration’s decision to move away from focusing policies 
primarily on housewife politics in the 1970s, to also including those re-
garding single parents and LGBTQ+ couples after the 2000s. This can be 
seen on their official site (Arbeids- og velferdsetaten [NAV], 2020), with 
thorough rules, for example, for gay and lesbian couples raising children 
together, with different rules for surrogacy and adoption cases. This trend 
has shaped commercials in Norway too, which increasingly spin scenarios 
involving various family compositions and close relations outside the tra-
ditional nuclear family model. In Norway, working from home was not 
often thematised in commercials before the pandemic. How did advertisers 
thematise working from home when this became a new norm during the 
COVID-19 pandemic? 
The pandemic era: Work-related advertisements in Japan 
and Norway 
Work-related advertisements that have appeared during the pandemic era 
in Japan and Norway show similar depictions of working from home and 
child-rearing as people adapt to the pandemic. However, these advertise-
ments also reveal several differences between adaptations to this situation in 
the two countries. 
Japanese advertisements have started depicting remote meetings as the 
representation of a new type of workstyle rather than a temporary work- 
around. These advertisements show working women and men mutually 
engaging in child-rearing and housework at home. But male participation in 
child-rearing tends to be the main theme, clearly marked as the ‘newest’ 
part of the new workstyle. In contrast, women’s work receives less 
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attention, signalling that women’s productive labour in the workforce and 
reproductive labour in the home are hardly considered anything new. 
On 7 April 2020, a state of emergency was declared in seven prefectures, 
including Tokyo, in response to the novel coronavirus pandemic. This 
period can thus be tentatively identified as the point when public concern 
was strongly drawn to the novel coronavirus in Japan, as foreshadowed by 
the Yokohama cruise-ship incident, an early instance of coronavirus in 
Japan in February 2020. Advertisers, too, responded to this concern, as 
around the time that people in Japan began to implement social distancing 
and take remote work seriously, many advertisements began to show 
multiple people communicating remotely via computers. Of the 16 ads 
which describe work from home in our sample from this period, 12 depict 
remote meetings using computers. An advertisement for a man’s suit 
company, for example, depicts four men sharing work information on a 
computer screen (The Suit Company, 2020). 
This increase of remote meetings portrayal reflects the new reality of 
remote working. The percentage of employees who experienced remote 
working has increased from 10.3% (December 2019) to 27.7% (May 
2020), which declined to 21.5 % in December 2020 (Cabinet Office, 2021). 
Although there is a gap between different occupations, the overall number 
of people who experienced remote working increased, and commercials 
during this period reflected this situation. 
Whereas commercials depict women ‘balancing’ paid work, childcare 
and housework, men are shown as adding childcare to their work from 
home. Interestingly, these ads are all produced by multinational companies, 
which may signal their adherence to representations of work acceptable in 
other developed countries. Moreover, while 10 out of the 16 pandemic-era 
advertisements in Japan in our sample present individuals working from 
home while engaged in housework or childcare, only one focuses solely on 
women. Many ads depict both men and women active together in their 
homes, but male engagement in child-rearing tends to be the main theme. It 
is the ‘newness’ that attracts viewer attention. For example, an advertising 
campaign on clothes appropriate for remote work launched by apparel 
manufacturer UNIQLO Co., Ltd., uses the catchphrase ‘New normal. New 
workwear.’ The version of the remote-wear product made for men features 
the slogan ‘For work, for parenting,’ while the slogan for the women’s 
product states, ‘Pants that make me feel positive.’ The text on the website 
selling the same women’s pants reads, ‘Work, hobbies, parenting is never a 
zero-sum game. In this new lifestyle, they all matter.’ The UNIQLO ads 
assume that today’s women all continue to raise children as they work 
inside and outside the home, while men have added parenting as a new 
activity.4 An add from Kureha Corporation’s advertisement for plastic food 
wrap also presents a working man engaging in housework and child- 
rearing. The website for this campaign champions dual parent engagement 
housework and childcare as the trend, asserting, ‘In more and more 
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families, it is not a matter of who should do it, but of doing it together.’5 
These advertisements by UNIQLO and Kureha portray two-income fa-
milies in which men participate in housework and child-rearing, although 
these were previously duties handled entirely by women. 
The ‘positive’ representation of men engaging in childcare does not reflect 
a reality. Through experiencing remote working, women felt that their 
burden on housework and child-rearing increased while men enjoyed the 
decrease in commuting time and women were less satisfied than men with 
the sharing the burden of childcare and housework with their partners and 
35.2% of them wanted their partners to do more housework (while only 
18.5% of men wanted to) (Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2020). 
These observations will be re-examined comparatively after studying 
commercials designed and disseminated in Norway during the same period. 
Return of domestic work and noisy children in Norway 
Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, it was found that in Norway 33% of 
employees reported being able to work from home from at least a half-day 
per month (Øksnes, 2018). However, working full-time in a permanent 
home office situation is quite different. After the first coronavirus infection 
was discovered in Norway, on 26 February 2020, the country took drastic 
measures and closed down on 12 March, with workers who were able to 
being asked to set up home offices, such that many people were working 
from home from March to December. As in Japan, this new normal, where 
individuals did not know how long their home office situation would last, 
led to many commercials and advertisements thematising and capitalising 
on the situation, both by portraying people working from home and by 
selling them equipment for their new work environment. 
As a result, working from home themes became widespread in com-
mercials during the pandemic. For example, the Norwegian commercial 
from mobile phone operator Telia released a commercial called ‘The show 
must go online’ (2020). Against the background music of the rock group 
Queen’s well-known song, ‘The show must go on,’ the commercial features 
the tagline, ‘Suddenly the internet became more important than pants.’ The 
humorous commercial shows four people carrying on a job-meeting online 
from home (and without wearing trousers). A man in his 60s is comically 
shown wearing animal slippers and using a robot vacuum cleaner to dust 
his floor while he is in the meeting. A woman in her 40s, meanwhile, is 
shown using nail-polish on her toenails. 
Gender roles also served as an important topic in relation to working 
from home. In a Norwegian commercial advertising the largest bank in the 
country, Den Norske Bank (2020), we are shown a multitude of people 
dealing with having to work from home. This commercial presents depic-
tions of gender and work roles commonly found in other Norwegian 
commercials. Although both men and women are shown taking care of 
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children through home schooling or other means in the commercials, quite 
different practices appear, too. For instance, women are often shown as 
engaged in self-care (cutting hair, polishing nails), but looking sad none-
theless about their confinement in the home. In contrast, men are shown 
enjoying their pandemic life by working out or having fun with pets; in one 
montage, we are even shown a man working out doing push-ups while a 
woman sits on his back. The product of the commercial is a tele-
communication service of broadband being sold, so what the people do 
with the increased internet speed as portrayed in the commercial can be 
quite broad. 
The COVID-19 crisis has had gendered consequences, especially in regard to 
work. Globally, women constitute 70% of the healthcare workforce on the 
frontline of the pandemic (Pozzan & Cattaneo, 2020). Evidence shows that 
during the pandemic, Norwegian women have devoted more time to their do-
mestic work and care work due to working from home, including increased care 
tasks for both older and younger generations (Nergaard, 2020). One rector at a 
Norwegian university, for example, suggested that female workers should be 
given priority when returning to university work to compensate for their pan-
demic caregiving burdens (Strand & Schei, 2020). These issues about women’s 
labour at home and in healthcare have not seemed to translate into the world of 
advertisement, which often focuses women’s engagement in self-care. 
Children, interestingly, often play the role of ‘noisy villains’ in com-
mercials. For example, a commercial by one of the largest building-stores,  
Byggmax (2020), depicts a man intentionally locking himself out of his 
home in order to escape his noisy children. In most commercials featuring 
children, focus is put on how noise adds a negative layer to the home, 
enhancing the sense that things are out of place. Although one could argue 
that children, not work, are the natural habitants of the modern home, 
commercials imply that the pandemic has upset the norm. Norwegian 
childcare policies have focused on enabling women to work through im-
proved state-supported public kindergarten services. 
A Norwegian labour force survey of the population aged 15–74 showed 
73.8% male work employment and 67.9% female work employment, with 
36.8% of women working part-time, compared to 12.5% of males 
(Statistisk Sentralbyrå [SSB], 2019). This part-time model is often coupled 
with unpaid informal care-work responsibilities. 
The ‘noisy children’ trope in commercials reflects the disruption caused 
by a lack of the normal access to childcare in Norway during the pandemic. 
The Norwegian societal model of the welfare state, which enables a high 
participation of women in employment, is thus now under stress. 
Institutions have closed down or are quarantining, thereby increasing do-
mestic and care responsibilities within households. Although the ‘working 
mom’ trope as a model of women working after having children faces new 
challenges due to the pandemic with digital home-schools, the measures 
that have been taken hastily in the pandemic do not necessarily aim to 
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prevent or mitigate this threat, but rather is a measure to get by for now. 
The advertisements analysed did not problematise to any significant degree 
the increased burden of care on women, but they did show many fathers 
taking on care responsibilities. 
Comparing Japan and Norway: Emerging paradoxes 
The pandemic has made working from home necessary for a wide variety of 
workers. Our examination of Norwegian and Japanese advertisements 
previous to and during the pandemic has uncovered common themes. Most 
pertinent to our study were narratives about the balance between domestic 
work and paid work, both of which took place in the home to a greater 
degree during the pandemic. Prior to the pandemic, Japanese women spent 
208 minutes per day on housework, compared to 44 minutes for men in 
2016 (Statistics Bureau Japan, 2017). Even though Japanese women now 
need less time for housework than they did 20 years ago, they still hold 
more responsibility for it than men, which can be linked to sociocultural 
factors. 
Women in Norway also still do more housework than men, spending 110 
minutes a day on average, compared to 60 minutes for men. Yet, there has 
been movement toward gender equity in Norway: Women have more than 
halved the time they spend on housework over the last 50 years, partly due 
to technology and more efficient ways of doing housework, while men have 
increased their time by 55% (Bufdir, 2016). It is interesting to note that 
52% of Norwegian men but only 36% of Norwegian women feel that the 
responsibility for housework is shared equally. Although Norwegian 
women do less domestic housework than they did in the 1970s, and men do 
more, the balance is still unfavourable to women (Vaage, 2012). Ellingsæter 
& Kitterød (2021) found that Norwegian fathers do both more housework 
and care work, which they thematise as ‘family work,’ but that women still 
do much more of all categories. Also worth noting is the socio-economic 
aspect, as men with higher education do more than those with lower edu-
cation, according to Ellingsæter & Kitterød (2021). 
Gender inequality in housework responsibilities is closely related to the 
cultural definition of expectations for both domestic life and what con-
stitutes normal. As depictions of remote work increase, advertising has 
come to show more scenes depicting work-life balance, which in Japan 
generally relates to the ‘new’ trend of men’s involvement in raising children. 
As noted above, in our sample, advertising in Japan has featured depictions 
of working women and men raising children and doing housework since the 
late 2010s. However, at the same time as those developments, the image of 
the busy salaryman has also remained common in Japan. Beginning with 
the spread of the novel coronavirus, depictions of remote work in Japan in 
ads have increased, and men’s participation in child-rearing has come to be 
portrayed in a positive light. However, conventional family norms are still 
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being represented and recapitulated and women are being pushed to the 
margins by men’s representation. In the advertisements in Norway, we 
noted in particular that although fathers were positively represented when 
shown taking care of their families, the families themselves were not always 
portrayed positively. Children were often portrayed as noisy disturbances 
for the man working from home. Women portrayed working from home 
were often shown as angry or depressed, as well as overly interested in self- 
care through their use of beauty products. Our analysis has led us to three 
gender work paradoxes for further enquiry, as described in the following 
subsections. 
Reworking the happy family myth 
Many advertisements appear to challenge conventional gender norms but 
traditional family roles are quietly reworked into the context of the novelty 
of remote work. As the above analysis indicates, the advertisements col-
lected here tend to depict heterosexual couples raising abled children, with 
both parents working and sharing housework and parenting responsi-
bilities. While this was true in both contexts, it was particularly evident in 
the Japanese selection. Diverse families such as those of single people, 
single-parent households, same-sex couples, or families without children 
appear very seldom in Japanese commercials compared to the Norwegian 
ones. Remote work serves as a prompt to integrate women’s work inside 
and outside the home and adds men’s housework and child-rearing to ex-
isting family norms, amid the continuing depiction of the conventional 
happy, abled and heterosexual family. 
The marginalisation of women 
Our analysis of advertisements in Japan and Norway highlights the de-
piction of remote work and men’s participation in child-rearing, as well as 
how this depiction reflects women’s double burden. The novelty of remote 
work reflected in the Japanese advertisements analysed is mainly attributed 
to men’s home life and not to women’s work life. Styles of work in two- 
income households have undoubtedly changed for both men and women, 
and the focus in advertisements is on the men who are participating in 
housework and child-rearing – or as we saw in Norway, their use of robot 
vacuum cleaners to avoid housework. The advertisements discussed do not 
focus much on how housework and child-rearing has actually changed for 
women in the pandemic, and often risk reproducing gender stereotypes. 
Technologies alone do not bring equality 
We might expect that advancing technologies could diminish housework, 
thereby reducing concerns about who has responsibility. Novel technologies, 
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however, do not by themselves rewrite conventional gender roles (see Wajcman, 
1991); rather, we must continue to discuss the meanings attached to women’s 
labour in society. We do not see any attempt, however, to draw attention to this 
issue in contemporary advertisements. The move of leaping directly to depictions 
of men’s novel participation in housework and child-rearing, while bypassing 
the women who are the ones actually taking parental leave or shouldering both 
work and household duties, has an insidious effect, although we do see in the 
examples of the noisy children in commercials that parenting is not presented as 
being without friction. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated how advertisements in Japan and Norway 
have portrayed the novel COVID-19 pandemic’s effect on work. This has 
been done by selecting and analysing advertisements in Japan and Norway 
for their portraits of new configurations of remote work and their effect on 
gender roles within the family. The primary advertisements chosen were 
first published during the COVID-19 pandemic, with some earlier ones 
analysed as well to contextualise the two countries. In Japan, the image of 
the busy, suited male salaryman of the late 2010s is retained, but the newer 
advertisements also use images of remote meetings on computer screens to 
symbolise remote work, concurrently evoking the participation of men in 
housework and child-rearing as desirable. More often, the changes in men’s 
tasks is the focus, while women do not feature much in the changed por-
trayals of home–work balance. In Norway, the reworking of the working- 
mom trope continues to be portrayed in the pandemic-themed advertise-
ments, but here as well, fathers are also featured. Children were not por-
trayed in a favourable manner in many instances, but a tension was shown 
between quiet workplaces and noisy homes in multiple commercials. Our 
analysis of the commercials focused on lifestyles, styles of work and ideas of 
gender depicted therein. In comparison, while these advertising trends de-
picted the novel topics of remote work and men’s participation in house-
work and parenting, under the surface they continued to perpetuate 
conventional family norms as well as the marginalisation of women. This 
was the case for both Japan and Norway, but with less diversity of gender 
roles in Japan, apart from a remarkable focus on men’s involvement in 
child-rearing roles. The question of whether the society-transforming event 
of remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic has changed gender roles 
in the home should wait for a post-pandemic study, but our enquiry into the 
world of advertisements suggests that work-life balance and equality are 
undergoing novel gendered tensions through this sudden rebalancing be-
tween work and home. 
150 Chihiro Wada and Roger A. Søraa 
Notes  
1 The products promoted here include coffee and a web magazine.  
2 One advertisement for an air freshener depicts a busy salaryman who sings to 
enjoy his work. Viewers are expected to be sympathetic to him and at the same 
time, laugh at the situation.  
3 The original video by Kowa Company Ltd. has been removed.  
4 These differences were seen in September 2020. The website has been changed 
and the same text was seen to be used for both women and men in March 2021. 
https://www.uniqlo.com/jp/ja/contents/feature/smart-pants/women/  
5 The original video has been removed. 
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Part IV 
Sexuality and reproduction  

10 The struggle to belong: Trans and 
gender-diverse experiences in 
Japan and Norway 
france rose hartline and Keiichiro Ishimaru    
Tracing the boundaries of gendered belonging 
Movements across the world advocating for the rights of transgender and 
gender-nonconforming (‘trans’) people have wrought immense cultural changes. 
These have occurred in tandem with an upsurge in trans political visibility and a 
growing push for gender diverse inclusion and recognition. The results have 
varied from context to context, materialising through new policies, practices and 
ideologies as well as bouts of governmental ambivalence and societal backlash. 
Two countries – Norway and Japan – present productive case studies for 
comparison given their divergent responses to trans rights advocacy. Norway 
has recently enacted numerous laws in response to the push for trans equality, 
while in Japan trans activists have met repeated resistance, making for slow 
progress. Though this would appear to give an irrefutable indication of how 
diversity issues are regarded in each country – with Norway demonstrating its 
reputed exceptionalism for human rights and Japan lagging far behind – we 
believe the actual situation is far more complex and deserving of a critical re-
view. Indeed, our study reveals considerable convergence of the two contexts on 
the issues of sterilisation, gender recognition and trans belonging. 
In this chapter, we reflect on the framework of the law/medicine/society 
triad in order to explore what trans rights means for gender diverse in-
dividuals in each country. We focus on how legal recognition of gender, or 
the lack of such, has intersected with the medical and social realms to shape 
gendered experiences of belonging. To do so, we draw on personal inter-
view narratives collected from trans-identifying activists in Japan and 
Norway. These stories allow us to better understand how and to what 
extent gender diversity materialises and becomes viable within each socio-
cultural context. This comparison enables us to trace the boundaries of 
gendered belonging as they are formulated within each context. 
We begin with a brief description of gender diversity and modern trans 
rights development in each country. Then, we outline the theoretical fra-
mework, method and methodology we have applied in our collection and 
analysis of the interviews. Finally, we present a discussion of the interview 
data from Norway and Japan. 
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Background: Setting the stage 
In both the Norwegian and Japanese contexts, three sites of tension 
emerged repeatedly in the interviews when discussing experiences and in-
terpretations of trans rights – namely, the triad of society, medicine and 
law. Trans people’s narratives of struggle uniformly invoke the power held 
by these three intersecting realms. The triad draws on the discourse sur-
rounding Western interpretations of rights and empowerment, which forms 
the foundation of the globalising movement for transgender and gender 
diverse (trans) equality. This framework defines equality within society as 
based on recognition and respect for one’s experienced gender identity as 
well as a sense of belonging, security and futurity. Law refers to the state or 
region’s sanctioning of procedures, laws or practices that benefit and pro-
tect trans people. In the realm of medicine, trans rights can be characterised 
by unfettered, well-supported access to gender-affirming medical technol-
ogies and practices. 
Interpreted loosely, this triad model can effectively be applied across the 
globalising trans rights movement, no matter the context. The movement’s 
emergence coincided with the materialisation of trans-ness as a politically-, 
medically- and socially-indexed positionality. Cultural differences within 
and across national boundaries, however, also shape trans lives, embodi-
ments and experiences. They do so in ways that do not always (or often) 
coincide with how trans rights and equality – or trans oppression and in-
equality – appear according to the Euro-Americo-centric model from which 
the trans movement has emerged. This calls for attending situationally and 
proportionally to the triad’s power when making cross-cultural compar-
isons. In particular, this chapter considers the difference between Norway 
and Japan concerning the sterilisation requirement for legal gender change, 
and the resultant impact on experiences of societal belonging. Passing leg-
islation to overturn this requirement has been central to trans activists’ 
efforts around the globe over the past two decades, with varying results. 
With this in mind, the following gives an overview of how gender diversity 
has materialised and been institutionally formulated within each country 
since the late 20th century. 
Norway 
Like its Scandinavian neighbours, Norway began implementing trans- 
specific practices and policies relatively early from a modern perspective. 
The roots of gender diversity in Norway are largely traceable through 
medicine and law. Medical treatment for ‘transsexualism’ (the diagnostic 
term) became available in the 1960s through sex reassignment surgery. In 
the 1970s, this practice was formalised into an administrative procedure, 
whereby complete sterilisation would make one eligible for legal gender 
change. Though never codified in law, the sterilisation requirement for 
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changing one’s juridical gender would remain in place for decades until 
pressure from international and local human rights organisations tipped the 
scales. In 2016, Norway’s Gender Recognition Act (GRA) took effect, 
following in the wake of the Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination Act 
2013, which protects people from discrimination on the basis of gender 
identity and expression. Norway’s GRA proved to be one of the most 
progressive of its kind. Based on the self-determination model, it allows one 
to choose to change gender without any medical intervention. No diagnosis 
or medical treatment is required; one need only to be a resident or citizen, 
and at least 16 years of age (or six years, with guardian consent) to request 
a change marker gender. Moreover, one could change back and forth in-
finitely, and there is no waiting period before the change takes effect. Once 
one has changed legal gender, they receive a confirmation of this change 
(which many call their ‘papers’ or ‘letter’), and this can be used to change all 
personal identification documents. 
The GRA stands out amongst the slew of acts which have speckled the 
world over the previous two decades. Most countries’ versions of GRA 
require that one first receive a diagnosis of transsexualism or gender iden-
tity disorder (e.g., Sweden and Finland), will remain in their new gender 
(e.g., UK) and is of adult age (nearly all countries which have a GRA); some 
also require that one observe a ‘reflection’ period (e.g., Denmark). 
However, despite its remarkable qualities, trans advocates are quick to 
point out several shortcomings of Norway’s 2016 GRA. To begin, one 
cannot choose a third gender or to opt out of the gender designation system 
entirely. Another shortcoming is that there has been no concurrent im-
provement in trans-specific healthcare, which continues to be monopolised 
by the state. The lack of second opinions or private options, combined with 
normatively exclusionary selection practices, has precluded a significant 
proportion of trans people from accessing the healthcare they need (Sørlie, 
2015, 2018; Van der Ros, 2017). 
Japan 
While Japan has a long history of gender malleability (McLelland 2007; 
Suganuma, 2012), juridico-medical and societal attention to trans rights is 
relatively recent. The 1990s witnessed an LGBT ‘boom’ in Japan, during 
which queer activism and visibility grew exponentially for several key 
reasons – namely, the spread of internet access, the advent of HIV/AIDS 
activism (and the resultant spotlight on male same-sex sexual practices) and 
the destabilisation of hegemonic masculinity following the country’s eco-
nomic downturn (Robertson, 2017). In this period, trans issues took hold 
as activists began pushing for a place to belong outside of the entertainment 
and service industry. However, in line with the broader LGBT movement, 
trans activists’ demands were deeply entrenched in Western cultural values. 
As a result, Japan’s response was, and still is, reticent – though not as 
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reticent as toward gay and lesbian rights demands. As in many non-Western 
contexts, trans people in Japan have made the most progress of the LGBT 
cohort. Gay and lesbian people have been seen as defiantly disrupting so-
ciety by choice, whereas trans people – due to being ensconced in the 
medical system – have been seen as disabled people in need of treatment for 
rehabilitation into society. Thus, Japan began allowing sex reassignment 
surgery in the late 1990s, after which it followed the emerging Western 
trend in 2003 by passing a law which allows one to change legal gender in 
the family register (koseki) following irreversible sterilisation. This law, 
called Gender Identity Disorder Special Cases Act ([GID law], 2003),1 was 
regarded as quite progressive at that time by the LGBT community at large. 
Patients who have received the Gender Identity Diagnosis (GID) but have 
yet to be sterilised and change legal gender are provided a GID certificate as 
a stopgap by psychiatrists. This certificate confirms their diagnostic status, 
thereby making it possible to both change legal name and (ostensibly2) be 
better protected in various social situations, such as public restrooms. 
Moreover, in early 2018, the government began financially supporting 
those who choose to undergo medical transition by covering 70% of the 
surgical costs, though this is is precluded by any hormonal treatment prior 
to surgery. While governmental support in gender-confirming medical 
practices is undoubtedly positive, the trans people we spoke to describe a 
situation similar to that in Norway – namely, that the health practitioners 
prioritise the needs of those who present more gender and sexual normative 
narratives, lending to a high rate of exclusion. 
The trans community has seen little legislative progress since 2003, as 
there continue to be no national provisions to protect individuals on the 
basis of gender identity or sexual orientation. Furthermore, despite a 
mounting pressure from human rights groups that culminated in a lawsuit 
challenging the sterilisation requirement in 2019, Japan’s government has 
upheld the constitutionality of its GID law (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 
2019). Promises to improve LGBT people’s lives have seldom come to 
fruition. However, Japan’s position as the 2020 Olympics host as well as 
the only G7 country to maintain its restrictive practices suggest that there 
may be changes afoot. 
In the meantime, many trans people continue to live in stealth or with 
gendered appearances contrary to their legal identification. Societal 
awareness is limited, as representations of trans diversity outside of pa-
thology are largely confined to the entertainment and service industry 
(McLelland, Suganuma, & Welker, 2007), and thus do not allow much 
space for seeing trans as a deeper, overarching experience and embodiment. 
More and more advocacy organisations are being established to promote 
societal awareness and support trans people. General awareness around 
LGBT issues is undoubtedly growing but due to the lack of legislation 
protecting queer and trans people, as well as a cultural pressure to blend in, 
many trans people continue to feel disadvantaged and misrecognised. 
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Theoretical foundation 
This chapter applies a transfeminist framework of interpretation, which 
facilitates a critical gaze toward gender by dissecting non-normatively 
gendered experiences, embodiments, identities and desires. The ‘feminism’ 
of transfeminism contributes with a heightened focus on the inter-
sectionality of compounding oppressions in shaping gendered subjectivities. 
Together they lay the groundwork for investigating the dynamic topo-
graphy of genders and what possibilities for identification are opened and 
closed by existing social, legal and medical structures (hartline, 2020a, 
p. 73; Stryker & Bettcher, 2016, p. 8). Transfeminism’s approach to gender 
is special in that it avoids dividing the scope into cisgender and transgender, 
rather seeing gender as a valuational system that implicates all people to 
varying degrees across varying situations. 
Gender, sex, identity and power have specific meanings in specific con-
texts at specific times, and part of a transfeminist approach is avoiding 
cultural imperialism by maintaining contextualisation (Connell, 2007;  
Sprague, 2016). The LGBT rights movement as Euro-American-oriented 
ushers in particular notions of what it means to be visible and empowered 
(Tudor, 2017). Formulating contextually relevant approaches to under-
standing LGBT experiences amidst the geopolitical shifts of globalisation is 
gaining momentum as a practice in many non-Western contexts by feminist 
and queer scholars (Massad, 2002; Suganuma, 2012). These approaches 
examine how diverse sex/sexual/gender identities, desires and behaviours 
are made viable (Connell, 2007). 
From the macro-level, we apply the theoretical tool of the (cis)gender 
imaginary, which unearths the ways in which gendered possibilities are 
shaped by a particular sociocultural context (hartline, 2020a, 2020b). The 
(cis)gender imaginary is the space in which gendered norms are (re)pro-
duced and embodiments materialise or deteriorate. It distinguishes the vi-
able from the monstrous, the desirable from the abject. (Cis)genderism 
remains the status quo even amidst ostensible efforts to undo it. Engaging 
with this concept points us away from focussing largely or exclusively on 
legislation and institutionally sanctioned practices, and toward the intricate 
weavings of the sociocultural fabric. Thus, it becomes feasible to under-
stand how gendered experiences are shaped through affective modes of 
living and belonging, enabling a more balanced comparison between two 
differing national contexts. 
From the micro-level, the research project is theoretically framed by the 
concept of ‘belonging,’ which describes the affective conditions of re-
cognition, stability and participation (Aultman, 2018; Probyn, 1996) and 
the ‘cognitive and emotional dimensions of identification and attachment’ 
(Yuval-Davis, 2009, p. 4). Contrary to ‘identity,’ which implies a stable self, 
or ‘citizenship,’ which marks only the formal boundaries of membership, 
‘belonging’ illustrates how the self metamorphoses in tandem with its 
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environment by articulating the ‘material cultural locality’ that shapes the 
individual’s subjectivity (Probyn, 1996, p. 5). As an analytical tool, it en-
ables an examination of the individualised and communal projects that 
trans people undertake in responding to marginalisation. 
Method and methodology 
This chapter draws on interviews conducted with self-identifying activists in 
trans communities in Norway and Japan. In Norway, 15 individuals were 
interviewed: 12 of whom had changed legal gender following the enactment 
of the GRA in 2016, and three of whom who chose not to do so. These 
were single, one-on-one interviews, directed toward understanding how the 
individuals came to a decision about legal gender change and the impact of 
the decision on their lives. In Japan, 11 individuals were interviewed; this 
included seven individual interviews and one group interview with four 
people. Also, once-off, these interviews were aimed at understanding how 
the individuals experienced being trans or gender-diverse in Japan amidst a 
lack of protection and non-sterilisation-based recognition, including how 
they came to a decision about sterilisation and legal gender change. Both 
sets of interviews aimed to collect individual experiences of gender diversity 
and reflections on trans rights. The interviews in Norway and three of the 
interviews in Japan were conducted alone by co-author hartline; the re-
maining eight interviews in Japan were conducted together by the two 
authors, hartline and Ishimaru. In all cases, the services of a queer- 
identifying interpreter was on offer; in Norway, everyone chose to speak in 
English with hartline; in Japan, half the participants spoke in English and 
the other half in Japanese with the aid of either co-author Ishimaru or a 
hired interpreter. All interviews were transcribed in English by hartline. 
The decision to focus on activist accounts was initially incidental. As an 
unintended consequence of the snowballing method as well as the tendency 
for interested interview subjects to be ‘out’ and active in the community, the 
vast majority of the interviewees in each context were trans activists and 
open about their identities in everyday life. Therefore, the representative 
quality of the data is limited in terms of what trans lives are generally like, 
since those who are openly trans are likely to have a markedly different 
interpretation and awareness of societal attitudes than those who are stealth 
or not yet out to themselves. We have chosen to take advantage of this skew 
in the data by drawing on the interviews as not just stories of personal 
experience but also as grounded insights into how institutions understand 
and help shape gender diversity. Having an activist background is valuable 
for becoming attuned to discourses around gender, as well as making one 
keenly aware of gender practices in general. With this distinction in mind, 
however, we also maintain vigilance when generalising activists’ stories; 
there is a certain amount of social capital accumulated by being out and 
well-connected with others in the trans community, as well as cultural 
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capital in having access to more diverse knowledge around trans rights 
within and beyond the national context. We therefore contextualise the 
selected quotes in order to give depth to each participant’s perspective. 
Discussion 
Our point of departure in exploring the narratives is the experience of legal 
gender change, as trans-specific legislation is the biggest difference between 
Norway and Japan when it comes to trans rights. As described in the 
Background section, Norway began allowing for legal gender change 
without sterilisation or diagnosis in 2016, whilst in 2019 Japan upheld the 
constitutionality of its GID law, 2003, which requires irreversible ster-
ilisation for legal gender change. In both Norway and Japan, the experience 
of legal gender change highlights the character and power of the state. 
Norway’s history of social democracy and welfarism and Japan’s hier-
archical structure and deference to authority, both lend the state and its 
institutions a particular credence regarding the legitimacy of gender ex-
pressions, embodiments and identities. The following discussions draw on 
the interview data to focus on how legal recognition of gender, or the lack 
of such, has intersected with the medical and social realms to shape gen-
dered experiences of belonging. Participants’ reflections on three key issues 
guide the discussion: 1. Attitudes toward sterilisation (as a transitioning 
practice and as a social and/or legal requirement); 2. Gender-diverse un/ 
acceptance across institutions; 3. Achieving a sense of belonging as a trans 
person. To provide context to the quotes, each participant’s stated gender 
identity, age range and legal gender are provided (in this order). 
Attitudes toward sterilisation 
Norway 
None of the Norwegian participants had undergone sterilisation at the time 
of the interview, and most described it as unnecessary, even counter-
productive, for their own transition journeys. Several felt frustrated that the 
state waited so long to make legal gender change possible without ster-
ilisation. Lene (non-binary, 30s, F) asked, somewhat rhetorically, ‘Why 
wasn’t this [option] available sooner? Why do we need to bureaucratise 
people’s bodies? Pathologize bodies?’ Anders (transman, 20s, M) shared 
this sentiment, adding that he was glad he could now avoid sterilisation. He 
had believed in the past that it was right for him, but eventually he realised 
that it was not that he was ‘born in the wrong body,’ but rather that society 
simply did not ‘understand [his] body.’ ‘Being male,’ he explained, ‘doesn’t 
necessarily mean cis male, with a flat chest, penis, beard, muscles, etc.’ 
Becoming legally male without sterilisation, for Anders, had ‘given back 
sovereignty over [his own] body.’ 
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Some of the Norwegian participants were still pursuing sterilisation de-
spite the GRA’s enactment. Ana (woman born in the wrong body, 30s, F) 
shared that while she felt more confident with her new legal gender, she did 
not feel free to behave exclusively like a woman because she had not yet 
completed her gender-affirming medical treatments. As an example, she 
explained that she still would not shower with other women at the gym, 
even though she could, if needed, justify her presence with documentation 
of her legal gender change. Her concern was about not imposing on people 
around her: 
I don’t know, maybe for others it’s different, but there are some things I 
feel that you can’t do if you still don’t have the right body. Not only 
because you can’t, but you shouldn’t. You shouldn’t be rude to other 
people, you should respect them. (...) Having the papers [confirmation 
of legal gender change] is not enough.  
This perspective was shared by Bente (transgender woman, 60s, F). While 
finally getting her female identification had been a ‘victory’ and helped her 
be more authentic with herself and others, she still felt incomplete due to 
having been denied trans-specific healthcare. She explained that every time 
she undresses in front of the mirror, she would see someone who was ‘a 
transgender, not yet a real woman.’ For both Ana and Bente, gender- 
affirming treatment via sterilisation was a critical part of their transition, 
and legal recognition could not compensate for the lack of physical shift. 
Japan 
Attitudes amongst the Japanese interview participants are quite negative 
toward sterilisation. This is not surprising given their activist status, but this 
stood in stark contrast to the Norwegian collective. The fact that sterilisation 
was still a requirement for legal gender change, rather than simply an option 
for one’s transition process, likely made it feel more oppressive to them. 
Discussions on undergoing sterilisation arose only in relation to the need for 
security, particularly regarding employment. Mariyo (woman, 30s, M) said 
that although she did not want to, she may have to undergo sterilisation in 
order to procure a stable job: ‘Being unemployed, I feel excluded from so-
ciety, and I think it requires a legal gender change to change that.’ Yukihiko 
(man, 30s, M) had chosen to be sterilised in young adulthood in order to 
secure employment, but it was now a decision he felt he should not 
have made: 
I didn’t really want to remove my ovaries, because I’d never seen them, 
they’re not visible. But it was really difficult for me to start working as a 
man with the female marker, so I had the surgery. At that time, I didn’t 
think it was a big deal. I thought, ‘Well, as long as I change my legal 
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gender, a lot of things will solve itself.’ But that was not so. (…) It took 
away my ability to produce children. (…) Now, if I met a man that I 
love, then maybe I would have had a child. And now I can’t get legally 
married, unless the law changes, because I’m gay and men can’t marry. 
So, it’s a bit like, ‘Well, what did I do this for?’  
Several other participants had chosen to avoid changing their bodies, not 
just to preserve function but also integrity. Uzuki (woman, 40s, M) had 
always opposed the GID law, saying that it unduly pathologizes transgen-
derism as a disability and thus compels people to change their bodies for 
society: 
Getting operated on and getting surgery is a very personal issue for me. 
Surgery is not a social issue. You don’t have to have surgery to be 
socially accepted. (...) I don’t want to do it just because I am told to. 
(…) I want to be an example for others.  
Gender-diverse un/acceptance 
Norway 
In reflecting on their experiences of acceptance, the Norwegian participants’ 
stories varied widely. Some felt generally empowered in Norway, particu-
larly following the GRA’s enactment. The protection afforded by the GRA 
was clear in nearly all the participants’ narratives. Torill (woman/trans-
person, 60s, F) said that after changing legal gender, she no longer worried 
about passing: ‘I’m not afraid at all anymore, I’m quite brave.’ As an ac-
tivist, she has felt more able to speak openly about being a ‘woman living in 
a male body.’ When people challenge or question her, she tells them, ‘It 
doesn’t matter that you don’t understand, because it is not your problem. I 
am the only one who knows who I am.’ 
However, many felt that Norway continues to disregard many of trans 
people’s needs, as exemplified by the binary requirement. Lene (non-binary, 
30s, F) felt there was no space for her to be genuine, since society and the 
state validate only binary-identifying people. She had changed her marker 
from male to female to match her socially read appearance, but she still felt 
misplaced: 
I don’t appreciate having binary ideals forced onto me. (...) You can’t 
actually live a good or happy or productive life under any of those 
circumstances where society or the system is pressuring you into 
something you’re not feeling comfortable with....For the general view 
of society, the binary does not represent reality at all.  
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Sebastian (transman/queer, 30s, F) shared this feeling, thus why he had not 
changed legal gender despite his masculine appearance: 
I feel sort of like [changing legal gender] has become an obligation just 
because I pass as a man and it is an option now. How is that different 
from being told before what gender I had to be? (...) I’m worried that if 
I change my gender marker, then I’ll just be another typical guy in the 
world, and my whole history of fighting for acceptance and coming to 
terms with myself and feeling pride will be erased in the eyes of society. 
I want to live as a transman, not just a man, but we have to choose one 
presumably cisgender category or the other.  
Sebastian also noted his frustration with the ostensible progress that 
Norway has made for trans rights, imploring, ‘Let’s not pretend this is the 
final stop on the rail line toward trans equality. Far from it. The train has 
just barely started moving.’ 
Furthermore, many of the transwomen (though none of the transmen) in 
the Norwegian cohort expressed a continued fear to enter private spaces. 
They did not feel that having a legal gender marker would necessarily 
protect them against rejection by others, particularly in gender-segregated 
spaces. In line with Ana’s above-quoted refusal to shower at the gym before 
completing her medical treatment, Bente (transgender woman, 60s, F) did 
not yet dare use women’s public bathrooms. She always opted for the 
handicapped toilet, for fear of being scolded by those who presumably 
deserve to be there. To be rejected in such an intimate space by ‘real 
women’ would negate her femininity to an indelible degree. Lene (non- 
binary, 30s, F) also worries about rejection due to her anatomy, describing 
the possibility of getting into ‘gender trouble.’ Even though she passes as a 
woman, the stress of being discovered as ‘not truly female’ proves too 
trying. 
Japan 
The struggle to have one’s trans or gender-diverse identity validated 
through the state and society was also a recurring element in the Japanese 
participants’ narratives. Several spoke of the ‘façade’ of acceptance in 
Japanese society, noting the disjuncture between appearance and reality. 
For example, Sayae (woman, 20s, M) explained that the lack of violence 
towards trans people does not indicate respect: 
No one has ever said to me, ‘I hate you, I don’t like you.’ Japanese 
people never say when they don’t like someone, they don’t say it 
directly. [People] only say good things. It’s not good. (...) We are never 
killed, we are never raped. But it doesn’t mean that we are happy. (…) 
We should speak up more, so people know. 
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Jinya (man, 30s, F) expanded on this, highlighting the in-between status of 
trans people from a legal perspective – not quite prohibited but not quite 
allowed: 
We LGBT people are not criminalised, so we don’t get arrested in 
Japan, but when we have to depend on the government, we aren’t 
recognised, so we can’t really get the same support that other people 
do. And that means that we are second class citizens. So that’s really 
hard for us. (…) I don’t feel safe living in Japan.  
Because gender identity disorder (GID) is regarded as an unfortunate, 
but curable, illness in Japan, the apparent respect for trans people is 
conditioned upon the trans person’s intention and desire to undergo 
sterilisation. For those who do not undergo it, genuine acceptance is 
difficult to come by, not only in broader society but also with the trans 
community. There is a hierarchy of belonging that ranks those who 
identify as the medical term ‘GID’ above those who identify as the 
Western term ‘trans.’ Broadly put, the former seek to undergo ster-
ilisation to become ‘typically’ sexed and pass within the binary, while 
the latter seek to challenge the binary by avoiding sterilisation. The 
divisiveness of the trans political landscape is of course not unique to 
Japan, but it may be amplified there due to limited knowledge on 
gender variance beyond small activist circles. The participants de-
scribed the situation as improving, but still they worried that the socio- 
legal emphasis on passing was pressuring uninformed youth to pursue 
measures they may regret later, as captured for example in Yukihiko’s 
story above. The limited representation of trans people proves pro-
blematic for those just beginning to explore their identities. When Keito 
(man, 30s, F) was young, he had thought undergoing complete transi-
tion was necessary for acceptance because there were no gender- 
nonnormative role models to look to for alternatives. As an adult ac-
tivist, he had learnt to be proud of his transness and now worked with 
others to promote alternative ways of transitioning. He explained why: 
Japanese people think trans people are very poor and discriminated 
against and have poor health. Many people look down on trans 
people. They don’t realise that trans people can be happy. (…) They 
discriminate against trans people who aren’t normal, especially 
outside the big cities where there is no concept of diversity. (…) 
Trans people internalise this discrimination…and think they must 
choose to be either a man or woman. (…) We need to show [people] 
that we can be happy without being normal.  
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Achieving a sense of belonging 
Norway 
In their personal projects for securing a livable life, several of the 
Norwegian participants found that passing fully as a man or woman pro-
vided them with a sense of belonging since their internal self is validated 
through acceptance as legitimately situated within the gender binary. The 
new identity marker, for example, was a stamp of approval from the state 
that could be deployed in difficult social situations. Camilla (woman, 20s, 
F) had always identified as a woman despite not always passing, but with 
her new legal marker, she saw herself as ‘real female, a born girl.’ She now 
felt she could improve her life by demanding more respect from the state 
welfare system and her employer, both of which she believed had treated 
her poorly for being trans. Dolores (woman, 50s, F) also felt validated by 
legal gender change, but since she had been turned down for much-wanted 
medical treatment, she found herself figuring out how to live with male 
genitalia. She strove to take pride in her status as a ‘woman with bollocks’: 
I like the double meaning of it. There’s another way to see it. A woman 
with bollocks is standing and fighting for herself. She has got a mouth 
and she is there for herself and for her beliefs. She’s not bad, but she can 
be brutal, standing up for her mates and her kids, forever.  
After changing legal gender, Dolores had begun to feel more secure in 
herself, even returning to some of the masculine activities and clothing she 
had given up in trying to be accepted as a woman. She took pleasure in 
being able to forego femininity in her hobbies and expression but still be a 
‘real woman.’ 
For some of the Norwegian participants, however, there continued to be 
a disconnect between self and the society/state, despite progressive legisla-
tion and relatively low reports of trans-directed discrimination. It became 
particularly clear here how underlying cisgender norms were still shaping 
subjective experiences of the gendered self, delimiting possibilities for em-
bodiment. Ingrid (transwoman, 30s, M) had decided against changing her 
legal gender from male to female because she did not feel she passed in 
everyday life. Having been turned down for trans-specific healthcare, she 
found herself lingering in a precarious position as she was unable to afford 
gender-affirming treatment on her own. Ingrid explained that changing 
legal gender could actually make her life more difficult, as she would lose 
the ability to resume a masculine role when safety and security were at 
stake, such as when travelling abroad or applying for jobs. She asked, 
‘What is the point of changing my legal gender if society still doesn’t see 
me?’ While becoming legally female may well compel institutional and 
social actors to openly regard her as a woman, Ingrid believed that it would 
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not necessarily compel their respect. As demonstrated with the issue of 
intimate spaces discussed above, societal attitudes are not fully subject to 
the state’s approval, so trans people must navigate public life carefully. 
Japan 
Most of the Japanese participants were actively engaged in LGBT organi-
sations, which provided them with a space for (co)validation and the power 
to promote personal causes. Across the interviews, there was a tendency to 
eschew complete institutional involvement in their transition processes, 
preferring rather to remain radical to some degree. For instance, Naoto 
(man, 30s, F) spoke of his decision to not take testosterone, even though he 
would have enjoyed the physical changes and passing as a man. His partner 
was a ciswoman, so he worried that he would be read as a cis-heterosexual 
male. He thus preserved his queerness through this act of bodily defiance, 
by claiming a belonging to masculinity whilst rejecting its principle stan-
dards. Okito (man, 50s, F) shared a similar approach, citing his desire to 
live outside the binary – ‘after 48 years inside it’ – as a reason for not having 
pursued hormone treatment. He considered the medical transition process 
to be only one of many ways to grow into oneself, and he found meaning in 
being an example of this: 
We think of trans as ‘transing’ – crossing – the boundary, but I like to 
think of it as ‘transcending’ gender. If I stay in this transcending state, 
and not choose one or the other, then maybe it will help other people 
do the same. People, all people, need to be more self-expressive and 
self-assured. Marriage, children, gender, hormones, operation – every-
thing should be a choice, and not be enforced. (…) We need more 
freedom of spirit so we can choose.  
Sayae (woman, 20s, M) also believed that the government was trying to be 
too involved in governing trans lives, but she was personally invested in 
passing socially. Having been on hormones for two years, she was ap-
pearing more feminine, which had made her life simpler: 
I care about legal gender, but more than legal gender, I care about 
whether I look like a woman. That’s what’s important for friends and 
parents. So, if I look better, my parents stop caring, stop wanting to 
make me stop [being trans].  
Sayae felt more accepted amongst her loved ones when she did not overly 
challenge their notions of gender identity. She did not feel further medical 
intervention is necessary for her, which she attributed to her privileged 
position. She was employed by an international company that allowed her 
to identify openly as a woman despite being legally male. Moreover, she 
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was fluent in English and was involved in both local and international trans 
activism, which had vastly expanded her knowledge of gender diversity. 
Nonetheless, she did not feel comfortable enough to be openly trans beyond 
her work and home life. It was important for Sayae both fit in with society 
as well as to be a representative for diversity. As seen amongst the other 
Japanese participants, the degree to which each positionality was sought 
depended upon a mix of desire and ability. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have explored the struggles faced by trans people in 
both Norway and Japan in order to highlight some of the commonal-
ities and differences in how trans belonging is understood and experi-
enced. We found that in both Norway and Japan, the individuals we 
interviewed generally expressed significant disappointment with the 
status quo of trans rights. There was a pervasive sense of non-belonging 
– nationally, socially, and, for most, psychically and physically. The 
maintenance of the cisgender standard, via the (cis)gender imaginary, 
became evident again and again through the internalisation of in-
completeness or misrecognition by most of the participants. They spoke 
of their repeated encounters with uncrossable boundaries and the 
tension it caused with their senses of self. In reconciling the tension and 
carving spaces of belonging, some sought to find pride and purpose in 
these radical positionalities, whilst others strove to align themselves 
better with societal expectations in order to enhance their security and 
life quality. Several had occupied both ends of the spectrum during 
their transitions, drifting across due to circumstance and desire. 
Initially, we had anticipated that the stories from our Japanese par-
ticipants would demonstrate a greater degree of non-belonging than 
those of our Norwegian participants. However, the difference was 
curiously narrow, leading us to speculate that it may be in part due to 
culturally conditioned expectations surrounding institutional support. 
We suspect that the promise of the Norwegian state (both implicit and 
explicit) to protect its citizens through uniquely progressive legislation 
and practices, particularly regarding gender equality, has imprinted 
upon trans people’s expectations of the state in such a way that any 
dissonance between one’s felt reality and the national imagery of 
equality becomes amplified, leading to a sense of frustration – and even 
personalised failure (hartline, 2020a). Meanwhile, the traditions of 
gender segregation and inequality in Japan have long obliged trans 
people to find alternative modes of coping with misrecognition and 
limited protection; with little anticipation of state support for diversity, 
it has been necessary to claim livable spaces outside state-endorsed 
boundaries of inclusion. 
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This difference was especially highlighted in how the two groups re-
garded the repeal of the sterilisation requirement. While in Norway the 
participants expressed the feeling of ‘det skulle bare mangle’ (‘it is now as it 
should be’) after the GRA’s passing, many of our Japanese participants, 
despite being trans rights activists, were not even aware that the sterilisation 
requirement had been recently upheld as constitutional following a lost 
lawsuit in Japan’s supreme court (‘Japanese transgender man,’ 2019). 
Putting aside the fact that a new act tends to make bigger waves than a lost 
lawsuit, it was clear that while the Norwegian participants strongly related 
their journeys to the state’s involvement, many of the Japanese participants 
considered localised participation, community and employment security 
and small-scale redress to be more important for improving their situation. 
Relying on community (which one can help shape) over the state and its 
institutions can make belonging more achievable, which may explain why 
the Japanese participants did not seem to be struggling a great deal more 
than the ones in Norway. However, this is a benefit only so long as one has 
sufficient access to a like-minded community. This is why it is necessary to 
read the Japanese activists’ narratives with a critical lens, as they are un-
derwritten by a degree of privilege likely to be lacking from many, if not 
most, trans people’s stories. 
In this chapter, we have sought to provide insight into the limitations 
and experiences of trans people in Norway and Japan in order to de-
monstrate the nuanced contextuality of gender diverse belonging. 
However, this is a topic that deserves continued investigation. For 
further study, we suggest that interviews be carried out with non- 
activist and non-urban gender-diverse individuals in both Norway and 
Japan. Exploring how gender variance is experienced and addressed 
among those who are not involved in the trans rights movement would 
be highly beneficial for further investigating the limitations of institu-
tional support in each country. 
Notes  
1 Law 111, or the Gender Identity Disorder Special Cases Act. This law has been 
challenged by human rights activists on multiple grounds, including the re-
quirement for patients to be diagnosed with gender identity disorder, to be at 
least 20 years old (thus disallowing children or youth), to have no children under 
20 years, to be not married (thus forcing married patients to divorce), and to 
undergo extensive and unnecessary surgery to become sterilised (Human Rights 
Watch [HRW], 2019). 
2 Several of the interview participants shared that they believed the certificate of-
fered no real protection from discrimination when using public restrooms 
without ‘passing’ as one’s personal gender identity, since the general public does 
not understand the certificate’s significance and would not accept it as justifica-
tion. Almost none of the participants said they used their certificate at all, aside 
from when attending medical clinics or changing their legal name. 
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11 A matter of gender (in)equality? 
Public discourses on declining 
fertility rates in Japan and 
Norway 
Guro Korsnes Kristensen and Yukari Semba    
Declining fertility rates 
The stable production of healthy new generations is the most important 
resource of any collective of people, including the nation. Hence policy 
makers, experts and the general public pay close attention to the national 
fertility rates,1 expressing worries if they appear too high or low. This paper 
sets out to explore the triangle of fertility, nation and gender, focusing on 
the cultural meanings that are ascribed to the notion of declining fertility 
rates when this phenomenon is discussed publicly in Japan and Norway. 
In the 20th century, the world population increased from 1.5 to 6.1 billion, 
and according to the latest United Nations (UN) population projections, the 
world’s population will be at 10.9 billion in 2100 (United Nations [UN],  
2019). Parallel to this, climate change has become a global worry, and in this 
regard there has also been an increasing recognition of the profound pro-
blems caused by global population growth (Clarke & Haraway, 2019). 
Whereas the fertility rates in the so-called Global South remain above the 
replacement rate, they have been decreasing in many countries around the 
world in the last three decades (United Nations, 2019). In Europe (49 
countries and the Channel Islands), the average fertility rate was 1.61 chil-
dren per woman in 2019, which is far below the 2.1 replacement level that 
the UN holds as standard for population regeneration (United Nations, 
2019).2 In Asia, several countries are facing the same situation, and, as in 
Europe, they recognise this as a serious problem. 
Both Japan and Norway are seen as rather typical examples of their re-
spective regions when it comes to fertility numbers and their evolution in 
recent years. In Japan, the fertility rate declined from 2.14 in 1973 to 1.74 
in 1981, 1.57 in 1989, and 1.36 in 2019 (The Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare [MHLW], 2020). In Norway, there was a marked decrease in 
the fertility rates from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s (from 2.98 in 1964 
to 1.66 in 1984) (Ravn, 2005). Whereas the fertility rates continued to fall 
in most European countries throughout the 1980s and onwards, they 
started to rise again in the Nordic countries. In 2009, the Norwegian fer-
tility rate was 1.98; however, it has dropped again since then. As can be 
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seen in Figure 11.1, the actual fertility rate stood at 1.48 in 2020 (Statistics 
Norway, 2020). 
Even though the fertility rate of Japan and Norway are rather similar 
today, the structural, political, social and cultural factors surrounding them 
are somewhat different. Despite a decreasing fertility rate, Norway still has 
a growing population (0.44% in 2020), due to immigration and a long 
history of rather high fertility rates (Statista, 2021a). Japan, on the other 
hand, has a negative population growth due to limited immigration and a 
longer history of low fertility (-2.1% in 2019) (Statista 2021b). Thus, while 
both countries are experiencing the phenomenon of an ‘ageing population,’ 
it is far more prevalent in Japan. 
Intrigued by this complex of similarities and differences, we examine the 
ways in which national fertility rates, and more specific declining fertility rates, 
are presented and discusses publicly in the two countries. We pay special at-
tention to what kinds of explanations and measures are launched, and how 
they relate to and produce specific understandings of gender and nation. We 
ask: What characterises the public debates about fertility rates in the two 
countries, and what similarities and differences exist between them? 
Theoretical perspectives 
To conceptualise the cultural/public meaning in regard to declining fertility 
rates and explore the intersections of reproduction, gender and nation, we 
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Figure 11.1 Total fertility rates in Japan and Norway. 
Note. Source: Japan: IPSS, ‘ Figure 4- 5, Total Fertility Rate of Major Developed Countries: 
1950-2018,’ Population Statistics of Japan 2020.  http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/ 
Popular/P_Detail2020.asp?fname=T03-09.htm Norway: (1960-2008) The World Bank,   
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN?locations=NO(2009-2019) Statista,   
https://www.statista.com/statistics/611702/fertility-rate-in-norway/.  
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between gender and nation as it unfolds in various kinds of population 
politics (Yuval-Davis, 1997). According to Yuval-Davis, there are three 
hegemonic discourses in relation to national reproduction: The ‘people as 
power’ discourse, the Malthusian discourse and the eugenics discourse. 
The people as power discourse is characterised by the idea that the na-
tion’s future depends on continuous population growth, and that this can 
be ensured both through biological reproduction and through immigration. 
For women, this way of thinking may mean that, for example, after a 
natural disaster, war or other crisis, there may be extra pressure for in-
creased reproduction. In this context, not having children can subject 
women to criticism, but it can also be an effective way of resisting national 
projects and government policies. 
In the second discourse, which Yuval-Davis labelled Malthusian, un-
controlled population growth is understood as a serious societal problem, 
and responsible policy should be aimed at limiting further growth. This 
discourse has been criticised for making poor countries and poor people 
responsible for global problems, and for stimulating and legitimising po-
pulation politics that are violating peoples,’ and in particular women’s, 
reproductive rights (Hartmann, 1995). 
The focus of the third discourse, eugenics, promotes population ‘quality’ 
over quantity. Quality is achieved through, for example, reward systems 
that encourage only selected people to have children. Yuval-Davis also 
notes that eugenics discourse legitimises the use of coercion as a strategy for 
effecting reproduction. This way of thinking about reproduction and po-
pulation is highly controversial, and several researchers have shown that 
eugenic discourses typically are targeting poor women and discouraging 
them to have more children and thus reproducing power hierarchies 
(Hartmann, 1995). 
Method, data and analytical tools 
The data material consists of white papers, political statements, newspapers 
and other news media items published in both Japan and Norway between 
2013 and 2021. The texts are sampled through systematic searches in na-
tional media databases. In Norway, we applied ATEKST, which includes all 
print and online Norwegian newspapers. In Japan, we used Bunzō II 
(Asashi Shimbun Database), Yomidas Rekishi-kan (Yomiuri Database 
Service), Nikkei Telecon (Nikkei Shimbun Database), Maisaku (Mainichi 
Shimbun Online) and Sankei Shimbun Databases (Sankei Shimbun), which 
are the databases of the five biggest national newspapers in Japan. In ad-
dition, we used news articles that we found through internet searches with 
keywords. When conducting these database searches, we applied the 
Norwegian and Japanese terms for population, fertility, fertility rate, re-
production, population politics and declining birth rate. 
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We focused on fertility discourse in public media because we see these as 
integral resources for understandings and meanings in this field (Arnoldi, 
2005). Our analysis reveals the kinds of information on fertility confronting 
the public in both countries as well as the political ambitions integrated in 
that discourse. We do not see media merely as reproducers of reality, but 
also as producers. The media is instrumental in defining what is seen as 
normal, acceptable and aberrant, what deserves and needs special attention, 
what is taken for granted, and so on. Moreover, media sets the political 
agenda, and various political actors use media as a vehicle for commu-
nication. Thus, we argue that it is important to analyse the ways in which 
cultural meaning production is represented, developed and formed in and 
by media. 
Our position as researchers in this field is neither that of pro-natalism nor 
anti-natalism. Rather, we take an explorative approach to the public de-
bates and the meanings expressed there. 
Japan: Struggle regarding declining birth rate and strategies 
to raise fertility rate 
An important area of discussion in regards to the Japanese fertility relates to 
a narrative of national crisis. On 4 October 2019, Prime Minister Abe made 
the policy speech at the 200th session on the Diet, and he stated ‘we will 
squarely address the declining birthrate, which should also be called a na-
tional crisis [kokunan]’ (Abe, 2019). When Abe came to power in 2012, he 
mentioned that one of his priorities was to increase the number of daycare 
centres so that mothers can return to the workforce (‘Number of new-
borns,’ 2019). However, under the Abe administration, which lasted seven 
years and eight months, TFR continued to decline every year and reached a 
record low 1.36 in 2019. It might show that the policy has not been ef-
fectively implemented, and it is still hard for young people to balance work, 
family and childcare while having children. In February 2016, one blog 
attracted attention in Japanese society. It was the anonymous blog entry 
posted by a woman who had not been able to get her child into day care 
facilities. The title was ‘My child wasn’t accepted for nursery school. Die 
Japan!!’ (Hoikuen ochita Nihon Shine!!) (‘Parents protest,’ 2016). However, 
Abe ignored it because it was an anonymous blog post. The entry spread over 
the Internet, and about 100 parents whose children were refused entry into 
childcare facilities lunched a protest in front of National Diet Building in 
Tokyo holding up signs saying ‘It was me,’ and a website collecting sig-
natures in support of introducing a better childcare system had collected 
more than 20,000 signatures within a month (‘Parents protest,’ 2016). The 
number of children waiting for entry into nursery schools is on decline by the 
government’s childcare support program ‘kosodate anshin puran,’ however it 
is still a serious issue in Japan (Hoiku no oshigoto report, 2019). 
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Several issues have been identified as leading to a declining birth rate in 
Japan. In addition to the lack of day-care facilities cited in the blog post 
above, these include delayed marriage, late-in-life pregnancy, the rising cost 
of child-rearing and women’s increased roles in society and the workplace 
(Castro-Vázquez, 2017; The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). 
Cultural value in Japan is given to families comprising a married couple 
with children. This makes marriage first and foremost a prerequisite for 
childbearing. However, as scholars have previously noted, women in Japan 
have become increasingly less likely to get married or bear children in the 
last decades. This is due to the potential difficulty of maintaining a work- 
life balance within the traditional gender framework that expects women to 
prioritise their families (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018). In addi-
tion, women fear that if they have children outside marriage, they will be 
socially stigmatised and faced with enormous financial challenges. For ex-
ample, they typically find themselves in low-paying part-time employment 
and must live on incomes below the poverty line (Lezott, 2020). 
Japan has the highest percentage of the population aged 65 and over in 
the world. Indeed, as of September 2019, this ageing rate reached a record 
high of 28.4%. The National Institute of Population and Social Security 
Research (IPSS) estimated that the rate of population aging will continue to 
increase, with 30% and 35.3% of the population being aged 65 years and 
over by 2025 and 2040, respectively (Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2019). In 
general, societies with declining birth rates and ageing populations ex-
perience labour shortage, which exerts long-term negative social impacts on 
the economy (Atoh, 1994). In 2014, the Japanese labour force was 65.87 
million, but it is estimated to decrease to 56.83 and 37.95 million by 2030 
and 2060, respectively (Cabinet Office, 2018). 
MHLW as well as local governments have devised various measures to 
mitigate the negative consequences of a declining birth rate and to maintain 
social security. In the 1990s, the Japanese government first initiated and 
expanded family planning policies and programs that sought to provide 
monetary assistance directly to parents. This took the form of child al-
lowances and steadily expanded provisions for parental leave and subsidies 
for childcare services (Tsuya, 2017). In 2010, the government introduced 
four major policies to support young people’s fertility, which centred on 
pregnancy, childbirth, child-rearing and work-life balance (The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2018). 
Among the policy initiatives meant to deal with the declining birth rate, 
the Japanese government has provided people suffering from infertility with 
financial and psychological support for taking infertility treatments. The 
criteria for receiving this support were relaxed first in 2006, then to a 
greater degree in 2013, making more couples eligible. However, the fi-
nancial cost of assisted reproductive medicine still overwhelms many in-
fertile couples because the Subsidy for Specific Infertility Treatment 
Expenses by the government does not cover all financial cost of intrauterine 
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insemination, in vitro fertilisation and intracytoplasmic sperm injection. 
However, in 2020 Prime Minister Suga stated, ‘We will swiftly make public 
health insurance cover infertility treatments and eliminate income thresh-
olds on eligibility. Until such insurance coverage becomes available, we will 
broadly expand the subsidy measures currently in place.’ Furthermore, 
MHLW sought additional funding from the government in its 2021 budget 
request to boost subsidies for couples receiving infertility treatments until 
insurance can cover these treatments (‘Itten Toppa,’ 2020). 
Although the Japanese government has implemented policies intended to 
support families’ fertility and boost the declining birth rate, these polices 
have failed to produce the desired result. Thus, the fertility rate remains 
well below replacement levels. 
The difficulties of raising children for women in Japan 
Another quite visible area of debate which relates to the Japanese fertility rate is 
the position of women in society, and, in particular, the difficulties Japanese 
women face when having children. According to the Japanese National Fertility 
Survey conducted in 2015, married couples reported that the average number of 
children they want was 2.32. However, the actual average number of children 
per family in 2015 was 1.94. IPSS’s survey presented the following reasons for 
them being unable to achieve their desired number of children: ‘It costs too much 
to raise and educate children’ (56.3%), ‘I strongly dislike the idea of bearing 
children at an older age’ (39.8%), ‘I want to have a child but cannot conceive’ 
(23.5%), ‘I cannot mentally or physically bear the burden of childbearing 
anymore’ (17.6%), ‘I cannot because of health reasons’ (16.4%), ‘It would in-
terfere with my job or business’ (15.2%), and ‘My house is too small’ (11.3%) 
(National Institute of Population and Social Security Research [IPSS], 2017). 
The following quotes, derived from newspaper articles, reflect the diffi-
culties Japanese women face when having children. The first three state-
ments show that raising and educating children is extremely expensive: 
It costs too much to raise a child. I often hear people around me say 
that it is impossible for them to raise three children. My husband and I 
are both full-time employees, but we don’t even have a house, so we 
decided that having only two children is realistic for us. (A woman in 
her 40s living in Tokyo; [‘Fōramu: Tanomuyo,’ 2020]) 
We have a one-year-old child and I am on childcare leave. My husband is a 
non-regular employee, and the amount of work he receives has been reduced 
drastically. This has had a serious impact on our household finances. (A 
woman in her 30s living in Aichi; [‘Fōramu: Tanomuyo,’ 2020]) 
Ideally, we would like to have one more child. But I want to respect our 
son’s desire to ‘learn,’ so we want to be able to pay tuition and academic 
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fees in the event that he wants to attend a cram school [private exam 
tuition] and go to a private high school and university in the future. When 
we consider education costs, we think, ‘We can’t afford it for two children.’ 
(A 36-year-old woman living in Fukuoka; [‘Fōramu: Tanomuyo,’ 2020])  
The next statement from a mother shows how difficult it is for women who 
have small children to get a full-time job in Japan: 
I am a non-regular university employee [who does not have maternity 
benefits]. It is difficult for me to have a second child. If I did have 
another child, I would have to give up my full-time job for a while. My 
first pregnancy ended in a premature birth, so I wouldn’t be able to 
work if I get pregnant. We live in a very strange world — I have to 
choose between a job or a child. (A woman in her 30s living in Tokyo; 
[‘Fōramu: Tanomuyo,’ 2020])  
The following statement shows that the woman feels guilty towards society 
and the nation because she chose not to have children at all: 
When I hear the words ‘declining birth rate,’ I feel guilty. I feel like I 
haven’t fulfilled my ultimate responsibility as a human. Naturally, I 
intended to give birth when I learned that I am pregnant. But at the time 
of the Lehman shock, there were cases where female colleagues on 
maternity leave could not return to work. I found it difficult to think 
positively about having a child. In addition, I didn’t want to be bound 
by the stereotype that ‘mothers should be like this.’ (A woman in her 
40s; [Takahashi, 2018])  
On the other hand, the following statement from a father indicates dis-
comfort in choosing the home over work after becoming a parent. 
I was busy with work and I often felt guilty when I left work to go 
home. And I’ve become more and more frustrated with spending time 
with my family. Deep down in my heart, I felt that it was natural for me 
to have a work-oriented life even though I had children. On the other 
hand, I questioned why my wife didn’t reduce her work responsibilities 
in order to take care of our child, and I was dissatisfied with her. (A 
man in his 30s; [Takahashi, 2019])  
This comment highlights men’s role in the fertility decline. Japan has gen-
erous paternity leave packages, with one year of paid parental leave 
available for fathers (with average income, fathers can earn roughly 60% of 
their wages during a year-long leave), but today only about 6% fathers in 
the private sector take advantage of this benefit. This shows why there was 
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so much attention surrounding the decision by the 38-year-old Japanese 
environment minister, Shinjiro Koizumi, to take two weeks off to care for 
his newborn baby in 2020. The director of the Research Institute for 
Women and Careers at Japan Women’s University, Machiko Osawa (as 
cited in Pinsker, 2020), explained the reason for Japanese men’s disinterest 
in paternity leave: ‘Taking paternity leave is more likely to reduce promo-
tion possibilities in the future.’ This means that to take time off work to 
care for one’s own children is not in line with Japanese cultural norms for 
manhood. 
Psychological pressure on women to procreate 
Whereas Japanese men are publicly given credit for staying home with their 
children, Japanese women are publicly encouraged to have children and 
also blamed for not having given birth. According to the Japanese National 
Fertility Survey conducted in 2015, 85.7% of men and 89.3% of women 
between the ages of 18 and 34 who have never been married desire to be 
married in the future. Moreover, 91.5% of men and 93.1% of women from 
this group desire to have one or more children in the future (National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research, 2017). In Japan, 
women without children often experience social pressure to procreate. 
Some politicians have made statements criticising women without children 
for being selfish. In 2003, former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori (as cited in  
Hays, 2014) stated, 
The government takes care of women who have given birth to a lot of 
children as a way to thank them for their hard work. (...) It is wrong for 
women who haven’t had a single child to ask for taxpayer money when 
they get old, after having enjoyed their freedom.  
On a similar note, Japan’s Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso (as cited in  
Jozuka & Ogura, 2019) stated in 2018, ‘There are lots of strange 
people who blame the elderly for the population crisis, but they are 
wrong. The problem is with those who haven’t given birth.’ In 2019, 
the ex-minister addressed the problem of the nation’s shrinking po-
pulation and encouraged women to ‘give birth to at least three chil-
dren.’ These comments outraged many people in Japan, especially 
feminists; however, there are quite a few people who unconsciously 
speak heartless words to childless women and couples. According to the 
survey conducted by Meiji Yasuda Research Institute in 2018, nearly 
70% of married women and 30% of married men in their late 30s to 
early 40s have experienced harassment due to childlessness. The survey 
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result also shows that many childless people feel uncomfortable to live 
in Japan. 
Norway: Between national welfare crisis, patriotism and 
global climate crisis 
In contrast to Japan, Norway has a comprehensive welfare state which 
includes a range of generous family policies including state-provisions for 
pregnancy, birth, extensive schemes for parental leave (including a parental 
leave designated to fathers), and publicly funded kindergartens and after- 
school arrangements (Ellingsæter & Pedersen, 2016). These policies, 
however, have not primarily been motivated by pro-natalist objectives but 
rather by gender equality ideologies and a concern for the general well- 
being of children and their families (Ravn et al., 2016). Moreover, 
Norwegians have relatively good access to part-time work, which means 
that parents who cannot or do not wish to work full-time can still earn 
income. Men’s involvement in family life and care work is supported by the 
state, and this is an important part of the Norwegian model for gender 
equality, which has been described as dual carer/dual earner model (Ravn 
et al., 2016). 
Despite these generous family policies, which have also been described as 
‘generous reproductive support’ (Skrede, 2004), the average age of first 
childbirth has increased from under 24 in 1964 to nearly 29.8 in 2019 
(Statistics Norway, 2020). Unlike Japan, Norway widely shares liberal 
social values and is more accepting of cohabiting couples and single people 
who have children. In 2014, unmarried mothers accounted for 44% of all 
births, and single mothers accounted for 13% (Ellingsæter & Pedersen, 
2016). Still fewer and fewer women become mothers at young age. 
The call for more children 
In Norway, as in Japan, the declining fertility rates are overwhelmingly 
described as a serious problem for the country and its inhabitants’ futures. 
This has been most obvious in recent years, when every new fertility-related 
measure has been declared ‘the lowest one ever measured in the Norwegian 
context.’ The most famous examples of this negative way of framing the 
declining fertility rate is to be found in Prime Minister Erna Solberg’s New 
Year’s speech at the beginning of 2019, where she explicitly asked the ci-
tizenry to have more babies: 
We Norwegians are having fewer and fewer children. To maintain the 
population, each of us must have just over two children on average. 
Today the number is only 1.6. Then there will be relatively fewer young 
people who will have to bear an increasingly heavy welfare state on their 
shoulders. Norway needs more children! I do not think I need to explain 
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how this is done. I will not make any orders either. Not everyone can 
have children or wants to have children. For various reasons. And more 
and more people are waiting longer to have children. Also for various 
reasons. But if you wait too long, it also becomes more difficult. An ever- 
increasing number of children are now being created with the help of the 
health service [fertility treatments]. We must therefore ask: Is it too 
difficult to have children early? We must make good arrangements [for 
young people] to have children during their studies and early in their 
careers.  
The message conveyed here is pretty clear: The fertility rate is not high 
enough for the nation of Norway – as we know it – to survive. In her 
speech, the Prime Minister was also explicit about her main worry, namely 
the sustainability of a comprehensive welfare state, which is dependent 
upon a relatively high number of workers and taxpayers. In this way, re-
production was made a question of labour resources and economy, rather 
than an issue of nationalist ideas about a particular Norwegian community 
or culture. The speech also provides some information about the problem’s 
diagnosis, as the Prime Minister sees it, namely that the Norwegian po-
pulation waits too long to have children. She also suggested a possible 
medicine in the form of political arrangements that will stimulate the po-
pulation to start their reproductive career earlier in life. 
Along a similar vein, other politicians as well as experts and re-
presentatives of various organisations have – both before and after this 
famous speech – expressed worries about the declining fertility rates. This 
has led to various measures being proposed to solve the problem. The list of 
suggestions includes increased child benefits, longer paternity leaves and 
various kinds of bonus for child number three, four and five (Kristensen, 
2020). Every now and then, more liberal regulations of assisted reproduc-
tion technologies and more state support for using these technologies are 
also mentioned as relevant measures for increasing the national fertility 
rate, but only as an addition to the main solution of equal opportunities for 
parenthood (Stuvøy et al., 2021). However, the overarching question posed 
in the discussion is, What kind of welfare arrangements can be introduced 
and/or increased to motivate Norwegian women and men to have more 
children? The idea that welfare arrangements is an effective measurement is 
taken for granted; the question is only what exactly should be increased and 
by how much. 
This idea that the state should try to enhance the national fertility rate by 
introducing various incentives and welfare arrangements represents a new 
direction in the Norwegian family policy, which up to this point had been 
presented as gender equality measures rather than pro-natalism. Thus, it is 
somewhat controversial. This controversy became particularly evident after 
Prime Minister Solberg’s above-quoted speech in 2019, which was met with 
a lot of attention, including numerous media debates involving politicians, 
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experts and lay people. Some debaters took issue with the Prime Minister’s 
position as interfering in people’s private lives and trying to put pressure on 
the younger generation, and in particular on young women. For example, 
Espen Gamlund (2019), a philosophy professor at the University of Bergen, 
wrote an opinion piece in a national newspaper with the headline, ‘Nine 
reasons to be sceptical of the Prime Minister’s call for more children.’ He 
objected to the Prime Minister interfering in something which ‘for the in-
dividual is so life-changing and irreversible,’ noting that this way of talking 
about reproduction is ‘reducing women into birth machines.’ Similarly, 
Anne Lise Ellingsæter (as cited in Martinčič, 2020), a professor in sociology 
at the University of Oslo and expert in family policies and fertility rates, 
expressed it like this: 
One can take one step back and ask what role the state should have 
when it comes to people’s reproductive decisions. In my opinion, the 
Prime Minister’s New Year’s speech exemplifies that the state is 
entering people’s private sphere when they are asking them to have 
more children.  
Stratifying statements about who should reproduce or not 
Whereas welfare arrangements and family policies are highly pertinent in 
the political debates about declining fertility rates in Norway, immigration 
is a more silent issue – at least on the governmental level. In recent years, 
this silence has somehow been broken, as various debaters have in different 
fora challenged the strict national focus on fertility rates. For example, the 
abovementioned Prof. Gamlund (2019) suggested increased international 
adoption as one alternative to increase the number of children per woman 
rather that enhancing the birth rate. Others have criticised the government 
for being double-minded by simultaneously fronting a restrictive im-
migration policy – which every year rejects the asylum applications of 
hundreds of children, even those living in very difficult situations in refugee 
camps – and calling on the nation ‘to maintain the population,’ as Solberg 
formulated it. This is how a representative for the Green Party in Norway, 
Farid Shariati (as cited in Skårderud, 2018), expressed himself to the 
newspaper Klassekampen when being asked about the prime minister’s 
speech: 
One can ask what kind of human view the government has, when 
they are so concerned with getting women to have more children 
rather than accepting more immigrants. (…) A better policy, if you 
want to increase Norway’s population, is to be more open to the 
outside world. We can welcome new people and recognise that they 
are the most valuable resource available. (…) Norway spends a lot of 
money that contributes to the flattening of world population growth. 
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That’s a good thing. But it sends a rather special signal by 
simultaneously closing the borders for immigration and saying ‘there 
must be more of us.’  
But there are also voices sceptical towards these alternative strategies. This 
reveals that the main concern is not only about numbers, but also the future 
of the nation and who can and should be birthing the nation – to para-
phrase Rodha Ann Kanaaneh (2002). An example showing how this notion 
can be formulated is to be found in a public statement delivered by Per 
Willy Amundsen, a representative of the Progress Party (Jensen, 2019):3 
I think it is important that we have a sustainable population composi-
tion. The birth rate among ethnic Norwegians is declining. In line with 
the Prime Minister, I think it is important to do something about this. 
But, as I see it, the solution is not to have more immigrants. Quite the 
contrary we have to make sure that the ethnic Norwegian population is 
maintained.  
Even though Amundsen is known for daring to say what ‘common people’ 
are thinking, this eugenics tendency is highly controversial and marginal in 
the Norwegian context. The fact that his statements have also received 
negative public reaction is a sign of their marginal status. Having said that, 
there are several examples of media texts presenting declining fertility 
numbers among immigrants as positive, which is somewhat paradoxical 
taking into consideration the call for more babies (Kristensen, 2009, 2020). 
Global over-population and national and/or individual 
responsibilities 
Another strand of discussion in regard to the Norwegian fertility rate is the 
pressure that the global population growth is putting on the planet, making 
it reasonable to reduce the number of children everywhere, including in 
Norway. This argument can typically be found in political claims fronted 
by the Green Party, experts on climate change and activists engaged in 
environmental organisations. Spokesperson for the Norwegian Green 
Party, Rasmus Hansson (as cited in Ekeberg, 2015), highlighted this point: 
If they [the government] are actually planning to encourage people to 
have more children, they are really out of their minds. As I see it, such 
policies are so outdated, I can hardly believe it. The declining 
Norwegian fertility numbers are good news. We have to get rid of 
the idea that everything should increase, and rather start preparing for 
societies with fewer people. (…) We can’t just sit here in rich Norway 
and claim that the population growth in Africa is the big problem.  
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Another example of a statement which questions this idea of increased 
Norwegian fertility rates is expressed in a national newspaper by 28-year- 
old Maja Sørheim (as cited in Salvesen, 2016), a woman who has taken 
individual moral pride in abstaining from motherhood for the good of the 
planet: ‘Little indicates that the child would have a very good life on a 
heated and depleted planet. (…) Most important, however, is the fact that 
having children is equivalent to fuelling the fire further.’ 
So, even though the fertility rate in Norway is below replacement level, 
not everyone is sharing the political claim that this is a big problem that 
should be solved by stimulating the population to have more babies. Quite 
the contrary, the global population growth and the ways it relates to cli-
mate crisis is seen by many to be a much more important problem. 
Concluding discussion 
In this chapter we have explored the ways in which national fertility rates, 
and more specific declining fertility rates, are presented and discussed 
publicly in Japan and Norway. We have paid special attention to the kinds 
of explanations and measures that are put forward, and the similarities and 
differences in this regard that come to play when comparing the two 
countries. The fertility rates in both Japan and Norway are well below the 
replacement level, which means that the population will decrease if im-
migration is not sufficiently high. As our analysis has shown, this decline is 
seen as a serious problem among leading politicians. Former Prime Minister 
Abe called the declining birth rate a ‘national crisis’ at the Diet session in 
2019. In the same year, the Norwegian Prime Minister communicated the 
same message to the Norwegian public by saying, ‘Norway needs more 
children!’ Both countries realise the need for countermeasures against the 
declining birth rate to prevent a future reduction of the labour force, a 
decline in economic growth and the collapse of the current pension system. 
However, the interpretations of the crisis and approaches to solving it are 
different in Japan and Norway. The Japanese government holds an implicit 
pro-natalist position. Many forms of fertility-related initiatives have been 
introduced expressly as population policies since the 1990s. The national 
government as well as the local governments devised various measures, such 
as monetary assistance in the form of child allowances paid directly to 
parents, promotion of parental leave, subsidies for childcare services and 
financial and psychological support for infertile couples. The governments 
have acted on the belief that the main causes of the declining birth rate are 
women’s delayed marriage and late-in-life pregnancy. However, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, young people, especially women, expect certain 
financial and lifestyle difficulties in raising children. In recent years, the 
Japanese government regards women as an important source of labour and 
has encouraged them to participate in paid work to make up for labour 
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shortage in the society with declining birth rate and ageing populations. 
However, there is still a strong tendency to regard unpaid work such as 
child-rearing and housework as women’s role in the society. As we in-
troduced in this chapter, Japan has generous paternity leave packages, but 
today very few fathers take advantage of this benefit. They believe that 
prioritising housework and childcare over their careers by taking paternity 
leave is more likely to reduce promotion possibilities in the future. 
In comparison to other European countries, women’s participation in the 
labour market in Norway is high, as 83% of mothers with small children 
are employed. The extensive schemes for parental leave and publicly funded 
kindergartens have rendered it possible for women to have a paid job 
outside the house. The Norwegian government’s strategies for increasing 
fertility are very different from those of the Japanese, as illustrated by the 
Prime Minister’s call for making it easier for young people to have children. 
In addition, the Norwegian government also pays attention to men’s re-
productive behaviours and involvement in family life and care work. 
On the other hand, in Japan, the rate of births outside of marriage is 
2.2% (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], 
2019). Marriage and childbirth are difficult for the Japanese to consider 
separately; thus, accepting the idea that women become pregnant while in 
school and (likely) single is difficult. Instead, the Japanese government has 
adopted strategies for supporting infertile couples financially and psycho-
logically in order to stop the declining birth rate. However, it has a risk of 
leading to prejudice against women without children, since a woman’s 
value in society is more likely to be defined according to whether she can 
give birth. In fact, as we have shown, some politicians have made dis-
criminatory statements against women without children. 
Since Norway is already tolerant towards cohabiting unmarried couples, 
single people and same sex couples, the government provides the same fa-
mily support to all. Although the Japanese government has given lip-service 
to the importance of gender equality and initiated some legislation, the 
rhetoric of many politicians shows that they still have conservative views 
about marriage, gender roles and childbirth. The Japanese government is 
also conservative about family formation. It is reluctant to accept diversity 
and premises its population policies on the traditional nuclear family of 
heterosexual parents with children. This position puts more burden on 
women than on men due to the stereotype that women are the main players 
in housework and childcare. 
Immigration is also a factor in both countries. In Norway, immigrants are 
an important part of the labour force; however, some negative views remain 
concerning immigrants’ fertility. If the national fertility rate continues to 
decline, immigration will be vital for avoiding a population decline. Even in 
Japan, society is becoming reliant on immigrant labour. In this regard, it is 
crucial to consider issues posed by a growing immigrant population within 
a host society experiencing a declining birth rate. 
186 Guro Korsnes Kristensen and Yukari Semba 
A significant difference in the gender gap exists between Japan and 
Norway. In 2020, the Global Gender Gap Report showed that in the po-
litical arena, Norway ranked 3rd out of 156 countries, whereas Japan 
ranked 120th, and 147th in the political arena. The difference in the gender 
gap exerts a great impact on the birth policies of the two nations. The fact 
that Norway’s population policies focus on gender equality is a by-product 
of women’s greater participation in working life and political life. In Japan, 
however, women have little voice in formal politics at the national level, 
and the employment rate of women is too low. The policies which support 
working mothers and young couples are not effective enough due to the 
small number of female politicians and female policy makers, causing the 
burden on women to increase. In addition, Norway has a better social 
support system than Japan for all parents and has tried to eliminate gender- 
based injustice concerning childcare. Seemingly, Norwegian women find 
work-life balance much easier to achieve than Japanese women do. 
Returning to Yuval-Davis’ (1997) discourses on fertility and population 
control, our study finds that the ‘people as power discourse’ is most pro-
minent in both contexts. It is made particularly explicit through the na-
tional leaders’ calls for more children. The Malthusian discourse, however, 
does not appear as relevant for the national context, which is not surprising 
as the fertility level is extremely low. In Norway, however, the Malthusian 
discourse does appear in some public discourse, namely when addressing 
the link of population growth to the climate crisis. The eugenics discourse 
also features at times, such as when immigrants’ fertility rates are discussed. 
However, for the most part, these perspectives appear as a marginal dis-
course in Norway compared to the ‘people as power’ approach. 
In any case, the fertility rate is declining not only in Japan but also in 
Norway. Our analysis indicates that gender equality policies alone are in-
sufficient to mitigate the declining birth rate. Thus, we argue that there is a 
need for more in-depth research on how young people are experiencing 
parenthood, and on the roles parenting and family life, including childcare, 
have in their imaginations of a good and desirable life. 
Notes  
1 The term fertility rate refers to the term total fertility rate that represents the 
number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end 
of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with age-specific fer-
tility rate of the specific year (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018).  
2 The term replacement level fertility is the fertility rate at which a population is 
able to replace itself from one generation to the next (Craig, 1994). The 
Population Division of the United Nations has long used a total fertility of 2.1 
children per woman as equivalent to replacement level.  
3 A populist party on the far right. 
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12 Assisted reproduction with 
donated eggs and sperm: A 
comparison of regulations on 
assisted reproduction in Norway 
and Japan 
Merete Lie and Yukari Semba    
Assisted reproduction in Norway and Japan 
Assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) spread globally after the first 
birth by in vitro fertilisation (IVF) took place in the UK in 1978. IVF is a 
process of fertilisation, whereby an egg is combined with sperm outside the 
body, in vitro. The first IVF baby was called a ‘test-tube baby’ (Van Dyck, 
1995) and the term from their initial introduction was ‘artificial re-
production.’ Opponents warned against ARTs on the grounds that re-
production constituted the very basis of humanity and that scientists were 
‘playing God.’ Moreover, ARTs go to the core of gender distinction as it is 
understood as based in sexual reproduction. Despite these controversies, 
ARTs were rapidly and eagerly adopted. This led to advances in re-
productive science and practice which, in turn, resulted in new methods and 
more efficient practices. As the very same reproductive technologies rapidly 
spread globally, controversy generally followed. However, the arguments 
proposed in the ensuing debates, especially the weight given to various 
arguments, differed across nations (e.g., Inhorn & van Balen, 2002; Lie & 
Lykke, 2017). By looking comparatively at the cases of Japan and Norway, 
we investigate the localised nature of the ART debate. 
In this chapter, we will compare the regulations of ARTs in two nations 
that differ culturally and socially – both historically and in contemporary 
times. According to Jasanoff (2005), regulations governing emerging life 
sciences have been incorporated into national projects to proclaim the basic 
values of a nation. These may be as varied as being in the frontline of 
science and progress versus fronting strict regulations substantiated in 
cultural values or religion. When ARTs were introduced in the UK, for 
example, values prominent during the Thatcher era, such as the promotion 
of a new enterprise culture and the value of individual consumer choice, 
constituted the framework of the political debate (Franklin, 1997). In the 
US, however, as Becker (2000) pointed out, the conservative notion of fa-
mily values was the moral authority underlying the debate. In Norway, the 
political debate was grounded in the pillars of the welfare state, the belief in 
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technology and progress, and a widely shared value of gender equality 
(Spilker & Lie, 2007). In Japan, Dr. Masakuni Suzuki, who successfully 
conducted the country’s first IVF in 1983 at Tohoku University, argued that 
IVF technology would help many people suffering from infertility and ul-
timately help the country by enabling the procreation of new citizens 
(Yui, 2016). 
To compare the responses to ARTs in Japan and Norway, the chapter 
poses two key questions. Firstly, what are the differences and similarities in 
the regulations of ARTs – that is, what is permitted and for whom? 
Secondly, how are the regulations justified, and what does such a justifi-
cation say about the two countries’ basic values and cultural differences in 
the late 20th and early 21st centuries? Public discourse and policy – that is, 
the debates and decisions on these matters – comprise our source material 
for discussing how meaning and morality are articulated in relation to 
gender and reproduction in the two countries. 
Theoretical perspectives 
This chapter frames our investigation of ARTs in Japan and Norway by 
focusing on a comparison of the regulations of gamete donation in the two 
countries. This is one of the many intriguing ART fields whereby one and 
the same technology functions differently across cultures. This has inspired 
Science, Technology and Society (STS) research on the social and cultural 
aspects of technologies and their technical development as well as cross- 
cultural studies among anthropologists. 
Regarding STS research, Jasanoff (2005) argues that cross-state com-
parisons often have the aim of determining best practices and policies by 
learning from other countries. According to Jasanoff, however, the problem 
here is twofold. One is that national policies are not independent of local 
cultural and social factors; inevitably, cultural differences trickle into policy 
making. Even when policymakers in different countries lean on similar data 
and scientific arguments, these may be interpreted differently or given dif-
ferent weight depending on the local context (Jasanoff, 2005, p. 17). 
Moreover, the same policies will not function in the same way in the en-
vironments in which they are introduced, and their effects will vary ac-
cordingly. 
Research in medical anthropology underscores Jasanoff’s position. Cross- 
cultural studies in this field elaborate differences that reveal the inherently local 
and political nature of biomedicine and biotechnology (Adelson et al., 2013). 
Moreover, not only may health services and medical training differ among na-
tions but also symptoms and diseases within populations. For instance, Lock 
(1993) examines women’s experience of menopause and finds striking differ-
ences between Japan and the US. In the US, menopause is experienced as a 
major physical transition characterised by well-known symptoms such as hot 
flashes. In Japan, however, menopause is not regarded as a major life event but 
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part of an ongoing process towards ageing; stiff shoulders are reported but 
seldom are hot flashes (Lock, 1993). Thus, the experience of bodily symptoms 
can hardly be discerned from a single society’s expectations for health and ill-
ness. Similarly, national health services organised to care for the population 
build on such expectations. 
Globalisation means that science and technologies, as well as people and 
cultural influences, are increasingly travelling across borders. Nevertheless, 
similar influences may meet a variety of responses (Inda & Rosaldo, 2008). 
Therefore, anthropologists hold that comparisons should be locally em-
bedded and not pretend to hold a disembodied ‘gaze from nowhere’ 
(Haraway, 1988). As the same phenomenon does not signify the same 
within different contexts, anthropologists argue against making cross- 
cultural comparisons out of context and argue for making comparisons 
only when they are locally embedded (Gingrich & Fox, 2002). Moreover, 
in anthropological studies comparison occurs also more implicitly as one 
inevitably will use one’s own background as reference when investigating 
similar phenomena in other countries. Our advantage is that each author’s 
point of departure is the knowledge of their own country. 
The chapter focuses on the case of assisted reproduction with donated 
gametes (eggs and sperm). The data material consists of official government 
documents, official announcements, reports from professional groups and 
Parliamentary debates, and information from news media on political de-
bates on this issue in Japan and Norway. Because of different developments 
in the two countries – such as legalisation versus guidelines and the relative 
power of the Parliamentary representatives versus professional organisa-
tions – the emphasis on the use of different types of data differs in the 
analyses of Japan and Norway. In the analyses, we identify instances of 
socially and culturally grounded reasoning that frame the pro-and-con ar-
guments of gamete donation in the two countries. What arguments and by 
whom have passed as relevant and legitimate, and on what grounds did 
both countries shift from long-term restrictions to the recent permission of 
egg donation? 
In the following, we will analyse this development over time in each 
country and study the debates and decision-making as processes of cultural 
production. As debates and policies vary, these sections will focus partly on 
the same issues and partly on different ones. This examination leads to our 
discussion of similarities and differences in ART regulations and arguments 
in the pro/con debates in the two countries. 
ART regulations in Japan 
Sperm donation 
The history of ART in Japan dates back to the late 1940s. In 1948, 
Dr. Kakuichi Ando of the Medical School in Keio University, Tokyo, 
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initiated donor insemination (DI) procedures at the request of a couple 
suffering from male infertility. The first DI baby was born in 1949 in Japan. 
Since then, more than between 10,000 and 15,000 DI offspring are esti-
mated to have been born (Minami, 2016). Dr. Ando faced severe dis-
approval after news of the first DI baby became public. However, he 
defended his decision as necessary for helping a legally married infertile 
couple. In Japanese culture, the eldest son traditionally took on the mantle 
of head of household and was expected to perpetuate the family name. 
Thus, the eldest male progeny and his wife were expected to bear children 
regardless of circumstances (Castro-Vàzquez, 2017). This emphasis on 
paternal duty shaped DI in Japan as an important means of protecting the 
masculinity of infertile men, whether or not they were fathers in genetic 
terms. DI was also beneficial for women because the majority of people at 
the time ascribed the fault of infertility to the wife. Not only did this as-
sumption devalue the childless wife, but it also threatened her marriage 
(Takeya, 2008). If a couple was unable to bear a child, then continuing the 
marriage became difficult for them. Hence, DI became acceptable due to 
public sympathy for infertile couples. 
Thus, sperm donation has been practised since the 1940s, and the first 
commercial sperm bank in Japan was established in 1996. Subsequently, in 
1997, Japan Society of Obstetrics and Gynecology (JSOG) established its 
first guidelines pertaining to DI, which stipulated that the technique should 
only be offered to legally married couples, that the wife and husband should 
tender informed consent and that the commercial provision of the donated 
sperm to infertile couples should be prohibited. Since 2018, however, fear 
of identity disclosure has led to a decrease in the number of anonymous 
sperm donors. One hospital cautioned potential sperm donors about the 
possibilities of identity disclosure in the informed consent form. The form 
stated that their anonymity might be in jeopardy if a donor offspring in-
itiated legal action at any time in the future to demand the disclosure of the 
donor’s identity and personal information (Osaki, 2020). This decrease has 
meant that people in Japan with infertility who are seeking to conceive 
through donated sperm are likely to go abroad or turn to online sperm 
donation (Kobayashi et al., 2020). 
Egg donation 
The first IVF baby in Japan was born in 1983. ARTs accounted for 5.8%, 
or 1 in 16.7, of all babies born in Japan in 2017 (Katagiri, 2020). Despite 
the substantial application of ARTs, no laws or legal regulations regarding 
ARTs existed until recently in Japan. Third-party reproduction has been 
governed by the guidelines established by the JSOG. Under JSOG guide-
lines, clinics could only utilise IVF with legally married couples. They could 
not assist women with becoming egg donors for other women. However, 
these guidelines are not legally binding, meaning that clinicians can 
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continue their medical careers even if they violate them. The first case of 
IVF using donated eggs in Japan was publicly disclosed in 1998. Dr. Nezu 
Yahiro had performed IVF using eggs donated by a wife’s sister, leading to 
him later being temporarily expelled from JSOG for violating its guidelines 
(Kinjō, 2012). There are also numerous instances of couples traveling 
overseas to seek donated eggs because they could not get donated egg in 
Japan. 
In response to the first domestic egg donation case and the rise of 
Japanese couples seeking donated eggs abroad, the former Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (currently the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare) 
established the ART Committee in June 2001 to discuss the drafting of a 
new bill on third-party reproduction (Tsuge, 2005). In 2003, the ART 
Committee concluded that reproductive medicine using donated gametes 
should be permitted, that treatments using gametes of siblings or other 
relatives should be prohibited and that the offspring should be accorded the 
right to acquire donor information. However, no law incorporating the 
Committee’s conclusions had been enacted at this time. 
The Japanese Institution for Standardizing Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (JISART), established in 2003, is an organisation that regulates 
the standards and practices of ART clinics with the aim of achievement of 
high standards of practice of infertility management. According to its by-
laws, JISART aims to improve the quality of patient care through the im-
plementation of a quality management system in Japan. Since 2007, clinics 
registered as members of JISART perform IVF using donated eggs after 
acquiring requisite approvals from the JISART’s ethics committees 
(JISART, 2021). 
The Oocyte Donation Network (OD-Net) was established in Japan in 
August 2012 with the objective of helping women with congenitally re-
duced ovarian functions (e.g., Turner syndrome) as well as prematurely 
menopausal women. OD-Net began to recruit voluntary egg donors and 
launched Japan’s first egg bank in 2013. OD-Net’s stipulations for donor 
candidates requires that the women are under 35 years of age, have pre-
viously given birth, are a good match for recipients in medical terms, have 
consent from their husbands to register as donors, would provide their eggs 
free of charge, and are willing to disclose their identities if the donor- 
conceived child requires it upon reaching the age of 15. OD-Net reported 
that the first child conceived by using donated eggs from an anonymous 
volunteer egg donor was born in 2017. However, it is still hard to find egg 
donors in Japan. So, certain countries in south and southeast Asia, such as 
India, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Nepal, and Cambodia, were destinations 
for Japanese fertility tourists seeking donated eggs. Most of these nations 
have recently banned the provision of eggs to foreign clients due to pro-
blems related to donor conception. Therefore, Some Japanese couples travel 
to Eastern Europe, Russia and the US, for this purpose (‘Score of 
life,’ 2014). 
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Legalisation of gamete donation 
Male infertility has been regarded as a more serious crisis than women’s 
infertility because the husband’s bloodline has long been viewed as more 
important in Japan. Many infertile men have confessed that their inability 
to father children made them feel that they had no value because they did 
not live up to the male gender role (Kurahashi, 2017). Thus, DI was in-
troduced to simultaneously alleviate male anxiety and mask male infertility. 
Nevertheless, women without children still face prejudice and discrimina-
tion, bearing the stigma of assumed infertility. 
A 2014 survey of public attitudes towards third-party reproduction in 
Japan revealed a notable division: 36.2% of respondents considered gamete 
or embryo donations as socially acceptable, whereas 26.6% found them 
unacceptable (Yamamoto et al., 2018). Although the demand for egg do-
nation is expected to increase in Japan as women marry later in life and 
incidences of age-related infertility increase, some barriers remain in place 
such as egg donors may incur risks such as ovarian hyperstimulation syn-
drome or damage to ovaries caused by egg retrieval for another woman. In 
2018, 99% of hospitals and clinics performing IVF in Japan refrained from 
facilitating egg donations because of JSOG’s guidelines (Shirai, 2019). 
On 4 December 2020, the Japanese Diet (Parliament) passed Seishoku 
Iryō Minpō Tokureihō (Reiwa 2 nen hōritsu dai 76 gō [Reproductive 
Medicine Civil Code Special Law (2020 Law No. 76)]), which recognised 
the legal parenthood of married couples who bore children through do-
nated eggs and sperm. Sperm donor shortage had become a serious issue 
since the beginning of the 21st century. It was thought that fewer men were 
willing to donate their sperm once they learned of the increasing legal rights 
of children globally to contact their biological parents (Robertson, 2018). 
Thus, the new ART law defines the parentage of children born through 
ARTs using donated gametes, and, in March 2021, both sperm donation 
and egg donation became legal in Japan under the special ART law. The 
main objective of the law is to stabilise the legal status of children born 
through third-party reproduction. The law stipulates that children born 
through egg or sperm donation will legally be the children of the birth 
mother and the mother’s husband who agreed to the use of the donated 
eggs and sperm. However, the law does not address the use of donated 
gametes by same-sex women couples and single women, only that by 
opposite-sex couples. This is a strong example of lawmakers’ attachment to 
the traditional view of the family as composed of heterosexual parents and 
their children. Meanwhile, additional clauses in Reproductive Medicine 
Civil Code Special Law in 2020 state that ‘necessary legal measures will be 
taken within a target of roughly two years’ regarding the right of the donor- 
conceived children to know their donors. Although donor anonymity is an 
important issue in many countries, it cannot be preserved in any case, given 
the current availability of genetic testing and tracing (Harper et al., 2016). 
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Moreover, the law does not cover other pressing issues, such as commercial 
gamete donation and surrogacy. The 2021 law nonetheless does reflect anxiety 
over Japan’s aging population and declining birth rate, and it is congruent with 
the national objective of promoting childbirth (Wernick, 2020). 
ART regulations in Norway 
Norway was an early initiator of legal regulations governing ARTs, having 
implemented them as early as 1987. Until recently, its legal regulations have 
been among the strictest in the world (Bleikli et al., 2004; Engeli & Allison, 
2017). However, a radical turn occurred in 2020 when the Parliament 
voted in favour of egg donation, access to fertility treatments for single 
women and egg freezing without medical reasons. Whereas previously a 
need for caution had been the winning argument for change, now the main 
argument was that a modern society should make use of technologies once 
they are available and follow up on those under development. 
This section will cover the development of ART regulations in Norway. 
Norway has a comprehensive public health service offering medical ex-
amination and three free IVF trials, initially for only heterosexual couples 
but later also offered to same-sex women couples and single women. Private 
clinics provide fertility treatments but require clients to pay for the treat-
ments; the related drugs are subsidised by the state. 
As in Japan, debate over ART in Norway goes back to the 1950s. In the 
early 1950s, a debate on DI surfaced after the appointment of a committee 
tasked with evaluating the practice and the legal status of the resulting 
offspring. The report resulted in a sharp debate in which opponents of the 
practice argued that donor sperm morally undermined the very essence of 
marriage by allowing a third person into the parental relationship 
(Melhuus, 2012).1 Nevertheless, no ban on insemination with donor sperm 
was introduced. 
Heated debates started again after the birth of the first IVF babies, in 
England in 1978 and in Norway in 1984. Three years later, in 1987, the 
first legal regulation, entitled Law on Artificial Conception, was introduced 
in Norway. In 1994, new ART regulations were included in the more 
comprehensive Law on Medical Use of Biotechnology. Although the 1987 
law permitted sperm donation, it prohibited egg donation. In 1994, how-
ever, an amendment to the law allowed for egg donation for those with 
certain medical conditions. 
ARTs remained politically controversial. The term used for the techni-
ques was artificial fertilisation, and, in media debates, practitioners were 
accused of tampering with nature. During the 1990s, to avoid stigmatising 
parents and their IVF children, the official term was set as ‘assisted fertili-
sation.’ In 2002, the government headed by the right-wing Christian 
Democratic Party – the political party most engaged in these issues – 
brought about a Parliamentary debate on revision of the 1994 law. Access 
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to egg donation, the most controversial issue at the time, had many sup-
porters but not enough to win the majority. The vote in the Parliament 
resulted in an even stricter law. Egg donation remained prohibited, sup-
ported by the argument that there should be no doubt as to the identity of 
the child’s mother. Moreover, it was voted in favour of upheaval of 
anonymity of sperm donors with reference to the child’s right to know its 
origin. 
In the 2002 debate, the Labour Party framed the issue of egg donation as 
a question of gender equality, arguing that if sperm donation is legal, then 
egg donation should likewise be allowed. Since gender equality is highly 
valued in Norway, the ban on egg donation was posed as a denial of gender 
equality. A representative from the conservative political party Høyre (The 
Right) countered this supposition by stating a limit to gender equality based 
on biological difference: ‘Not everything can, or should, be made equal’ 
(Spilker & Lie, 2007, p. 335). Norway follows the traditional Roman law, 
Mater semper certa est (motherhood is always certain); thus, a mother is 
legally defined as the person who gave birth to a child. However, legal 
fatherhood is defined in social terms as the man who is married to the 
woman who gives birth (Pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant). In the de-
bate, gender emerges as highly relevant in the bioethical debate with ga-
metes as a form of stand-in for women and men and their respective sexual 
behaviours. Politicians argued that whereas eggs remain in a woman’s 
body, sperm had always ‘gone astray,’ pointing to men’s extramarital 
sexual behaviour. However, egg cells should remain with the birth mother, 
and it was essential to avoid raising doubts about the identity of the mother. 
From 2003 to 2020, the Law on Medical Use of Biotechnology remained 
in effect with two exceptions. In 2007, same-sex couples received access to 
treatment. This was a consequence of changing the law of marriage by 
granting same-sex couples equal legal rights to heterosexual couples. Later, 
access was granted to couples where one person has a heritable venereal 
disease, such as HIV. Thus, no longer was a couple’s infertility the only 
qualification for ART. The law continued to gradually loosen until a revi-
sion in 2020 instantly changed the Norwegian Biotechnology Act from one 
of the strictest in the world to a relatively liberal one. Egg donation was 
legalised along with fertility treatment for single women. The law also 
permitted egg freezing without medical reasons and access to early ultra-
sound examination2 and NIPT (non-invasive pre-natal) testing for all 
pregnant women. Nevertheless, certain restrictions were added, such as an 
age limit of 46 years for a woman to gain access to ARTs. Egg donation was 
limited to couples where one parent would have a genetic relation to the 
offspring. Parents were obliged to tell children that they were conceived via 
a donor, and the age for children to ask for information about donors was 
lowered from 18 years to 15 years. 
Returning to public discourse on ARTs, we find that Parliamentary de-
bate in 2020 emphasised arguments that affirmed Norway’s status as an 
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up-to-date society and a gender equal one. Firstly, lawmakers argued in 
favour of liberalising the law on the grounds that the technology had de-
veloped and matured. To be a modern society, they argued, Norway should 
permit and use these technologies. Secondly, they contended that these 
changes meant acknowledging women’s fertility rights. Many of the 
speakers supported the argument that Norway needed a modern 
Biotechnology Act to uphold the value of giving the population access to 
modern medical treatments. Previously, the principal concern of the 
Norwegian Biotechnology Act has been precautionary, employing a ‘better 
safe than sorry’ approach so long as the consequences remain unknown 
(Melhuus, 2012). However, the most persuasive arguments in 2020 was the 
need to update and remain in the frontline of global technological devel-
opments. Thus, the Parliament voted in favour of a suggestion that the law 
should be continually reviewed and updated to adapt to rapid developments 
in biotechnology. 
There was a debate on restrictions regarding the use of surrogacy abroad 
among Norwegian citizens, but this suggestion was not approved. The 
prohibition of surrogacy, however, was retained with a clear majority. 
Moreover, the government was urged to work in international fora ‘against 
the abuse of women in the international surrogacy industry.’3 
The importance of notions of gender equality differed in 2002 and 2020. 
In 2002, for example, support for egg donation as a matter of gender 
equality failed to win the majority. At the time, the vote against egg do-
nation was based on a partially forthright and partially implicit assumption 
about the priority of motherhood, which worked against equalising egg and 
sperm donation. The 2020 debate, however, did not frame equality as a 
matter of gender but as a question of access to treatments within the public 
health service. This position argued that all women regardless of income 
and location must be provided access to such specialised health services. 
The argument of equal access also included the aim of putting an end to the 
so-called fertility travel abroad. Access to available fertility treatments and 
tests were presented as women’s rights, whereas men were seldom men-
tioned in the debate. Only a few representatives spoke against fertility 
treatment for single women by arguing that children need fathers. This lack 
of debate about fatherhood and support for single motherhood was slightly 
surprising given the long campaign to acknowledge the equal importance of 
fatherhood and motherhood as part of gender equality policies in Norway. 
Legally and culturally, Norway has a bilateral kinship system, acknowl-
edging genetic as well as economic and social inheritance from both sides. 
The 2020 debate in Norway’s Parliament illuminated how ART regula-
tions are considered ethical and political questions, guided by the percep-
tions and politics of gender. During the debates, there was hardly any 
reference to medical expertise or consideration of advice from the officially 
appointed Biotechnology Advisory Board.4 Rather, the debate mainly 
centred on differing values and morals among the lawmakers. Before the 
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vote, a major newspaper in Norway conducted a survey on the question of 
egg donation and found that 57% of respondents were in favour of lega-
lising the practice.5 Furthermore, young people were more positive about 
egg donation than older people were. Among the adherents of different 
political parties, those voting for the left were most positive; only those 
voting for the Christian Democratic Party had a clear majority against egg 
donation. In 2002, the conservative party Høyre had argued against egg 
donation based on the primacy of motherhood and the importance of never 
questioning the identity of the mother. In 2020, however, they argued in 
favour of egg donation when the arguments had shifted to individual rights 
for access to available treatments. The recent legal permissiveness may also 
be due to the rapid decrease in Norway’s fertility rate and an appeal from 
the conservative Prime Minister for the nation to making more babies (cf. 
Chapter 11 in this book). 
Egg and sperm across nations: Similarities and differences 
Human reproduction is closely associated with gender norms, sexuality, 
family patterns and kinship. Hence, cultural differences most visibly surface 
in these areas during the debates and regulations of ARTs. 
In both Japan and Norway, a marked divide has existed between the 
legality of sperm donation versus the prohibition on egg donation. 
Although sperm donation has been practiced for a long time and included 
in the health services of both countries, IVF using donated eggs was pro-
hibited in Norway and Japan until 2020 and 2021, respectively. In 
Norway, DI was controversial but publicly recognised when it became part 
of the national health service in 1972. In 2005, the donor anonymity clause 
was rescinded, based on the belief in a child’s right to know its origin. In 
Japan, DI was introduced in 1948, causing some controversy but rapidly 
coming into use. The Japanese special ART law came into effect in March 
2021 and stated that ‘necessary legal measures will be taken within a target 
of roughly two years’ regarding the right of donor-conceived people to 
know their donors. DI has continued retaining the practice of allowing 
anonymous sperm donors, and many voices have been raised in Japan 
against the abolition of donor anonymity to protect the masculinity of in-
fertile men and donors’ privacy. 
The two countries differ in terms of the recognition of kinship. In Japan, 
kinship is recognised traditionally through the father-line, which makes pro-
ducing a male progeny of utmost importance to couples and their extended 
families. In Norway, kinship is recognised bilaterally. Research shows that in 
countries where sperm donation is viewed as less acceptable, the male line is 
recognised as the sole inheritance line; this contrasts with countries where ac-
knowledgement of the mother’s line is more important than that of the father 
(Inhorn & van Balen, 2002; Mehrabi, 2017). Still, in both Japan and Norway, 
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sperm donation is less controversial than egg donation, which accords with the 
overriding principle that motherhood should never be questioned. 
In both countries, women are culturally recognised as protagonists in 
terms of reproduction. It is generally taken for granted that women want 
children, and only those without children have to explain themselves to 
others (Ravn, 2005). In Norway, this was reflected in the latest 
Parliamentary debate, as discussed above, where ARTs were framed as part 
of the reproductive rights of women. In Japan, infertility was generally 
understood as caused by a barren woman, while infertility among men was 
silenced. Thus, if a couple failed to bear children, then a culturally approved 
remedy was for a man to divorce and remarry. As such, anonymity con-
tributed to the silencing of male infertility when sperm donation became a 
practice. 
A marked difference between attitudes toward ARTs in the two countries 
relates to the cultural norms of maintaining reproduction exclusively within 
marriage. In Japan, fertility treatments are offered to heterosexual married 
couples only. At the core, Japan has a family pattern that emphasises the 
birth of a son in the patrilineal system and within the bounds of legal 
marriage. Thus, increasingly later marriages in contemporary Japan have 
led to concerns about the rise of childless couples. Moreover, male in-
fertility is a problem that is both silenced as if non-existent, and a matter of 
great concern. In Norway, however, childbirth likewise has been postponed 
during the last decades but is not in the same way connected to legal 
marriage or the patriline.6 Consequently, in Japan, access to ARTs is re-
stricted to childless married couples, whereas, in Norway, unmarried cou-
ples, same-sex women couples and single women have gained access to 
ARTs on equal terms over time. 
Egg donation had, however, been prohibited in both countries until very 
recently. A striking similarity between the two countries is that they recently 
and at the same time took a radical step in moving from restrictive to 
permissive regulations. The arguments in favour of such a change are si-
multaneously similar and different. In Japan, the central arguments lie in 
the low birth rate and the many couples who travel abroad for treatments 
that are inaccessible in their country. In the context of an ageing population 
and a declining birth rate, allowing IVF using donated eggs is congruent 
with the objective of the country to promote childbirth. The legal approval 
of gamete donation, including eggs, is viewed as a countermeasure to the 
declining birth rate. Lawmakers and politicians have never argued for ac-
cess to donated gametes as an issue of gender equality or human rights. 
Little attention is paid to the welfare of donor-conceived children or the 
right of same-sex women couples and single women to bear children. Thus, 
ART access remains denied to them. 
In Norway, the argument that the country needs more children was also 
valid in the 2020 Parliamentary debate, but more emphasis was given to 
women’s individual rights for access to treatments that are available 
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worldwide. Moreover, access to ART treatments, including egg and sperm 
donation, was extended to single women following the earlier extension to 
same-sex women couples. The overall arguments in the Parliamentary de-
bate was centred on the goal of becoming a modern country by utilising 
available technologies instead of lagging behind, and that all women should 
have the right to access these technologies equally within the public health 
system. 
In both countries, the argument for permissive regulations of gamete 
donation aims to put an end to fertility travel outside of the country to gain 
access to treatments that are not permitted in one’s country. Interestingly, 
the argument that the treatments are safer in one’s country than abroad is 
equally argued in Japan and Norway. 
Finally, an interesting point of comparison is that when Norway included 
ART regulations under the new and more comprehensive Law on Medical 
Use of Biotechnology in 1994, the first paragraph states its purpose as 
follows: 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that the application of biotech-
nology in medicine is utilised in the best interests of human beings in a 
society where everyone plays a role and is fully valued. This shall take 
place in accordance with the principles of respect for human dignity, 
human rights and personal integrity and without discrimination on the 
basis of genetic background, on the basis of ethical norms relating to 
our western cultural heritage. [emphasis added]7  
The Parliament reached a consensus in 1994 that the law should be based 
on ethical principles (as opposed to medical or scientific reasoning) and 
primarily on the principle of the equal value of all human beings. After the 
rejection of a proposal on Christian values, the voters then reached an 
agreement on the statement ‘our western cultural heritage’ (Melhuus, 2012, 
p. 63). An actual definition of this heritage was not included in the state-
ment; neither does it refer to a long-lasting debate about Eastern versus 
Western values (see, e.g., Wong, 2008). The Japanese ART law does not 
include similar general statements. 
As previously mentioned, ARTs refer to technologies that are accessible 
across the world. In discussions of globalisation, there has been a con-
tinuous debate on the relationship of global trends versus local cultures and 
traditions, including arguments of eastern and western values versus the 
idea of ‘universal human values’ (Inda & Rosaldo, 2008). Some have ar-
gued that in a time of increasing global exchange there is a need for global 
ethics, but still, the case of ART regulations reveals marked differences 
between nations (Bleikli et al., 2004). Japan and Norway differ according 
to their cultural traditions of family patterns, kinship and gender relations. 
Nonetheless, when analysing the debates and policies of gamete donation, 
an overall argument is that policies of egg and sperm donation have differed 
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over time due to cultural understandings of a basic gender difference – an 
argument that is similar in both countries. 
Notes 
1 See Melhuus (2012, pp. 47–70) for a thorough analysis of the Norwegian legis-
lation of ARTs until 2011.  
2 Until 2020, all pregnant women were offered an ultrasound examination by week 
18, that is, after the limit of free abortion at week 12. In addition, the Parliament 
requested the government to enforce access to ultrasound examinations during 
the first trimester and within the public health service system.  
3 https://www.stortinget.no/no/Saker-og-publikasjoner/Vedtak/Vedtak/Sak/?p= 
77395. Vedtak 621.  
4 Retrieved from https://www.bioteknologiradet.no/english/ (accessed 5 November 2020).  
5 Retrieved from https://www.aftenposten.no/norge/politikk/i/zJ3E4/klart-flertall- 
sier-ja-til-aa-aapne-for-eggdonasjon-i-norge (accessed 5 November 2020).  
6 Retrieved from https://www.ssb.no/en/statbank/list/fodte (accessed 30 November 2020).  
7 Retrieved from https://app.uio.no/ub/ujur/oversatte-lover/data/lov-19940805- 
056-eng.pdf (accessed 30 November 2020). Italics inserted by authors. 
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13 Becoming a feminist academic in 
Japan and Norway: A dialogue 
with professors Masako Ishii- 
Kuntz and Agnes Bolsø 
Jennifer Branlat, Agnes Bolsø, and  
Masako Ishii-Kuntz   
Feminist dialogues 
The following dialogue between Masako Ishii-Kuntz, Professor Emerita 
and Vice Dean of Ochanomizu University (Japan), and Agnes Bolsø, 
Professor Emerita at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU, Norway), began in virtual space, as did most meetings during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, in late 2020 and continued to June 2021. Its purpose 
was to explore the ways in which these two professors in Gender Studies 
view their professional trajectories in a wider perspective than that of the 
traditional career narrative. The dialogue sets into play questions of early 
lived experiences from childhood, the possibility or impossibility of finding 
a ‘home’ in feminism at various points in time and of pioneering academic 
work in the highly interdisciplinary and international field that Gender 
Studies is today. 
A dialogical approach such as the one featured here has two principle 
aims. First, it opens up a space for the participants’ existential ‘struggles 
of becoming’ to take form (Frank, 2005, p. 968). Rather than Profs. 
Ishii-Kuntz and Bolsø presenting themselves solely through categories 
such as ‘feminist academic’ or ‘sociologist,’ which emphasise profes-
sional identities over personal, the aim here was to show how the pro-
fessional and personal are intertwined and interrogate each other. 
Second, dialogical enquiry allows for stories to emerge in a shared space 
– in this case a virtual one – and during moments of contact with others. 
Finally, the dialogical welcomes the influence that all speakers have on 
each other's storytelling processes. 
Both born at the beginning of the 1950s into quite non-traditional fa-
milies during the ‘housewife era’ of the post-war period, Masako Ishii- 
Kuntz and Agnes Bolsø embarked on journeys, which, although geo-
graphically distinct, resonate in many respects. Professor Ishii-Kuntz grew 
up in the small fishing town of Rumoi, Hokkaido, the most northern island 
of Japan. She pursued her undergraduate and graduate studies in Family 
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Sociology in the US. After 20 years at the University of California- 
Riverside, she returned to Japan with the strong desire to work with the 
motivated young women at Ochanomizu University, where she led the 
Institute for Gender Studies from 2015 to 2020 and is now Trustee, Vice 
President and Professor (Emeritus). Her research concerns gender dynamics 
both in families and in the workplace, with a particular focus on Japanese 
fathers’ involvement in housework and childcare. A major part of her 
Japanese fatherhood research has stemmed from her involvement in an 
advocacy group for shared parenting, which was the driving force for the 
1992 law giving men the right to take family leave from work. Her research 
on the ‘Ikumen’ phenomenon – ‘cool’ fathers who are actively involved in 
caring for their own children – has been instrumental in establishing a space 
for men and masculinity in the field of Gender Studies. 
Prof. Bolsø grew up on a coastal farm in Ørland, Norway, as the 
daughter of a wartime sailor and midwife. She has been head of the Centre 
for Gender Studies at NTNU, editor of The Norwegian Journal of Gender 
Studies and involved in the development of Norwegian feminism, Women's 
Studies and Gender Studies since the 1980s. After beginning her university 
studies in mathematics, she was quickly politicised in the 1970s and went 
on to study Sociology and History. She obtained practical training as a 
researcher in agricultural and rural studies before specialising in Gender 
Studies. She has generated a thematically broad academic output on gender, 
sexuality, and power and politics. Prof. Bolsø is currently pursuing research 
on trans bodies and femininity, enquiring into the role of symbolic gender 
in trans transformations. 
The dialogue between Agnes Bolsø and Masako Ishii-Kuntz was medi-
ated and edited by Jennifer Branlat, whose questions appear as headlines 
throughout the dialogue. Jennifer is a post-doctoral researcher and feminist 
educator at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. 
How did you arrive at where you are today?  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
In terms of career, I would say it was random. First, I had planned 
on becoming a math teacher and then politics erupted onto the scene 
in the 1970s, and I realised I couldn’t save the world with mathe-
matics. I changed to History and Sociology. As a student in 
Sociology, I had a teacher who belonged to the same political 
movement as me and hired assistants to do data processing on 
punch cards. I was coding for him, but I also really enjoyed his 
teaching. As a result, I ended up moving into his field of research, 
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which was Rural Sociology. I did both my Bachelor's thesis and my 
Master's thesis with him as a supervisor. I think I was still planning 
to become a teacher when politics took hold of me during my 
Master's. I proletarianised myself and that's how I came into re-
search. I was still working in agriculture and five months pregnant 
with my son when I was recruited as a researcher for the Center for 
Rural Research. I was always a feminist, socialist, communist and 
supporter of green politics from the 1970s onward. It was a whole 
package. A very exciting journey.  
It was difficult to get funding for sexuality research at the Center for Rural 
Research, so I jumped to Gender Studies, and that was where what you 
could call a ‘career’ started. That was also accidental. I got a Ph.D. and 
filled in as a professor until I obtained a permanent post. I think I was much 
less strategic than I was just taken by the events.  
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
In my case, I grew up in a family where my mom didn’t really do 
much in terms of childcare or housework. It was my father who 
performed all the domestic tasks. As a result, I grew up questioning 
why that was the case, because in my friends’ families it was their 
mothers who were taking care of them. In Japan (at least in my 
childhood days), children bring bento lunches from home, and it 
was the case that my lunch never seemed to look as attractive as 
those of the other girls, whose bentos were made by their mothers. I 
grew up thinking that something must be wrong with me or my 
family. By the time I graduated from high school, I imagined that my 
college education should take place somewhere outside of Japan 
because I knew that I wouldn’t be able to find the answers in Japan. 
I left Japan in the early 1970s and started my college education in 
the US, in the wake of the 1960s civil rights movement.  
After my undergraduate degree, my parents said that I had reached the 
end of their financial assistance, so I had to get a job but didn't have a 
work visa in the US. I had to come back to Japan. I began working for 
an English language newspaper, and it was then that I was exposed to 
gender discrimination that existed in Japanese working life. At the 
time, I didn’t want this to be my future, so I worked, saved money and 
was able to go back to the US after four years of working. I remember 
thinking that English language newspapers would be liberal, but my 
experiences ended up being quite the opposite. After four years, I 
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entered my Master's program, and after my Ph.D. I decided to stay in 
the US because of my experiences with discrimination at the newspaper 
company. At the time, I didn't want to come back to Japan at all. 
I ended up getting a job in the Sociology Department at the University 
of California, Riverside [UCR]. ‘Pressure cooker’ would be the words 
to describe my years at UCR because of the ‘publish or perish’ research 
environment. I survived this battle to receive a tenure in 2003, but I 
began to feel that something was missing in my career, namely teaching 
for the future generations. Throughout my career in the US, I main-
tained a part-time teaching post at Ochanomizu University, one of the 
two national universities in Japan for women. For several summers I 
would teach a graduate seminar, and I came to be quite fascinated by 
the quality of the female students in terms of their seriousness towards 
learning and their high level of motivation. I felt like my mission in life 
was to return to Japan to work with these brilliant students and con-
tribute to their future development. The fact that I am in Japan now 
and have been for the last 15 years was something that I didn’t plan on. 
[laughs] You just never know.  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
It seems that both of us were embarrassed about things we are quite 
proud of today. Your story about your norm-breaking parents re-
minds me of my mother. I feel a deep solidarity with the women that 
came before me: My free-spirited aunt but also my mother, who was 
more grounded. She was a nurse during the war and helped evacuate 
patients by boat from the local hospital to the islands during the 
German bombing of Kristiansund in 1939. It was in this context that 
she helped a woman give birth in fairly dire circumstances. This event 
affected her, and she ended up going to a midwife school in Oslo. She 
worked as a midwife during the rest of the war. My mother was 
tough.  
My father was a convoy sailor during the war and like so many men, 
under the constant threat of torpedo strike, he had a breakdown and 
had to be hospitalised. He ended up falling in love with a nurse in the 
hospital, and when my mother happened to find one of their love letters, 
she put on her coat and left for Trondheim to seek legal help. My father 
told her she couldn’t obtain a divorce since they had children, but the 
lawyer told her differently. She raised us alone. She was a feminist, but 
she probably never said the word in her life. She divorced my father in 
1953, the year I was born. No one we knew was divorced in 1953. The 
one memory – even though there are so many – I have of my mother 
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being different from other mothers was when we went to church. She 
wasn’t a Christian, but there was no entertainment in the village of 300 
people so she went to church to listen to the organ and the singing. She 
loved to sing, and she knew all the words. She would sit straight up – she 
was quite tall – and she sang the absolute loudest of the congregation. 
Always. At the time I was ashamed but now, thinking about it, I’m so 
proud. Then later when she took a position in a more remote area, she 
bought herself a moped, a helmet and big gloves [laughs]. 
How are the words ‘feminism’ and ‘gender’ used in Japan?  
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
Beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a period of 
five or six years of the so-called ‘gender bashing’ or ‘gender-free 
bashing’ in Japan. Anything and everything related to gender came 
under scrutiny. I was, in fact, advised not to use the word ‘gender’ 
when I was invited to give a talk. I was quite offended, as you can 
imagine. In many cases, the words ‘feminist’ and ‘feminism’ have 
been reserved for academics to a great extent. The terms have not 
been used on the same level among the general public. Perhaps that's 
why we do encounter criticisms here and there levelled against 
feminist philosophers or thinkers in academic sense, but we don't 
hear muchelmets’ who organised a series of demonstrations, the 
most well-known of which involved storming into the Diet, the 
National Assembly, wearing pink helmets. Those sorts of women 
represent the very active or radical women who are opposed to the 
government, which at the time opposed the idea of birth control 
pills. In those days, though, we were not using the word ‘feminism’ 
at all to describe these women. Rather, the words ‘Women's Lib 
(Liberation) Movement’ were used to describe female activists in 
those years. So, in a sense, these women were known as activists for 
women's causes, not feminists per se.  
What about the term feminism in Norway?  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
Today feminism in Norway can be anything. There are all sorts of 
feminisms. I think we could just be pragmatic about the word 
‘feminism’ and let it reflect the context: the relevant cause/topic and 
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those who are involved, where and when. Sometimes it is women's 
issues, sometimes it's gender issues and sometimes sexuality or 
feminism itself that's at stake. The choice of word depends on the 
concrete context. All the words are contestable, and it's quite dif-
ficult to find a word that is uncontested. I became a feminist, a 
conscious feminist anyhow, in the early 1970s. I belonged to the 
communist/socialist student left at the time, and feminism to me was 
a bourgeois word used among the liberal right. This was not alto-
gether true, as I see it in hindsight! But to me it had roots in the 
suffrage movement, which was primarily a bourgeois, upper-class 
political movement. Feminism first arrived with the French 
Revolution and was connected to the acquisition of civil rights. 
When the leftist women's movement came along in the 1970s, it was 
for me all about liberation – women's liberation but also everybody's 
liberation from the capitalist system within which the bourgeois feminist 
had secured her rights.  
How about feminism and class in Japan?  
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
I think that's quite similar within the Japanese context in which highly 
educated, well-to-do middle- to upper-class women were very active in 
pursuing their ideals or expressing their opinions with respect to the use 
of birth control pills.  
Feminism today – is it still about class?  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
Throughout history, if you look again at the suffrage movement, 
the upper-class women who participated were labelled feminists 
and really had a hard time of it. Feminism was a derogatory label. 
They were not seen as proper women – they were called men in 
skirts, sometimes hardly considered humans since they were un-
derstood as neither ‘man’ nor ‘woman.’ There's an echo of it in 
today's boardroom feminism, or Gucci feminism as it is sometimes 
called. Corporate feminists don't want to use the words ‘feminism,’ or 
‘women's liberation’ because they are first and foremost meritocrats. It's 
all about competence and qualifications and the right to have a position 
based on competitive processes. If today's feminism is a very broad term, 
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it encompasses all sorts of ideas about women and society, and the re-
lationship between men and women and capitalism. It lends itself to 
different kinds of analysis. That's why I say we have to be pragmatic – 
feminism cannot mean one thing. When we say feminism, it could lit-
erally mean anything that has to do with equality, where women and 
men are involved. I would say, though, that the echo of the derogatory is 
still very much in place.   
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
I think, in case of Japan, the word ‘feminism’ or even ‘gender,’ or ‘femi-
ninity’ and ‘masculinity’ – all of these have been used by bourgeois women, 
but at the same time by men who are against anything to do with women. 
Politicians, male politicians, or those espousing dominant culture have used, 
for example, gender in the gender-bashing context and feminism the same 
way. In that sense, there are different kinds of feminism that exist in Japan, 
too. But as far as being the target of criticism, all feminisms have become the 
target of both politicians and upper-class men.  
What was your experience of attending university during the 
tumultuous 1970s?  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
During this period in Norway, it was a time of fagkritikk or, to put it in 
English, critiquing the disciplines. There was nothing – and I mean nothing 
– about women's issues on the reading lists. In History and Sociology, we 
created our own courses, seminars and reading lists [shows the papers from 
her personal archive]. In History, for example, we made a course on women 
in working life and the Norwegian women's movement. We actually re-
ceived university credits for this course, which was established with the help 
of a socialist professor in the History Department who helped obtain official 
recognition. There was another from Sociology called ‘women and pro-
duction’ that discussed women as the reserve army under capitalism and 
women's relationship with the trade unions. We created it and we also did 
the teaching as undergraduate students [laughs]. There was a critique in 
every discipline that not only women were invisible, but the working class 
was invisible, and rural people were invisible. It was the white upper-class 
man that was visible in every discipline. This effort to make women and 
women's situational historical contexts visible was deeply empirical.  
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MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
I have to admit that you were ahead of me in the 1970s in your 
undergraduate studies. When I was an undergrad at an American 
college in the 1970s, the American women's rights movement was in 
full swing from the 1960s. A couple decades later, we read a book 
that I remember quite well, Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice 
[1982]. This book acted as an eye-opener for me because it helped 
me better understand the ethics of care and how it is internalised by 
women. In understanding my own family, especially my father's 
involvement in childcare, I thought Gilligan's views could also be 
adopted by men who care. Gilligan was occasionally criticised for 
not providing data to support her arguments, but even if I were to 
read her work for the first time now, I would still learn a great deal 
about the ethics related to domestic care work. In my college days, 
we were just given the readings and were asked to read them. 
Through the readings we came to discover many dimensions of 
women's issues, but we didn’t create courses or reading lists like 
Agnes did [laughs].  
Was feminism part of your motivation to build a career in the 
academy?  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
For me, it was all about women and women's liberation, increasing 
women's strength in all areas of society. I wasn't using the word 
‘feminism’ at the beginning. I started out as an applied researcher in 
Agricultural and Rural Sociology funded by the government and by 
agricultural corporations and organisations. There was a lot of work to 
do to give rural women confidence and in bringing feminist points of 
view into all sorts of research topics. We women did not obtain the 
right to inherit a farm until 1978, which was quite late. Prior to that, 
family farms were passed to the son, which means it took quite a while 
to change attitudes and get boys and girls to be treated equally in 
agriculture. My research was related to a deep gender division in 
agriculture, and I saw it as my task to work to strengthen women's 
position in rural areas. ‘Feminism’ as a concept was not a part of that 
picture. It was about women's confidence and rights.  
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MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
As I said, I grew up thinking that there was something wrong with 
my family because of my father's heavy involvement in housework 
and childcare. I didn’t even know the word ‘feminism’ then, of 
course. But looking back, I definitely became fascinated by fem-
inists’ writings in pursuit of my childhood questions. So, yes, 
feminism was part of my motivation in building my career as a 
sociologist. When I began to do research on housework and 
childcare during graduate school in the 1980s in the US, I was told 
by many male professors that there wasn’t much to research in the 
division of household labour. They claimed the topics of house-
work and childcare were too ‘domestic,’ that they were ‘women's 
issues’ and that it was important to set my sights higher. I re-
member being warned by American male professors that con-
ducting research on housework and childcare was most certainly 
not the overarching research theme that I should be pursuing. But 
given my childhood experiences and being strongly influenced by 
feminists’ thinkers, I remember feeling that I must find the answers 
to explain the phenomenon of gendered division of household 
labour.  
Which aspects of women's situation did you try to make 
visible in your research?  
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
In the 1980s when I was interviewing women who were trying to 
build certain careers, I heard them saying over and over, ‘I have to 
be a man to succeed.’ It was quite commonplace, you know, that 
their partners were not helping them at all at home. Interestingly, it 
was their mothers who were helping them to raise their kids or 
with whatever household tasks that needed to be completed. Those 
career women were forced to be the front runner: Embodying a 
form of masculinity, the ability to compete or showing off that 
they could do just as much or even better than men. In many re-
spects they had to present themselves as men. It's also not as 
common in Japan to seek domestic help. I think there is a strict line 
between what's considered public and private. Many Japanese 
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people believe that family falls completely within private domain 
and therefore don’t wish to bring outsiders into their private space. 
That leaves restricted possibilities for who can help with children 
and housework. That's why these domestic tasks fall on the mo-
ther. Given these domestic responsibilities that have been falling 
on women, I felt what I could do through my research was to 
discover the ‘caring’ aspects of fathers. I believed that mothers’ 
experiences of childcare stress and anxiety can be alleviated 
through their partners’ involvement in domestic tasks. Thus, in my 
research, I have identified both work- and family-related factors 
affecting men's involvement in childcare and housework. I have 
also examined how men's housework and childcare would influ-
ence women's psychological well-being. Most recently, I have been 
involved in a research project that examines ‘caring masculinity,’ 
which rejects men's domination and its associated traits and em-
braces values of men's care as positive emotion and relationality. 
Thus, you can say that my feminist approach has been not only for 
the benefits of women but for those of men as well.   
AGNES BOLSØ: 
I think I touched on my commitment to bringing women's voices 
into research in what we tried to accomplish at the Center for 
Rural Research. After that, there was a theoretical change, and 
sexuality came to the forefront with two big research programs 
through The Research Council of Norway – I had funding for both 
of them. They were called Gender in change [Kjønn i endring] 
(1996–2001) and Gender Studies: Knowledge, limits, change 
[Kjønnsforskning: Kunnskap, grenser, endring] (2001–2008). It 
wasn’t so much women's situation I was interested in but rather 
the ways in which sexuality, eroticism and the symbolic aspects of 
gender are deeply coded into culture. The symbolic aspects of 
gender are things that men and women, whether straight or queer – 
anyone can play around with them. They reveal that masculinity 
doesn’t have to be attached to men. Around this time, the notion of 
‘women's situation’ became old-fashioned sounding, particularly 
in the context of the welfare state with its benefits for both men 
and women via parental sharing and the dual-earner model. The 
welfare state made women essential to the family economy and has 
facilitated male parenting. It's no longer a question of women's 
situation.  
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Feminist theory – inspirational or instrumental?  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
It was with Judith Butler that I started to be interested in theory. 
Feminist theory of course existed before Judith Butler, but as an 
applied researcher, I wasn’t able to relate so much to feminist 
theory. I knew about it and was familiar with the ideas and dis-
cussed them, but in applied rural research it was women, men and 
women's rights and increased confidence for women that we were 
interested in. That was when I made a point of the fact that women 
who said they didn’t drive the tractor actually did drive the tractor. 
They had to do it for practical reasons rather frequently, and so they 
did it. I realised that they actively took part in portraying their role 
and importance as less than it was in reality. Women taking part in 
their own diminished positioning started to puzzle me more and 
more, and I needed more fine-grain tools and foundations for 
thinking about gender, and women and men, so feminist theory 
provided a way in. By this time, men's studies had come along, and 
in combination with Butler's deconstructing of man and woman 
altogether – that was really something. Something new and very 
compelling. But I think perhaps the most significant realisation for 
me came with a shift in my own sexual desires. Until my thirties, I 
had been straight, had children with a man that I loved and truly 
desired men. Falling in love with a woman and starting to desire 
women was quite puzzling and challenged me in ways that I wanted 
to study. I began to study this experience by reading about sexuality 
and the erotic, but also by doing my own project on my body. It was 
like going through puberty again. That was when I left rural studies. 
I suppose everything was driven by my own development. In any 
case, it wasn’t possible at that time to obtain funding for projects on 
rurality and homosexuality. That's when I left rural studies and 
joined the group that had by then been formed at the university, the 
Center for Women's Research. It was both accidental and driven by 
my own desires.  
It wasn't until the 1990s in the wake of Judith Butler's Gender Trouble 
[1990] that it really hit me that my theoretical understanding of ‘man’ and 
‘woman’ meant something also for my academic research, and that there 
were already feminist theoreticians worth reading and listening to out there. 
You know, Aleksandra Kollontai and Rosa Luxemburg can only help us 
with some things and not others! It's quite embarrassing to admit this 
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today, particularly when Gender Studies has become institutionalised and 
theory now occupies a central space.  
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
It’s fascinating to hear your reflections because there are so many 
overlaps. We were born and grew up in totally different cultures. 
Yet, I was also quite influenced by Judith Butler myself. During my 
undergraduate years, we also had to read Betty Friedan's Feminine 
Mystique [1963], and other pillars of feminism and feminist 
thought. In my readings of those texts, I really felt like, ‘aha!,’ this is 
the answer I’ve been searching for in relation to my family being 
different from others. It was an eye-opening experience for me, not 
just going to the US but reading some of the early feminist in-
tellectuals’ theoretical writings. Then, with Judith Butler, I was very 
taken with the concepts of deconstruction and performativity. I was 
also fascinated with the theoretical frameworks of R.W. Connell 
about masculinity. The concept of diverse masculinities rather than 
‘the masculinity’ which has been presented in contrast with ‘femi-
ninity’ was especially inspirational in my pursuit of fatherhood re-
search.  
I find many similarities between Agnes’ and my own experiences as 
undergraduates and then as Master's students. In particular, I also 
started out first and foremost as an empirical researcher. I read feminist 
writings, but not with the intent to use theories from those readings, 
but more or less as inspirational readings and guides. I was conducting 
empirical research as a family sociologist with a focus on gender in-
equality in families. I eventually came to realise the importance of 
theoretical thinking with respect to feminism and gender issues, but I 
definitely started out as an empirical researcher. In that sense, our 
backgrounds are quite similar. I remember reading interdisciplinary 
works – feminist perspectives on women – and I read those books 
without thinking too much. But I eventually came to think that I could 
apply theoretical dimensions to my empirical research. I was initially 
reading them for inspiration.  
AGNES BOLSØ: 
Empirically-grounded research, with few exceptions, was the 
founding principle for the Center for Women's Research in 
Trondheim, which was created to connect all these influences from 
different disciplines that had been raging throughout the 1970s and 
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the 1980s in history, psychology, mathematics, biology – every-
where. The idea was that all these researchers from different em-
pirical fields and disciplines would have a place to connect. Initially, 
we didn’t teach our own courses; we coordinated the attempt to 
make women and the distinctions between women and men in the 
disciplines visible, as a consciousness-raising in a way. In the 1990s 
when Women's Studies became Gender Studies and ‘feminist theory’ 
was really established as a concept and a tradition, theory became 
central in the introductory classes to what now had become a field in 
its own right.  
What was the answer to your burning question about why 
your family was different?  
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
[laughs] There are many, many answers. Actually, my main dis-
covery was that there was more than one answer for my question. 
But one of the eye-opening answers that I learned in Sociology 
courses in the US was that my dad probably lacked the resources to 
compete with my mom in terms of his social status, income and 
education level. He had an education to be sure, but my mother 
was so much more career-driven that she was too busy to pay at-
tention to the children. My father on the other hand didn't really 
care about his career. He seemed to care more about keeping a 
diary of my milestones as a baby, what foods I ate and the things I 
enjoyed. I think my father cared more about his kids and less about 
his career.   
AGNES BOLSØ: 
Did you ever find out how it was possible for your father to be a norm 
breaker during the post-war period in Japan? I think it's an interesting 
topic for further research.   
MASAKO ISHII-KUNTZ: 
Perhaps he also didn’t pay much attention about what a ‘masculine’ 
man should be or should not be doing. I remember asking him why 
he spends so much time with us and his answer was always ‘because 
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I love you kids more than anything.’ The fact that he was breaking 
the masculine norm of being a breadwinner at the time can be ex-
plained by his own childhood in which he often resented the fact 
that his own father was a very strong patriarchal presence in the 
family and thus was never involved in the care of his children (and 
there were seven of them!). This is also consistent with the com-
plementarity socialisation hypothesis which suggests that if you 
grew up with a distant father, then you are more likely to be op-
posite by actively engaging in childcare. Now as I look back, his 
experiences can also be well explained by the caring masculinity 
concept.  
Returning to my time at the university, and to the oppositions of my 
mentors during graduate school, I decided to pursue my research on the 
division of household labour in spite of the advice I received. I studied 
motherhood and fatherhood, family life, housework and childcare while at 
the same time reading feminists’ theories. As a result, I not only have found 
answers for my own questions, but also became convinced that the research 
on domestic labour is more than just a women's issue. Consequently, I have 
been taking both gender and feminism seriously in order to further my 
research in this area. 
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Conclusion: Comparative 
perspectives on gender equality in 
Japan and Norway: Reflections and 
lesson learnt 
Priscilla Ringrose, Masako Ishii-Kuntz,  
and Guro Korsnes Kristensen   
Exploring gender equality 
The aim of this anthology was to understand how gender is intertwined in 
dimensions of family and home, education, media, technology, sexuality 
and reproduction in Japan and Norway by comparing these issues within 
and across the two national contexts. In doing so, we have approached the 
notion of gender equality from an open perspective, exploring the different 
forms and contents it embodies, over time and with reference to the wider 
global context. This chapter will reflect on the convergences and di-
vergences we have found in all the dimensions explored, focusing especially 
on social and cultural conceptions of gender equality in Japan and Norway, 
as they were brought to light in this anthology. We will also discuss the 
empirical, methodological and theoretical lessons learned from the different 
explorations. We conclude with wider reflections relating to welfare and 
policy in both countries. 
Reflections: Chapters in review 
While the statistical comparisons outlined in the introduction suggest a 
stark difference in the status of gender equality in both countries, we sug-
gest that our volume – which adopts qualitative approaches, supplemented 
by some quantitative studies – provides a much more complex and nuanced 
picture. The explorations of gender equality undertaken in this book break 
down any potentially reductive polarisations of the status of gender equality 
between Japan and Norway. We can illustrate this complexity with re-
ference to several chapters which reveal a complex interplay of con-
vergences and divergences across the two cultures. The chapter on trans and 
gender-diverse experiences in Japan and Norway, for example, showed that 
despite ostensible difference in trans rights, the maintenance of cisnorma-
tive institutional and cultural values is rife in both contexts. Informants 
reported a pervasive sense of non-belonging – nationally, socially and, for 
most, physically. 
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In other chapters, we find convergences along several dimensions, 
alongside differences, which are often differences of degree. This was the 
case in chapters dealing with the dimension of work-life balance, as ex-
plored in the chapter on academia, which looked at the career trajectories 
of women and men professors in Japan and Norway. Here we find that in 
both contexts, male and female academics had to endure precarious job 
situations and found their domestic work and care situation challenging. 
However, domestic and care chores were much more challenging for 
women in both contexts, especially for Japanese women. Significantly, 
Japanese women also reported gender discrimination in academia, which 
was not the case reported by their Norwegian counterparts. 
Other chapters also illustrate the complex interplay of convergences and 
divergences, such as in the area of reproductive tights. The chapter on 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) revealed strikingly similar 
patterns of legislation in both national contexts but a complex of similar 
and different motivations underlying them. This chapter explored the his-
torical development of ARTs in Japan and Norway. In both Japan and 
Norway, a similar clear divide existed between the legality of sperm do-
nation and the prohibition on egg donation. However, a radical change 
took place when both countries legalised egg donation within a similar 
timeframe – 2020 (Japan) and 2021 (Norway). The arguments in favour of 
such a change in both countries were simultaneously similar and different. 
In Japan, these included arguments relating to the low birth rate but which 
never deferred to the issue of gender equality or human rights. In Norway, 
the argument that more children were needed was also found in 
Parliamentary debates, but much more emphasis was placed on women's 
individual rights for access to treatments that are available worldwide. 
All the chapters referred to in the anthology were the product of a 
complex process of cooperation between researchers in Japan and Norway, 
as described in our introduction. As noted there, cross-national research 
presents both pitfalls and many potential benefits. In terms of pitfalls, as  
Mangen (1999) asserted, researchers may face linguistic and cultural 
challenges in engaging with data from the other national context. This was 
the case in the chapter about masculinity in the Samurai film and Viking 
series. Both authors were from the Norwegian university, and despite being 
familiar with masculinity studies in Japan, they still had to rely heavily on 
Japanese colleagues for understanding the cultural nuances of the Japanese 
film script and for their invaluable knowledge of the wider generic phe-
nomena of Samurai films in Japanese culture. 
Challenges were also experienced when researchers from one context 
used methodological or theoretical approaches which their research part-
ners were not so familiar with, or which were not so commonly used within 
their nationally inflected disciplinary field. However, our approach was 
generally to embrace these divergences and to accept that cross-cultural 
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research must be able to leave room for differences, as well as to ac-
knowledge the added value these differences confer. This is the case in the 
fatherhood chapter, which triangulated qualitative and quantitative 
methods – an approach which is less common in Norwegian gender studies, 
but which brought added depth and breadth to the discussion of father-
hood. This chapter achieved this added value by constructing and applying 
a multi-sample structural equation analysis developed by the Japanese re-
searcher to both Japanese and Norwegian contexts. The chapter looked at 
how intersectional dimensions such as employment status, education and 
age predict men's gender ideology and influence men's childcare involve-
ment. The results meant that new knowledge about Norwegian fathers was 
generated thanks to the statistical model proposed by the Japanese re-
searcher. The chapter concluded that Japanese men who have younger 
children and whose spouse's income is higher are more likely to be involved 
in childcare, whereas, for Norwegian fathers, their childcare involvement 
was not influenced by these sociodemographic factors. 
In line with this, and as Salway et al. (2011) noted, there are many ways 
in which cross-national comparative research provides added value. They 
also point out that such research can strengthen both the rigor and utility of 
research since such work tends to prompt researchers to engage in both 
ideological and methodological reflexivity. Such ideological reflexivity will 
be discussed at the end of this conclusion when we take a step back and 
look at the ideological differences underlying Japanese and Norwegian state 
policies as related to gender equality. However, more relevant to our in-
dividual chapters is the contention that cross-cultural research raises 
awareness of the need to take on board both the sociopolitical con-
tingencies of the local histories as well as wider social and political contexts 
and understandings (Salway et al., 2011). This is the case in the chapter on 
the Japanese and Norwegian home, which focused on cultural under-
standings of the home. On the one hand, this chapter looked at the parti-
cularities of both national contexts from the 19th century onwards, 
engaging with such national phenomena as the housewife schools which 
were set up in Norway from the 19th century, and the contents of the Meiji 
Civil Code (1889) which reinforced paternal authority within the family. 
On the other hand, the comparative dimension also compelled the authors 
to consider the broader cultural understanding of the home in much wider 
Western and Eastern historical perspectives, relating to global phenomena 
such as modernity, industrialism and capitalism. 
State ideologies 
Finally, we return to broad ideological strokes referred to above, looking at 
state ideology in both contexts in the light of some of our overall findings. 
While this volume interpellates a range of convergences in forms and/or 
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contents of gender equality across both contexts, it also points to some 
fundamental differences between the two contexts that derive from its 
governmental systems. While the Norwegian and the Japanese governments 
both have stated aims to improve gender equality, the fact that Norway has 
an advanced welfare state (which has been associated with the concept of 
state feminism) means that the value of gender equality has for decades 
been systematically applied to a range of policy areas, especially family 
policy. Within the framework of the welfare state in Norway, family policy 
is the most important way to become gender equal. In Japan, we also find a 
focus on gender equality in government policy but the level of importance 
placed on it is not high relative to Norway. In recent years, the Japanese 
government has been implementing many policies with the aim of achieving 
better gender equality in a range of areas, such as welfare provision for 
elder care and single parents. However, in the following we look at why the 
Japanese policies relating to dimensions of equality may not have been 
improving the lives of its citizens to the same extent as gender equality and 
other equality policies have done in Norway. 
There are several reasons we can identify that could explain why gender 
equality policies have not had an optimal impact on the daily life of 
Japanese citizens. One reason for this is that while Japan can to a certain 
extent be considered to be a welfare state, its welfare system is not as ex-
tensive or far-reaching as its Norwegian equivalent. Secondly, gender 
equality policies in Japan have not been as radical as those in Norway. 
While for example the Japanese government has encouraged more women 
to join the labour market by creating policies to promote women's active 
participation in society, in Norway more radical approaches have been 
favoured, such as a quota system to encourage more women to be part of 
corporate boards. A third reason that might explain why gender equality 
policies in Japan may not be so effective in practice is that Japanese citizens 
may not feel entitled to welfare policies as much as Norwegian citizens do. 
This lack of a sense of entitlement relative to Norway may partly be ex-
plained in relation to the Norwegian tax system. Norwegians pay high 
taxes, which in turn makes them feel that they are owed welfare benefits, 
which is not the case in Japan. An additional factor, as discussed in the 
home chapter, is that Japanese and Norwegian citizens have very different 
relationship to the private spheres. Japanese citizens are very protective of 
their private spheres and reluctant to reveal any private issues which might 
suggest that they need welfare. This is especially the case when it comes to 
sensitive issues such as domestic violence, but also when it comes to other 
areas such as poverty, meaning that some individuals may find it difficult to 
admit their need for welfare benefits. The degree of entitlement is different: 
In Norway welfare is associated with rights, while in Japan welfare is in-
flected with failure and shame. 
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The idea of  gender equality 
Perhaps the most glaring difference that emerged from this volume is the 
different relationship Norwegians and Japanese people have to the very idea 
of gender equality. In Norway, gender equality does not need to be de-
fended or reflected on. It is part of the fabric of social and political society. 
In Japan, gender equality is more of an issue, rather than something that is 
taken for granted. This is illustrated, albeit on a light-hearted level, in 
Chapter 8. In this chapter, gender equality is presented as an ideal in the 
Samurai film, whereas in the Viking series it is presented as an idea that is so 
pervasive and ‘extreme’ that it has become laughable. 
Finally, turning back to the global statistics that opened our volume, we 
note that the Japanese government's relation to both understandings and 
policies of gender equality is highly influenced by Japan's relatively low 
rankings in global surveys relating to gender equality. These rankings have 
made a difference in how politicians perceive gender equality and in the 
belief that they, put simply, ‘need to do something about it.’ The impetus 
for change in gender equality is thus impacted by Japan's perception that it 
needs to improve its global image. Surveys such as the World Economic 
Forum's Gender Gap Report (2021), in which Japan was ranked 120th 
(while Norway was ranked second), means that the government is sensitive 
about global data. The Japanese government has made moves to revise 
policies accordingly, but in doing so they are responding to outside pres-
sures rather than being concerned about making gender equality happen for 
its own sake. In Japan, therefore, the government to some extent pays lip 
service to gender equality. And while the Norwegian government may also 
respond to external pressures, it actively keeps up its global image as a 
model of gender equality, even going so far as to invest funds into exporting 
gender equality to other parts of the world. So, in both Japan and Norway, 
gender equality is a matter not only of policy and practice, but also of 
perception, image and, by default, a question of self-interest. 
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